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Economic Analysis and the Labor Problem 
The broad field of labor economics has been experiencing the pattern of 
expansion undergone by most other specialisns in the past. Numerous studies 
have been made dealing vri.th labor legislation, trade-union behavior, unem­
ployment insurance, ivage theory, and labor problems during prosperity and 
depression. Although labor economists divide the field into rather arbitraiy 
categories fet? include perhaps the most significant area: labor policy. This 
may at first seem odd, since the term labor policy appears frequently in the 
literature. This study, however, atteajits to show that the term, as it is 
currently being used in the field, is misleading. A distinction should be 
made betrreen "industrial relations policy" and "labor policy". IndTistrial 
relations policy deals -ndth the rights and duties of the parties in their 
contractual relations with each other and the extent to •?riiich government 
ought to intervene in the settlement of lavsful industrial disputes. Labor 
policy concerns itself iiYith the regulation and control of labor markets for 
the purpose of modifying the play of economic forces affecting the allocation 
of resources and the level of employment in the economy. It is the latter 
rather than tlie former area "Bhich this study intends to investigate. 
contrast, such fields as agricultural economics and public finance 
both provide positions of ±E5)ortance to agricultural policy and monetary-
fiscal policy, re^ectively. This is not intended as a criticism of indi­
viduals fjorking in the field of labor. It reflects a somenhat unsatisfactory 
state of econotaic theory itself. Policy questions frequently arise which 
uitfortunately involve tools of anail^sis yet to be developed* Furthermore 
the borderlands of labor economics — the sociology, psychology and politics 
of labor problems are not easily excluded. In fact thegr perhaps will 
ultiioately provide the economist with the required analytical tools. 
These difficulties hoirever are not Insuperable. It is still possible 
/ 
to block out the major criteria to be used in analysing policy questions. 
And a neir orientation lying iirlthin the framenrork of economic analysis rather 
than legislative or historical description needs to be developed. Ey no 
stretch of the imagination is the discussion of labor legislation in the 
purely legal sense adequate for dealing with governments' activities affecting 
labor-ntanagement relations. Government lny its very nature most follow the 
path of legality in effecting its policies. An evsQaiation of the policies 
themselves, however, requires criteria of an extra-lagal nature — in the 
present case, the economic consequences of specific governmental decisions. 
Moreover, Tdth the proper economic orientation, appropriate legislative en­
actments designed to meet specific labor problems may in fact lie outside of 
the labor framofwork., per se. 
A coiaplete history of labor legislation transcends the framework of this 
study. Althou^ many cases and legislative enaclments are included in the 
discussion they serve only to illustrate the long-time transformation of the 
public's interest in labor questions. The en^ihasis placed on -tiie early period 
of our histozy reflects the author's feeling that the requirements of a labor 
policy, directed toward fxmdamental economic problems, are most clearly ex­
pressed in a relatively sinqple, primitive econongr. ^e issues of the time 
are not clouded by a major concern over "industrial relations". !Fhe effects 
of imga - r^rico iicciaiona on ro.Jturcc allocation aa "..til SJS the Juipact of 
econoailc progress on labor marketo are clcurly poreolvod. 
As the atudy profprcssos ohrcnoloi;lcallyy eooiiotalc pro^Toss and Its 
attendant privation act aa a atlaulua to tho growth of T/orJooan's organi­
zations* Initially, this m&nifojta itsolf in the form of socio-jiolitical 
dmnands by the JO organizations* Later, with the advent of the factory 
systoD, Qoro iijoodlato cloluo oro oado for Incroaocd incone, shorter hours 
and better working conditions* The growth of trade unions, a necessary COQ~ 
dltlon for aclilcving these claims, is at once hindered by prevailing concepts 
of property rights and legal insbituticms* Labw's struggle to overcome 
these barriers end the events leading V53 to the present period wherein the 
public concerns itsolf increasingly with "industrial relations" problems 
are briefly considered and doouoented* The passage of the V.'agner Act serves 
to iUastrate this concezTi* The Act is of interest to us, however, only 
because it represents the fulfiUment of labor's long search for equality of 
status* Since it does not represent a coiq>lete labor policy, it receives 
rather limited treatrient* The Taft-Hartley law is also treated in a per­
functory manner for the same rea .on. It ::;crcly represents £ continuation 
of the power struggle between labor and management. Tliis stateii.ent is not 
intended to deprecate the importance of this struggle. It serves sii^ly to 
reinforce our initial distinction between "Industrial relations policy" and 
"labor policy" * The former involves power-relations between business organ­
izations and trade unions, together with collateral administrative, legal 
and procedural issues. The latter involves properly economic questions in 
regard to the deteriixination of waces and prices. Concretoly, of course. 
"industrial relations" refer to economic goals or objects, and therefore 
in the concrete sense "industrial relations" overlap into "labor policy". 
While this is fully recogniiaed the distinction between the tii»o is maintained 
in principle, and vie may reiterate that our primary interest is in the latter* 
This study vievra both the Vfagner Act and the Taft-Hartley lavf primarily in 
terms of the impetus given trade union organization. Secondarily, and more 
i^^3ortant for this study, are the effects of such organization on the determi­
nation of Yiages, prices and the level of employment. 
Because society recognizes the need for broader policies dealing -vath 
periodic flucttiations in income and eu^loyment the remainder of tliis v/ork 
devotes its attention to the problem of integrating "labor policy" with the 
twin goals of full eii?)loyment and continued econcanic grcrnth. 
In the present study an attempt isill be made (1) to pull together the 
manor investigations -wioich have contributed to the area of "labor policy" as 
a bona fide subdivisicsx of labor economicsj (2) to explore the existing 
gaps in economic theory as they apply to questions of labor policy; and (3) to 
anticipate the major pathways to be followed in the future. 
Government Policy and the Labor Problem 
During the two hundred and seventy odd years of our national existence 
labor tias been subjected to a multitude of orders, controls, and directives. 
For the most part these represent policies used government to solve basic 
problems affectiiig either labor directly or the economy at large. 
One notices, in tracing these policies, a continuous thread leading to 
our present extension of governmental influence in the area of economic 
control. On a fev? occasions a positive policy was noticeably lacking, 
eniphasizing a laissez-faire philosophy dominating goveminental decisions. 
For the most part, how-ever, the problems confi'onting labor, as our economic 
system grew more complex, were not capable of solving themselves. They 
demanded continiiing intervention on the part of government. 
It is the purpose of this section to describe the various policies and 
programs instituted by government to solve labor's problems, first, in a 
predominantly agrarian econony* second, in an ejqjanding industrial econonor, 
and third. In a relatively coinplex econcacr. 
Although policy considerationa are usually couched in legislative enact­
ments, early labor policy -was determined through judicial interpretation. 
Public and court opinion evolved through a series of stages finding its 
beginning in the early colonial or agricultural period. In this period 
the man Tdthout property was looked upon as partly shiftless, 
partly vagabond, partly criminal, and the opinion of the 
time supported many kinds of coercive laws by wliich both 
adults and children might be captured or enslaved or other-
Tdse cong^elled to work. In this tray it tras considered that 
propertyless laborers trould be trained in the habits of 
industry and thrift by -vjhich they could rise to the position 
of proprietor and could share in the rights and civilization 
of their superiors.^ 
This early period is of particular interest because of the extensive 
e:q)erimentation in the use of social and economic controls. The mercantilist 
philosophy •sas an iji5>ortant ini'luence in shaping colonial labor policy. More­
over, -Uae colonial period marks a real begismlng in the efforts on the part 
^Commons, J.R. and Andrews, J.B., Principles of Labor Legislation, 
Haiper and Brothers, New York, 1920, p. 25. 
o£ govemxnent to regulate man's economic aotlTitiea, temporarily abandoned 
during the industrial revolution, and further augmented as our economy grew 
more con^jlex and mature# 
Because of the erbensive use of controls in colonial i\iasrica, thia 
period is of further jjaportance in that it provides the frameiflrork of English 
law which guided the decisions of the courts from the Vfar of Independence to 
the post Civil V/ar period# 
Early labor policy 
Describing the English influence, Morris points out that 
the controls for the regulation of ccmerce, industry and 
labor which viere introduced in the Englidi colonies in the 
New World irere to a large degree rooted in English and 
Continental e^rience. However, in studying these controls 
it must be borne in mind that the labor problem was only one 
phase of the general problem of economic regulation under 
mercantilism. A study of'the labor codes apart from these 
general controls trould serve to give labor matters a false 
emphasis for that tine and place 
However, in order to appreciate the attitude of colonial administration 
in regard to both commerce and labor it is necessary first to look behind the 
English mercantilistic system. It is the tran^lanting of this system within 
the institutions of the New "i»orld that furnished the background for the 
policies which were later adopted. 
The Acts of Trade and the Tudor Industrial Codes were the fundamental 
devices employed by England to enhance her world position. 
%orris, R.B., Government and Labor in Sarly America, Columbia University 
Press, Sew York, 19lt6, p."!'.* 
Tl»e fomor prcviUod i'cr the cxt,craal re^^ulatlon a-.u uoalrol 
of rortil^,-]! trade and the suViOixlination of nolonifJ. inters-sts 
to those of U:o nothcr country*, -he latter sought to assure 
profit to the loiylish entreprcneUk- O.T f.Tiarantoeiiig hin aii 
adequate sui-pli' of labor at a autjiatoncc . a^c luu- ao -he 
aaae tiae to safo^iuard the worker a,:aiii3t un'.mz'rantud ax-
iiloitiition h\ oider that a^riciultural and iuiluatrir.1 lii^or 
necto aii'ht contlnuo to bo nat over the lone tcnn.^ 
Colonifi.1 Icijialativc enactments wtere baaed en the Tudor Industrial 
Codes • The extent of Lh^-ir adoption can be aeen fron t;io - oHoirLin 
generally acceiitod notiona prev;-lent in colonirJL /jnerica:^ 
1* Conijulsor;,' la or .or ell able bo led inaivicuals faliint' 
certain specific catct^orios. 
2« Those indi-'iduols not engaged in anj' occupation tvc;c coc^^elled 
to m5rk or \':&re subject to crijzdnal prosecution. 
T:iis attitude is even nore forcefully described by lorfafiuci. 
To the erilichtened liiclishraan the nass of prope; tylcss laborers 
Tvas not an crcjjiic pai-t oi the coru-cmfcalthj thou;jh its liibor, 
they declared, vjaa the source of ::he r^at^rial gi in of the 
classes that did constitute the coar.crmcalth. Jo il" laborers 
are worked to the utaost i>jid . iven the barest subsistence, the 
•wealth and poror of the nation rrould be increased, -ere their 
uraceB increased above subsister.ce, they roulu merely vork less 
or spend their additional income in cji'inli, to the ^ui'ther loss 
of the national productive power. Conversely-, it \vas argued 
by scne, hi£h prices for fcodstuffc aro i,-ood, 3i;:cc tliey force 
the laborers to work hai'der. If more food be produced than 
expected and prices threaten to fall, wote Sir uilliain jPetty, 
the surplus should be put in granaries instead of allowing it 
to be 'abused by the vile and brutish part of joankind to the 
prejudice of the comnonwealth'. An increase of population is 
desirable J by lowering wajres it spells conpetitive ac vantage in 
foreign trade. But if la -orers could not bo ecployed then their 
^Ibid.. p.2. 
^Ibid., pp. 3-ii 
death 'TOS nothing but an e.v.se' to the comaionwealth 
The colonies, however, •.ve.-.-e faced -'/dth a dilencoa: they -.vere constant­
ly short of manpov/er, and v/ages were rather hieh, yet high ria£,es served to 
encourage idleness. As a consequence, several policies rere instituted to 
cope v/ith the problem. To counteract idleness, early statutes punished the 
person without a calling by Tifhiprjing or fine. Later, however, forced labor 
and the comnatment of such individuals to the public workliouse vrere also 
utilised. The Tudor Acts, as they T.ere applied to the colonies, reco^-iiaed 
the loss of manpower invol-ced in unnecessai^y labor turnover, c-aid the 
colonial administrators also recognized the necessity lor au|.,5ienting the 
labor supply wherever possible. To this end attem|>ts rere lEade to protect 
the Trorkers' status and to siinijiiiEe involuntary uneiaoloynent. Hence, curbs 
TOre placed on "irresponsible disitiissals as leading to unenplo^-ment and 
luposing great burdens on the poor relief agencies. 
In addition, 
colonial tOTOS and villages or other licensing bodies 
customarily set the -wages or fees of certain quasi-public 
functionaries, such as porters, caraen, dra^/men, millers, 
smi-ths, chimney-STseeps, graveditigers, pilots and others .3 
By placing ceilings on -wages, however, the supply of labor could not 
be maintained or increased without coercive methods. Consequently, 
^Borfman, Joseph, The Economic I^nd in Ameiacan Civilizationj 
Viking Press, Mew York, vol. 1, 19i).^ p. 9» 
p 
Korris, R.B., 0£. cit.j p. 17. 
^Ibid., p. 20. 
the bomd-labor system •was devised to attract irorlcEien from 
Europe and to assure a cheap labor supply in the colonies ••• 
Various other methods trere employed to counteract the scarcity 
of skilled trorkaen. In the first place, artificers in the early 
days of settlement ivere required to stick to their lasts. In 
several colonies acts were in effect wiiich unquestionably out-
lavred strikes and eflectivelj'' forestalled labor coabinaticns 
Secondly, realizing that coercive measures themselves vrere not sufficient, 
iiiduceaients oi' another variety -vfere utilized in an ofi'oi't to encourage skilled 
ivorknsen to settle in this countiy or to enter particular trades. liany 
colonies as "well as local comiaunities offei'ed Tforkmen ••• 
exeiaption froa taxation for a specified period of jesjcsf 
exemption from labor on roads and highTfays and from 
militaiy trainitig, land grants or peases, and other 
attractive subsidies and bounties.^ 
In spite of all these measrires, it TOS not a simple matter to keep tiie 
ranks of labor at a level sufficient to meet the demands of t'ne colonial 
labor market. 
In the main, the ultimate economic objective of colonial -work­
man •was security through agricultxa-e rather than indus'biy 
As soon as a wrkaan had accumulated a small amount of money 
he could, and in many cases did, take up a tract of land and 
settle on it as a farmer. This •was the paradox of the high 
wage scale, for, as the author of American Husbandry pointed 
out, 'nothing but a high price -will induce men to labour at 
all, and at the same time it presently puts a conclusion to 
it by so soon enabling them to take up a piece of -tTaste land.'3 
The effects of all this on labor relations in the colonies offers a 
marked contrast to the situation in contei^^iorary England. In the colonies 
^Ibid.j p. 30* 
^Ibid., p. 33* 
^Ibid.a p* U8. 
10. 
-rvorlaaen, particulai'lj'" skilled crei'tsmen, v/c.-e held in hi.;h 03tocm. ;;i(-h 
T,mge3, relative independence, and the recc^paition or Icibor's inr or'if.;^co hx 
the progress of the colonies tended to soften class distinctiono. 
Although labor policy involving; alcilled labor conbined eocrclor. trith 
special favors aiid privileges, the same standards rers not r liod to 
apprentices and v<men and children. Even here conditions -.'rere net as 
intolerable as they turned out to be vdth the advent of tlie factor^' a^'sten# 
The eiiiplojTa.erit of T®men aiid cliildren vsas inplicil iii the 
colonial labor program ... Church and state both en­
couraged fioaily industry as a patriotic obligation ... 
During the Revolution vromen undertook many of the tasks 
of men# "ilany bomid servants, other than apprentices, 
\Tero minors, and an impressive proportion of all enii:ra;it3 
to the colonies vrerc cliildren and yovtng people. The 
courts sought to safeguard their condition o^ eriplo;.Tient^ 
but, save for restrictions on the term of apprenticeships, 
there was no legislation coaparable -ynLth the uodem child 
labor laiTs, rrhich, in the case of Federal enactnents, ha";'c 
had to pursue a thorny constitutional path. As most in­
dustrial production in the colonial and ."levclutionari' 
periods ims still in the hoae, shop, or putting-out stace, 
children in the main enjoyed workin^^ conditions "fhlch 
•were indisputably superior to those prevailing in the 
early factories, Tdiere apprenticeship degenerated into a 
method of esqoloiting cheap labor 
Althotigh sweep ng safej^-uai-ds for the protection of -s-romen iuid children 
'.Tere non-existent in the colonies, the courts did denand that er... loyers 
fulfill certain obligations tov/ard their employees. This applied not only 
to wonien and children but to other vrorkers as -well. 
The master Tiras liable for acts committed by his ser/eint 
in the execution of the master's authority or ior his 
benefit and "without specific command. The colonial courts 
do not seem to have offered the employer the three loop­
holes found in modern tort law. These are; (l) the 
n. 
•fellow servant rule', iBhereb/ an oni)loyer escaped i^esponsibility 
for all accidonta in v,iiich an Injury coulti i:o attributed to the 
aocliconco of another eaployee, (2) t'lc doctrine of assuiiiption 
of rialc, where'.y an injured en^loyee who had known of Uic eu-
plo/er's noelicence y/ith respect to the haaard cauainc tho injuiy, 
but r.iio navertholeaa voluntarily entered into or contiimed on 
hia job, did so at his crm risk, miC (2) the doctrine of contributory 
nocligoaee. It is doubti'ul w^ietlier servants in colonial times coulsi 
have recovered d£aaaf;oB froa their Eiactc-ru for injuries occurrioc in 
the course of their eaplo.rj-^nt vrhere their f&ult or negligej^ce could 
have be^n j roven. CTI th«- other hand, oastera -were e:qjected to piro-
vide acdical aa-Jistance for bound servants v/ho fell ill in the 
course of their eaploynent. This -Has the closest approach in the 
colonial puriod to concept now eaibodiod iii oiir .orlcaen's 
CoE^ensation Acta.l 
Sunmarizing the experiences of labor control by colonial ^ ovemcicnts, 
there was a definite recognition that business of a monopolistic character 
should be subject to regulation in the interest of the connunity at large. 
Given the scarcity of labor, controls •Rore extended to include both skilled 
and unskilled working people. The nature of such rti^ulation involved the 
establishaent of aaxtcua wage rates and ainicrua hours as well as the prices 
of necessary articles of con3U3J?)tion. 
Although the strike weapon was not widely used, priijoarily because of 
the difriculties izivolvec in tlx- foniiaticn of labor ccrib.inations, there T?ere 
other neans available to workers to voice their protests. There were two 
aajor weapons available to labor« "incorrigible conduct or legal redress 
by petition to the courts."2 In the absence of adequate protective 
legislation or administrative niachinery, these techniques were the 
only possible ways for disgruntled laborers to better their conditions of 
^Ibid., p. 520. 
^Ibid., p. 522. 
12. 
employment or to guarantee themselves a Living wage. 
Both employee and employer, hoviever, -were considered to have mutual 
obligations. 
Throughout the length and breadth of the original states, 
ivorkers irore enjoined to obedience to their masters or over­
seers and strict observance of their contracts. The master 
had the right to chastise the disobedient servant as well 
as the slow or incompetent one, provided that the punishment 
urns not excessive or unreasonable. Considering the fact that 
all servants and most wwlanen were excluded from Juries by 
property qualifications and that the bench -was exclusively 
recruited from the employer class, an extensive study of the 
complaints brought against masters for abusing this power 
indicates that the courts, especially in the Northern and 
Middle colonies, made serious efforts to curb employers -nho 
Tuere cruel and abusive or callous to their -workers' vjelfare.^ 
However, as long as the trorkers' welfare vrais dependent upon the 
humaiiitarian motives of a propertied governing class, his position was 
indeed precarious. In some of the Southern colonies, for example, masters 
Tirere usually able to secure specific performance of the labor contract 
fraa. the courts. This TJas true not only of the indentured servant but of 
the -worker under contract as -well. At the other extreme, although labor 
combinations having as their objective "better -vrorking conditions, higher 
•wages, fees or prices for the manufactured p3roduct"2 -were frovoied upon, 
the maintenance of a monopoly of their trade or craft inas even encoiuraged 
by the toisn authorities. 
But these policies -mere not long lived. By the mid-eighteenth century 
a relaxation of controls •srais already evident. At the time of the 
^Ibid., p. 523. 
^Ibid.a p. $2h* 
f 
23* 
Hevolutioiiary »Var, due to the maimer in isdiich the -war "was financed, namely, 
the overissuance of paper currency, the threat of inflation required drastic 
controls* Xo this end various state govemiaents attempted to regulate both 
prices and wages. But in the absence of any real attenpt to stem the 
currency crisis, the wage and price control programs VBre doomed to failure. 
The reaction to the system of controls during the Plevolutionary period and 
prior to it vras the rise of a laissez-faire philosopl^jr* 
During the Hevolutionary era a perceptible momentum toward 
labor combinations and concerted action by wrking-class 
groups yjha effectively diverted from economic into political 
channels. Masters and journeymen joined in protest against 
British ii:5)erial policy and si;^ported the non-importation 
agreements, vMch proved a great boon to local industry 
and eu??loynent» V»hen the vjar came they left the plow and 
the vfork-bench, at least for a time, and joined the armed 
forces. The really notable uprising against terms and 
conditions of service in the revolutionary period TOS the 
mutiny in the Pennsylvania Line. As a result, the foimdations 
of permanent trade unioniaa irere not really laid until the 
post-Eevolutionary period.^ 
To trace this development it is necessary to distinguish between two 
distinct influences. As a result of the success of the independence move­
ment certain political forces Tsere destined to shape future labor poliQr. 
On the other hand, the rapid economic development of the country determined 
the future role of labor in the economy. 
Turning first to the political forces, 
the strong dislike of the English crom and of the royal 
governors ... led to a reaction against executive authority 
in general that resulted In the practical si^remaoy of 
^Ibid.. p. ^ 25, 
Ih. 
a:iother oi" the three cjorc iiuite '.^raiiC: ca oi" ijoverix-ent, 
nane]^ the leeialatxiro 
Viith the eatablishnent ol' the Constitution and a new [:ovei'n::.cat in 
power, p8j:*ticularly dominated b/ I'edoraliat doctrines, the political 
frajne-nork Ln vJiich policiea 'rserc Ic l.u (ieoenained becarae quite a.^parent. 
This can be seen i'ron the r;enerall/ accepted doff.aa of Federalism. The 
loTver House ".ms to rejjresent the v<?.riou3 claosea interests in 
society. I:ut nince ^11 groups rri.Lh.Ln the ecouo:.!,) could not possibly bo 
represented, certain broac inter^ats wore to be included. These vera 
recognized as consisting of thjree classes: the landed inttrests, the 
learned professions, anJ the merchants. The latter class naturally v>s3 
to "represent the artisans and manufacturora, as bheir intereaus were 
considered to be to a great extent identical."2 Because of the assvaaed 
harmony of interests between the .'uerchant, Kanufacturin^, and laboring 
groups and also the great fear of centr-ilized authority, the constitutional 
basis of labor legislation becaiae obvious. Although the federal constitu­
tion said nothing about labor,3 the first ten aiiendnsnts luade it un-
raistalcably clear that labor problems wore to be dealt with by the states. 
It was only later that considerable control Tras exei'tod through the 
indirect application of the commerce, Yfar, taxing and maritii'iie powers 
of the federal govemnent. 
^erriam, C.E,, A History of i'jaerican Political Theories, i^cmillan 
Co., New York, 1931* p« 31. 
^Ibid., p. 112. 
30gg, F.A, and Ray, O.P., Introduction to American Government, 
D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 19h2f p. 606. 
But apart 
from the obstacles imposed by the division of ponrers 
between the states aiid the federal government, the chief 
hindrance Lrpofled by the Constitution on labor legislation 
is found in the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
i-'ourteenth iimendmenta, v.tiich are frequently' invoked to 
nullify legislation iriterferiJig with the liberty or 
property of employers or employees.^ 
Secondly, i;he grovsing complexity of the production process brought 
Tdth it changes iii the relationship betv/cen eiaployer and employee. On 
both sides the cosibination movement -was already apparent at the tine of 
the Constitutional Convention. There TOS 
a clear-cut trend auong master mechanics, journejTnen, 
laborers, merchants and industrialists toward the for­
mation of their oym associations along economic lines ... 
Actually, employers' trade groups such as the Spermaceti 
Trust, local chaEbers of comierce, and the societies of 
master craftssen preceded the craft union .2 
Fortunately, however, the tremendous power of the young economy to ezjjand 
minimized, to a large extent, the frictions between the tvo growing factions. 
Relatively full enploy^Jient and extreme mobility of the factors of production 
were largely responsible for the lack of labcrHnanageaient conflict. Even 
the introduction, to a verj- limited extent, of power-driven 
machinery and labor-saving devices in the Eevolutionary era 
did not seem to create ... a serious problem of labor 
displacement ... The continiially expanding economy of the 
colonial and early national periods virtually nullified any 
displacement of workmen resulting from new technologj^ or from 
increased operational efficiency 
^Rohlfing, C.C., et al. Business and Government, Foundation Press, 
Chicago, 19lAj P* 609. 
^Korris, X»B., 0£. cit., p. 536. 
3lbid., p. $26. 
Before dealing vdth tlie laboi-- probleci as it developed in the post-
Eevolutionarj"" period it is necessary to trace the changes that rrere 
occurring in the nature of the econouy. Although the period under con­
sideration ivas essentially'- agrarian, the non-agricultural sector of the 
econoiiiy began to shovf manifestations -.?hich clearl^'- marked the futxire 
nature of the production and distribution processes. Although it vre.3 too 
early to predict the final domination of industry over aj^riculture, the 
organic con^osition of non-agricultural pxirsiiits ivas dearly undergoing a 
narked transformation. Only in the l350's, vath the advent of a tech­
nological revolution in transportation, did the outcome of the battle 
become evident. 
IIoTjever, as the productive process developed the relationship of 
employer to employee underwent a series of changes, no less revolutionary 
than the teclmological changes responsible for it. Bogart offers a 
succinct description of these interrelated developments. 
Curing the colonial period icany articles "i^ere produced 
in the home, and in therie household industries t.here was 
no possibilit*' of price or -vrage struggles, for the producers 
and consumers rrere identical. 2van the itinerant \TOrker, 
•working up the raiT material belonging to his customer in 
the home of the latter, T/as at little disadvantage, since 
labor Tfas still so scarce that lais •'.vages i-enained high. 
'<?hen population becane denser, the h-andicraftsiaan set up 
his 0T?n shop, v/hei-e he -worked up his or/n raaterial on order 
from his customers, i^ho were his neighbors* ... In this 
custoEL-order stage of industry- tlie three functions of 
merchant, raaster, and joumejnnan v.-ere united in the same 
person, and the only things which tlireatened his returns 
irere the poor quality of his am. yrork or the conipetition 
of other handicraftsmen. 
The next stage came when the master Trorkman began to 
employ joximejnnen, and also to make goods in advance of 
orders for sale in his shop to transient visitors, in 
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addition to custom-made articles. The journeyman now 
occupied a less stable position, for he no longer ovmed 
the raw materials in the shop, although he still retained 
his hand tools. CHving, however, to the restricted area 
of the market the relations between master and journeyman 
remained harmonious j they v/orked side by side and vnsre 
not sharply differentiated either by earnings or social 
position. Conflicts over -wages or hours were consequently-
infrequent. Tliis retail shop stage prevailed in the shoe 
industry in Philadelphia in 178?• 
The next step was revolutionaiy for the worker. Improve­
ments in transportation began to widen the market, and 
some of the more wealthy and enterprising merchants sought 
orders in the newly developing markets of the V/est and South. 
In these distant markets the merchants sought orders for 
goods to be made and delivered later. But here the compe­
tition from other centers of manxifacture, also seeking 
orders, forced the merchant, now become wholesaler, to offer 
his goods at as low a price as possible. The attempt of 
aaployers in this wholesale-order stage to reduce wages 
so that they could meet distant congjetition was the be­
ginning of the conflict between labor and capital. But 
this severer competition also led to efforts to lower costs 
of production by the use of machinery, which was eagerly 
sought from England, by better technical education of 
apprentices, and by tariff protection against importation 
of foreign goods. 
?/ith the widening of markets and sale to distant customers 
it next became necessaiy to extend long-time credit and 
this required capital. New banking facilities came into 
being and a new credit system w^hich favored the larger 
producer. Under these conditions there developed a new 
type of merchant-capitalist or merchant-manui'acturer, 
Tisho took over the wholesale business now made possible by 
the wider markets, with the recently added warehouse and 
commission business. The former master became a small 
contractor, employing one to a dozen journeymen, and 
sold his product to the wholesaler instead of to his 
customers. The older *bespoke' and shop work gave place 
to production on order, and the price now determined by 
coii5»etition rather than by custom. Ti'ages also became 
competitive aixi a distinct wage-earning class appeared 
•v?hich did not own its tools. The journeyman consequently 
became a wage worker and found himself exposed to new 
forces of con5>etition "srtiich threatened his wages and 
standard of living: contract prison labor, sweatshops, 
homework and the pressure of other localities all tended 
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to force donn the rate of vrages. Agaizist these conditions 
labor first began to combine and since the skilled loechanloB 
•were first to feel the pressure, it was natural that thesr 
should be the first to organize the early trade unions .1 
Although tl\o first continuous organization of labor in the United 
States "nas that ol' the shoemakorsj organized In 1792 in I-'hiladelpliia, and 
the i^rinters, tailors, caipenters, and sailers organized sporadical]^, 
the labor movement essentially -was dormant up to 1820. 
As the industrial revolution proceeded during the period 1820 to 
181;0 early signs of a labor moveisent began to appear* Comnons refers 
to this era as the "awakening period" of the American labor moveoient. 
It is here that -me find, for example, the establishment of the Mechanics* 
Union of Trade Associations organized in 1827 in Philadelphia. Also the 
first "natiomzide" union was organized in I83li under the name: National 
Trades' Union* 
There are sojae rather interesting conclusions to be draira from these 
begiimings* 
The early labor movement In the United States did not spring 
from factory conditicois, as it did in England tdiere the 
separaticra of ec^jloyer from enplc^Tee -was clearcut. In America 
the factory ^ jrstem at that tine iras aLaost entirely outside 
the labor movement, since the factories -were confined to the 
cotton indxistry and most of the early factory -norkBrs trere 
women and chil^lren or immigrants irtio TOre unorganized. It 
arose rather as a protest against the mcrchant'-capitalist 
system, tdiich iras reducing the master and the journeyman to 
a common level of ttage dependency. The movement ms given a 
political turn by the extension of manhood suffrage in the 
late twenties through the abolition of property qualifications 
for voting and holding office, Tfhich placed a new and untried 
^Bogart, E.L., Econgaic History of the American People, Longrnans, Green 
and Co., New iork, 1931» pp» 42TQi55T 
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•weapon in the hands of the unpropertied workers. As yet little 
had been done to protect the I'ights of labor by legislationj 
vd.thout political righta labor had been unable to exert anj"-
influence -upon lavtmaking.l 
Labor's attesjpt to ini'luence legislation, however, was not based 
entirely on economic need. Schleainger, in describing the attempts on 
the p.art of tlie more enlightened citizens of the period to correct the 
existizic inequalities, points to the efforts of such men as llathew Carey. 
In the -writings of Carey one finds the prevailing opinion of the laboring 
classes held by the "possessing classes"* These "erroneous opinions" 
about the poor '.vere: 
1. That every man, "woman and gro"wn child able aiid vdlling 
to TTOrk may find employnient. 
2. That the poor, by industry, prudence, and economy, may 
at all times support themselves cosafortably, vrithout 
depending on eleoiiiosjmary aid — and, as a corollary 
from these positions: 
3. Tliat their s'offerings and distress chiefly, if not -wholly, 
arise from their idleness, their dissipation, and their 
extravagances. 
k' That taxes for the support of the poor, and aid afforded 
them by charitable individuals, or benevolent societies 
are pernicious, as by encoiiraging the poor to depend on 
them, they foster their idleness and unprovidence, and 
thus produce, or at least increase, the poverty and dis­
tress they are intended to relieve.2 
In order to ieprove their position, by counteracting the attitudes and 
mores of the day, the aggressive elements in the young labor movement 
at-fcengjted to combat the assault on the dignity of labor. A program based csa 
^Ibid.j p. 
2Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., The Age of Jackson, Little, Bram and Co., 
Boston, 19h5f P* 133 • 
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a series of special demands, intended to improve labor 
morale rather than its econonic position -was instituted. 
These made regular appearances, Vvlth slight variations, 
on the mastheads of nearly all ths Worldnginen* s papers' 
Eq^ial Universal Education 
Abolition of Hkprisoment for Debt 
Abolition of all Licensed Monopolies 
An entire Revision, or Abolition of tlie Present 3.'ilitia System 
A l«s3 Eaqjensive Law System 
iJqual Taxation on Property 
An Effective Lien Law for Laborers 
All Officers to be Elected by the People 
Ho Legislation on lieligionl 
Bogart poiiits out, however, that this political movement cane to an end 
by 1832, and the emphasis -vras placed on economic and industrial goals .2 o?he 
depression of that year all but wiped out the existing labor organiaations. 
Labor in a g;rovdng industrial econoay 
The year I8I4O is usually employed as a bench-aiark to conveniently note 
the successful establishment of tlie industriail system in the Axaerican 
econoray. It designates the \iltiiaate victor^'- of the industrial revolution 
and the entrenchment of the factory sji-stem. The iaapact of this revolution 
on labor policy -was already noticeable in the legislative enac'tnanta of 
the most industrially advanced state of the period, namely, ilassachusetts. 
Although the earliest American labor laws enacted -were the mechanics' lien 
and -wage exen^Jtion la-^rs of the I830's and iBitO's, they did not cc^je with 
problems arising directly out of the factory system. As noted earlier, the 
^Ibid.« p. 13U* 
^Bogart, E.L., o£. cit.» p. 1;32. 
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factory system utilized Viromen and children primarily. 
During the thirties there -was a steady migration of farsiers' 
daughters to the rapidly growing factory to^ms of LoY?ell, 
Lawrence, Manchester and other industrial centers. In the 
cotton mills of New England and the midcile states almost 
sixty percent of the employees in I83I ware •aomen. In Ilev/ 
England in i860 about a third of all factory Tforkers vfcre 
women, though in the country as a vfhole the proportion -was 
about one-fifth. Children y^ere more largely used in the 
factories organized on the Fall P.iver type, vdth the usiial 
abuses of long hours, IOT; pay, laclc of educatioii, and ovei*-
•vjork. Some early mills recruited child labor from alms­
houses, but this was never ao generally done a.s in linglond 
partly because there were ao fe?/ dependent poor in ianorica.l 
The first legislative enactments that were truly designed to remedy 
evils growing dii'ectly out of the factoiy system were:2 the enactment of 
a statute in laassaclmsetts in I836 pi-oviding schooling for employed 
children; the Massachusetts lavf of loli2 providing for a ten-hour la^r for 
children under twelve years of age; and the New Hampshire law of iSli? 
limiting the Tforking day in factories to ten hours for children ixnder 
fifteen.3 These beginnings at the state level and the grovdng clamor for 
more extensive legislation, augmented by tlie demands among mechanics 
during the thirties for a ten-hour day^ led to some notable achievements. 
Most noteworthy of these was President Van Buren's executive order in 
I8I1O, establishing a ten-hOTir system for Government employees. It was 
hoped by the advocates of such action that the individual states would 
follow the lead of the Federal government. There were no legal bars 
preventing the states from taking such action. 
llbM., p. 
^VTitte, E.E., "Labor Legislation", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
vol. 8, 19hZi p. 660. 
3Bogart, E.L., o^. cit., p. Ii39* 
22. 
The corporations had been created by the legislatures; their 
existence depended upon lecislativo action; vrithout thoir 
charters they vrould cea-'ic to exist j and it seemed evident to 
the public and to the workers that those corporations could 
be required by the legislatures that had created them to close 
tiieir establishments after ton hours of operation per day. 
The right thus to regulate the corporation was nowhere dis­
puted. The only question that nroso was as to tlve desirability 
of so doinr, in the interests of tlie tr^ide, the operatives, the 
corporations, or the community.1 
The relative inactivity of the Federal t,ovcmaont in tho enactLient of 
legislation safeguarding labor stems not only fron the limitations iiaposed 
by the Constitution. The laissez-faire theory was Generally accepted by 
most of the chief executives of the united States diu-inr: the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century. Although President Van Buren isatied his famous 
executive order of iGliO, his message to Congress in 1J37 confirsas this 
point of view. In spite of the problems created by the financial crisis 
of that year he said: 
All comaTinlties are apt to look to Government for too much. 
Even in our own countrj'', wher« its powers and duties are so 
strictly limited, we are prone to do so, especially'' at periods 
of sudden embarrassment and distMss. But this ought not to 
be ... the less government interferes with private pursuits 
the better for the general prosperity. It is not its legiti­
mate object to make men rich or to repair by direct grants of 
money or legislation in favor of particular pursuits losses 
not Incurred in the public service ... But its real duty — 
that duty the performance of which laakcs a good government the 
most precious of human bleissin^s — is to enact and enforce a 
system of general laws coomensurate vdth, but not exceeding 
the objects of its establishment, and to leave every citizen 
and every interest to reap under its benign pretection the 
rewards of virtue, industry'" and prudence .2 
IW'are, Norman, The Ind^trial Worker, l81;O-l06O, The Riverside Press 
Cambridge, 1921;, p. 126. 
^Havens, R.M., "Laissez-faire Theory in Presidential Messages During 
the Nineteenth Century", Journal of Sconoaic History, (Supplcsaent), 
December, l^lil, p. 87. 
Apparently this attitude on the part of our Chief iiixecutivea I'^as not a 
short lived one. Indeed, it yras persistent throughout this period. Almost 
tTOnty 5'ears later another J\merican president afi'imied this policy during 
another of our recuvilng crises. During the depression of 1357~58 l-'resident 
Buchanan isas faced with the problem of answeriiig his critics. 
A question iThich inevitabl;^' arose in the cavrse of tPie crisis 
vfas v;hat the Federal Government wight do to relieve it. In 
his message to Congress both in 1357 and 1353, President 
Buchanan gave the official answer that govaniiaent can do but 
little to alleviate depression, since it could have done 
noth:lny to avert the crisis. No useful public v/orks TOre to 
be stopped, but econoniy TOS necessary in order to keep govern­
ment borrowing at a inininium.l 
Obviously, labor policy, at least fron a legislative standpoint, is not 
to be found at the Federal level in this period. But this is not to ssy that 
the labor problems arising were not dealt v.-ith at all. On the contrary, the 
courts Trere very active establishing precedents, ivhich were later to becone 
the targets of reformers. The Philadelphia Cord'wainers case, 1306, set the 
stage for many later judicial opinions. The key to the practical i^siportance 
of this case rras the use of coinmon-lavr doctrine of criminal conspiracy. In 
the eyes of the coux-t the coabination of vrorkiaen, by forcing higher ^rages, 
r.'ere causing production costs to rise, and since conpetition in reality set 
tiie price of shoes, the producers yrouid be unable to market their product 
in coK^jetition -cyith other producers .2 "Hence they, the -workers, •were 
•^zneck, S., "Depression and Auerican Opinion, 1357-1-59", Journal of 
EconoHiic History> vol. 2, May 19h2, pp. 15-16. 
2Sayre, F.B., Cases On Labor LaWj Harvard University .Press, Canbridge, 
1922, pp. 99-102. 
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tlireatening ivith injury the v.'elfare of the entire coimnunity."^ The 
inl'luence of tliis uecision can be seen quite readily. 
Within the next thirty years there follov/ed a series oi" 
similar o&atss throu^rhout the i^ast, reflectiiic these senti­
ments. In some of then! courts conceded the right to 
strike for higher wa;,es but conder.med strikes to corjpel 
the discharge of Trorkmen 7/ho t;ould not join the unions as 
arbitrary neans 'which •went to deprive their fellov: citizens 
of ri[.;hts as pz-ocious ao an.;r tliey contended X'or.*^ 
Ill the case of Goguuon-wealth v. fimt, c lietcalf, lil (Mass. I3li2), 
the decision i^endered in I5li2 the doctrine of criminal conspiracy a 
considerable setback. 
And, as Dean Landis of Harvard Law School ... has remarked 
about Shavr's opinion ... 'he foreshadows clearly the 
doctrine of a later day that the lej^ality of a sbriice is 
to be made to depend upon the end sought to he attaine.l.'3 
In summing up the major contributions of judicial interpretation to 
labor policy in this period Mason groups them under three heads: 
First, all combinations to raise T^ages were held indictable 
as conspiracies at coromon lavrj the mere fact of conspiring 
for the piirpose of increasing •wages t/as the gist of the 
offense, therefore, there need be no inquiry as to motives. 
Secondly, it isas contended that 7/nen nien combine, the means 
•which they exercise become a matter of iaportancej if the 
means employed are coercive, and infringe on the rights of 
others to pursue their OTO trade or calling, they are ixi 
restraint of trade and as such render the combiJiation an 
indictable or actionable conspiracy. 
^Gregorj'-, C.O., Labor and the La-jf, IV.">V, Ilorton and Co., Hew lork, 19h6 
p. 25. 
^Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 29. 
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Finally, perhaps the most rundamental theory advaiiced v/aa bhat, 
when men mite, their objects or motives becone important. If 
their first object in coiabining is to benefit thenselves, to 
enhance their vreiges, reduce their hours, and so forth, the associ­
ation is not only la.vrful but praise-worthyj if, on the otlier haiad, 
the first purpose of the coiabination is to injure the enployer, 
or other parties who have no concern in the dispute, the afreo-
ment is a conspiracy.^ 
Any discussion of labor policy ivould not be complete vdthout mentioning 
the "safety-valve doctrine" and its place iii the general settiiig. 'Cn terms 
of policy it is quite apparent that the supporters of laVor v?ere iapressed 
Tdth the doctrine. As Schlesinger has pointed out: 
The Jacksonians thus re£.;ai-ded the keeping open of the public 
doinain as a democratic ir^perative. It 'was not I'or them a 
soctional question alone. The poorer people of the .est 
demanded easy access and cheap lands for their ov<n. direct 
benefit. The poorer peoule of the i^ast similarly required 
a liberal land policy, to provide for some a refuge, and to 
relieve the pressure on the great majority by draining off 
rural poijulation -which might otherwise flock to toYm and 
swell the lal.or s'orplus.^ 
This recognition of the "safety-valve doctrine"3 by both Jackson aiid 
Van Buren can be seen in their annual messages in which they appealed to 
Congress for a liberalized land policy, '.hether the frontier did aifect the 
evolution of the labor movement in the United otates, as Oorniions and others 
have suggested, is still an unsettled question. However, even the critics 
^ason, A.T., Organized Labor and the Law, Dulte University i^ress, 
Durham 192$, pp. 63-69. 
2Schlesinger, AJ<U, Jr., o£. cit«, p. 31+6. 
3See: Turner, P.J., "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History", .tUaerican Historical Association (Annual I-leport), 1893, 
p. 199-227. 
of the doctrine adjnit that: "A r'ortlou of the acricidtiiral population did 
inake a choice betv/een eaatem industry and \vtJstom fan:i-aa3cins and to the 
decree that it electcd the lattor sone effect upon waj;;:e rates may have 
foUowGcI."^ Certainly, the incrs;,scd vol\c:ic of foreign in;nir-ration nulli­
fied any effects that the availability of free land rmy have Jiad on 
eastern labor n;arI:ots. There is rlso the po3sibll.ity that trade mion 
growth nay have been inhibited by theao policxca. . ith increarjed labor 
iiobility and t}ic difriciilties of cocEJunication among i -migrant groups, 
one vrould hardl;}' e>a)ect union organizations to flourish. 
In SLcnniary, there T/ere several inrjortant forces at vrork changini:,' the 
labor scene and hence leading to a labor nioveroent "pure and simple", as 
Professor Conmons describes it. Cut of the Yrelter of reforms and e^qjeri-
nents, inclxiding the huraajiitarian movement of the forties, Fourierism, and 
the political protests of the "workers" in Jackson's time, a bona fide 
trade union movement begins to emerge, dating from about 1353 • i^ore 
specifically, however, the forces iaiderlyi:ig these changes include 
the development of tlie factor:y' ^^stea, the greater use 
of machinery, the still fm-ther -vTidening of the narket 
throiigh inprovenents in means of transportation, the 
formation of corporations, the coming of the iKUHigrents 
in large nuiabers, and other factors ...2 
Although the labor scene continued to i^row more coaplex as industry 
3-Danhof, C.IT., "Economic Validity of the Safety-Valve Doctriiie", 
Journal of i:.conc»aic History'' (Supplesient), leceraber, 191:1, p. 105* 
Ssogart, E.L., o£. cit., p. iUi3. 
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developed, the relative importance of agricultxire continued to hide the 
ruablinga going on in the industrial sector of the ecanoioY* In addition# 
labor's supporters, those responsible for pointing up the unsatisfactory-
conditions under which American labor -was employed, burned to a relatively 
more iisportant issue, namelj'' slavery. Consequently, the clamor for labor 
refona became submerged in the much greater conflict shaping up betTOen 
the proponents and opponents of the slavery issue* In a sense this was 
unfortunate, for it permitted labor to -work out its own salvation •without 
the benefit of publicity and constructive criticism. As a result 
the sldLlled trades settled doim to the practical task of 
getting more pay for themselves by means of permanent 
and exclusive organizations. A new type of union was 
established, vMch steered clear of all programs of social 
and political reform and confined its activities to 
in^roving conditions in the trade. 'Its main weapon -sms 
the strike; its aim, to establish a minimum -wage for the 
trade and to maintain it by means of a closed shop.'^ 
Although the panic of 1857 stifled these attejnpts at organization, the ground-
trork -was laid for the trade union movement which follcfwed a generation later. 
The Civil War called a halt to labor's drive for iasproved vjorking con­
ditions. In fact, the slavery question oocD^ied the attention of many labor 
leaders, overshadowing other issues that might have come to the fore had 
not the threat of negro ccaspetition in the labor market beccsae a real 
possibility. One writer, in describing the attitude of labor toirard the 
slavery issue, stated: 
The m^rkingmen of the antebellum period tsrere not fond of 
Negro slavery} indeed they possessed a deep hatred for 
the institution. But there is little evidence to reveal 
%ogart, E.L. og. cit., pp. 
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that they fought wholeheartedly against the continued 
bondage of the black man. They v/ere suspicious of 
abolitionist motives, resentfiil of abolitionist in­
difference to -wage slavery, critical of the methods 
used, and of the potential benefits to be derived by 
the potential 'freedom'. They -were deeply conscious 
of the cOE^petition the -wJiite laborer -would have to 
face if the Negroes Tjere emancipated, ajid much siore 
interested in alleviating their o-m tveaiy and burden-
soEie lot than in obtaining the freedom of the bondsraen. 
Perhaps the attitude of the workingrjen Tras a selfish 
one but, be that as it may, there is little evidence to 
uphold the thesis that the antislavery movement had 
great strength ' in the factories aiad shoe-shops' 
The period 18^ to 1872 is tmique in /jnerican labor history because 
it represents a transformation in oxir economic, social, and political 
stature. In the early 1850's vie find the national unions of skilled 
•workers emerging. As markets broadened, the rapid extension of railroad 
mileage and the opening up of tnonk lines not only sharpened the con­
flict between -worker and eE5>loyer, but conflict also arose betvieen -worker 
and -worker. Labor in one geographical area faced the con^ietition of 
labor in another geographical area. Li order to organize the craft 
throughout the -whole coii?>etitive area, TO find national tmionisra arising 
among machinists, stonecutters, molders, blacksmiths, printers, and hat 
finishers. Although the panic of 1857 resxilted in a -ivealcening of this 
movement, and the early years of the Civil 'liar disorganized labor unions 
further, this -nas only a tei35)orary setback. Advances in technology, trade 
and transportation had already established a pattern ishich inevitably led 
to a further aggravation of the labor problem. Hot only -s?ere national 
^Rayback, J.G., "The '.Vorkingman and Slaveiy", Journal of Economic 
Historyj vol. 3, Noveiabor, 19k3f p* 163. 
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unions being: forjicd, but local unionisa continued to oxi^iiid. i7ds fTorfbh 
of local organization during: tlie l360's is lUustratcd by tlie union 
directoi'ios covering twenty 3tet.js. • <oventy-oit'^t local uniona vcrc listed 
at the end of 1363 • By tho end of thts iollowiug year 270 ivem liated «.ad 
in 1365 approxiaately thi'ee hurjdred locals were in oxiatonce. 
From IS63 throxigh 1065 as siany as t>»elve new natiojihla 
Tuere formed, including; such iiaportant unions as the 
locofaotive engineers, the bricklayers, jsaaons, and 
plasterers; aiid the cicir oakei-s ... ^  
In terajs oT labor policy, during the Civil -Var the federal t;0vem;:ient 
I'eaorted to prograiss deaigaed to alleviate the manpower sliorUifc t^rowin^; 
out of the vise of conscription end the increisad recjiiirsnents of » '^rsr 
econcKjy. To this end Congress in 136]; "passed an act alloKlnt' contracts 
to be Kiade in foreign countries in T?hich ijnmitjTfinta pled^red their snroa 
or any other j)i*opertiy they ai{::ht accjuiisj to pa^'" for tranapcrti;tio .."2 
Apparently the attongjt to augment the dcsaestic labor supply through in-
crousc'd isiEiicration was quite successful. "«n advertisement ccclarod 
that arrangements -Rcre so complete that smy kind of labor could now ba 
obtained in any nusibers and at reasonable coat ."3 
Cbviously, the labor controls utilized by the federal covemuent 
ware limited by the accepted distinction betireen the ri^hta of the states 
as opposed to those of the federal govemsseat. This distinction, howsver, 
^Lester, jv.A», Eccgioaics of Labor, Macsaillan Co., New Xork, I9IA, p* 5i4 
^Dorfoaa, J«, op. cit., p. 966. 
3lbid>, p. 967« 
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v&a to bo clorlTlod aooo ten yoars lator by tho Sv^eme Court in tlie 
Granrer oaaos. 
Althoui;h it ia aot the purpose o£ this diaouaaion to point out the 
tiotail'.d cliaiii oa thjt ivoro occurring in tho labor novcmQnt, it is 
noooasar:^' to suaaariae Uio nore im3:)ortvint of these ao they affect the 
status of thu federal [jovx-'i-naent's role i:i tlio developaient of labor 
policy, V/are haa deacribed the evolution of national trade unionism 
durinc the Civil .<ar in the foUondng fashion: 
At tho outbreak of the Civil iVar and for four ye^rs 
t})ereafter the few national unions laere in a sad -way* 
They nure national in naste only> irithout funds ^ and 
laokLng control over their constituent locals* 'riie 
Typocraphioal had survived fron ISSO largely becauae 
of its benefit features. Tho ^tone Cutters had 
maintained SODB sort of organization frm 1853 and t!ie 
Hat Finishers from 135^1; • The L!olders and the Ilachinistsf 
both organized in 1359, hardly aaintained :iheEiselves 
throufjli the Civil Xisr* T]ie president of tho 1-achinists 
did not bother to attend the 1861 convention because he 
did not e:q:«ct osy delegates to appear. Tie 2>Ioldors* 
national orgairlsntion secaas to Jiave disappeared in 1362 
and its leader, ^ Ivis, lost faith in trade unionism 
and turned to cooperation and politics. The revival 
of t}ie national unions camc in 1861t, rras halted by 
the depression of 1367» and reached its height in l373» 
the i-ear of the panic .1 
Tlie period l36k-6$ finds the labor movenent pressing, at the state 
level, through the concerted activities of the VJbrkinginsn's Assemblies, 
for an eight-hour day. 'i.'ith the creation of the National Labor Union, 
a politico-refom body, in 1866, labor's deinands "were essentially a 
revival of the refona planks popizlar iji the forties and fifties; shorter 
^'are, II,J,, The Labor Moveaent in the United States, 1860-1895, 
D. Appletffltt and Co., Hevr ^ ork, 1929, pp. 3-4* 
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hoursj disposal of public landsj tlte national debt issuej oooperation 
and prison labor. However, "in spite of the fact that 1866 Harked the 
peak of postwar ibidustrial activity, the national unions were insignificant 
factors in the general labor movement."^ in 1870, at the National Labor 
Union Convention, an ingjortant question of labor policy arose ivhich had 
repercussions later in our history. As a result of the Burlmgame Treaty 
of 1869, vfoich gave China most-favored-^ation treatment, the probleia of 
competing •vvith cheap foreign labor arose. Hofwever, the power of labor -ma 
not adequate to influence federal trade policy. 
By 1870 the National Labor Union declined in itr$)ortance to be replaced 
by a series of Industrial Congresaes Tsrhich included delegates fron the five 
national unions, the Sons of Vulcan and tte Knights of St. Crispin. Attejupts 
were nade to consolidate the various labor organizations then in existence. 
In addition, the Congress of l87i|. included two new labor societies ex­
hibiting a new trend. They ^ rere organized as secret societies and v?ere 
named the Industrial Brotherhood and the Sovereigns of Industry. The 
divergent aims and objectives of the various delegates, however, made unifi­
cation iQ^>ossible. 
The itnportance of this period may be summariaed by pointing out that 
these various organizations did have one thing in common -which lainijnized 
the necessity for any positive program on the pfirt of government to deal 
•with labor disputes. Although there were strikes in various industries 
they were usually ineffective. Labor organizations, for the most part, took 
^Ibid*, see footnote p. 9« 
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the same position on the strike issue. 
It Tfas in fact J almost a truism ox' the period that strikes 
were dangerous and ineffective, did more Imrm than good, 
and should be stipplanted by peaceful and intelligent methods 
for the settlement of industrial disputes.^ 
As a substitute for strikes, labor advocated peaceful settlement of disputes 
primarily through collective bargaining procedures. 
TiVhile these efforts trere going on, the effects of the Civil TVar on the 
garment industry in Philadelphia seemed to portend much greater progress 
in the establishment of a unified labor organization. By I869 the Garment 
Cutters' Association of Philadelphia had transformed itself into the first 
bona fide national trade and labor society in American labor history — the 
I&aights of Labor. 
The nevf organisation was modeled after the secret fraternal orders of 
the day. Although its influence did not expand quickly, it gradually 
extended its pOTser to include the coal and iron workers, stone cutters, 
gold beaters, machinists, boilenmikers, blacksmiths and many others. 
Difficultiea arose, however, as a result of the secrecy en^jloyed by the 
new order. In the coal fields secrecy meant theft and murder, and as a 
result of the crimes committed by the Molly Maguires and the hanging of 
several members of this inside ring urtiich controlled the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians, secrecy was discredited. But the leaders of the organization 
were not yet ready to dispense -with the enigmatic character of the order. 
They had reason to fear any disclosure of the strength and character of 
the organisation. 
^Ibid., p. 1?. 
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The great upheaval of 1877 not only illustrates the conflicts arising 
out of the insecurity of the vrorker, but ealao sets the stage for federal 
intervention in labor disputes. The railroad strikes in r'ittsburgh re­
vealed the extreme nature of industrial coni'lict. They could hardly be 
considered strikes, but -srere rather revolts on the part of an entire 
comaunity against the Penni^lvania railroad. Viare describes the incident 
in the following manner» 
The effect of the riots of 1877 "was enormous* For the 
first time in Aufcrica the head of labor revolution was 
raised. Until then, the labor movement had been ignored 
except by those in imsaediate contact rith it. A few 
intellectuals had talked about it in sentimental texms. 
Its hopeless struggle against forces it could not under­
stand, its tinhappy e:g)eriment8 TSfith self-eEgilcyaent, its 
pathetic ventures into politics, its petty bargaining, 
had gained the syu^pathy of preachers and editors like 
Channihg and Greeley, but a hardened communiigr could 
well afford to treat it Tdth contejapt. The Great 
Upheaval revealed a great discontent, and iwfaat Tsras more 
significant, a great, if unwieldy, power. Civil 
authority had been brushed aside» The militia -were toy 
soldiers at the mercy of destmictiTe mobs. OnHy the 
regulars could deal with them, and the United States 
was coming to a pretty pass Trtien Federal troops had to 
rush into every village to maintain law and order. 
So the lid -nas clamped dovn. The courts began to see a 
riot in every strike, and a Holly ^ iaguire in eveiy trade 
unionist. The doctrine of con^iracy TOLS revived and in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere strengthened by statute law. 
Labor became an outlaw, the wage-earner a meaber of a 
subcomniunity or class, separate and distinct from the 
general community to tshich he had, at least in theory, 
always belonged. Credence was given in fact to the 
»un->American' theory of class war.^ 
It seems quite obvious that inactivity on the part of government at 
each level was responsible for the violence occurring in the settlement 
^Ibid.j pp. lj,8-i<.9. 
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of labor disputes. In spite of the eight-hour law for federal eii^loyees 
pasijed in 1868^ and the pasaage of factozy inaction acts by such states 
as }^8sachusott3 in 1867^ it was not \intil the 1880's that a considerable 
volume of legislation was enacted. In fact, even tshen legislation •was 
passed, the spirit of the law v/as frequently violated. A case in point 
is the eight-hour legislation of 1068. 
The question of vAiether the new ei^'ht-hovcr day shovild be 
accompanied by a corresponding reduction in wages remaiiaed 
unsettled, and the law \Tas subject to such varied inter­
pretations that it did not secure an eight-hour day for 
all the ecqjloyees who were supposed to be covered by it. 
In 1372, hovrever. President Grant prohibited by procla-
nation any wage decreases ^ ich mi^t be put into effect 
in carrying out the law, and In the same year Congress 
nade provision for back pay to those workers -whose wages 
had suffered a reduction because of it. Hoia-s laws of a 
more general nature were also enacted, but merely defining 
a legal day's work, they permitted working days longer 
than those ^ecif ied in the statute if the wage ccaatract 
provided for more hours, and lacked adequate enforcement 
machinery.^ 
It seems quite understandable that labor resorted to violence in this 
period in an effort to achieve specific goals. Government apparently 
was indifferent torsard the efforts of the worklngman. to in^rove his 
status. And even when it did intervene only token efforts were made to 
enforce poli^ decisions. 
fietuming, however, to the effects of the Pennsylvania affair 
on labor policy throughout the country, repercussions were felt as far 
away as the Hid-iTest. In a Nebraska case of 1879 in T^iich eighteen 
^Stein, E. and Davis, J., Labor Problems in America, Rinehart and Go., 
New York, 19h7, pp. 
tailors on strike r/ere convicted of unlavrftil conspiracy, the court vras 
guided hy the eloment of intent. The workers •vvere judged guilty of 
conspiring jointly to injure the employer,! 
During the 1370's and OC's the Congress of the United States author­
ized investigations in the field of labor relations in order to determine 
the causes of labor disputes and reconimend adequate legislation to cope 
Tfith the problem. Several considerations made such inquii-ies necessary, 
VTith the grovriili of the Knights of Labor the conflict sharpened. liew tech­
niques of industrial >varfare were being developed on both sides. On the 
side of the employer, for example, mth the favoritism of the courts becomr-
ing more and aore obvious, the "yellovr-dog contract" Tjas first utilized. 
FoUoTdjig a strike in I870 the Tiestem Union Telegraph Coiapan,/ coinpelled 
its operators to sign oaths riot to affiliate rdth any union. Employers 
in many industries foUotjed suit, "including the railroads, meat pack­
ing, and iron -Aforks."^ 
In order to deal adequately -with the growing coa^olexity of the labor 
problem. Congress ena-tted legislation in iQoii. creating a Bureau of Labor 
to be incorporated in the Department of Interior .3 But the events of the 
period moved swiftly. Alreadj'- a ne-vf type of labor orgaiiiaation appeared 
%ap3trick v. Ilamge, 9 Neb., 390, discussed in liason, A.T., 0£» cit.» 
p. 80. 
^Taylor, A,G., Labor Probless and Labor Law, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
New York, 1938, p. iB?^ 
%osenfarb, J., The National Labor Policy and How It Works, Harper 
and Bros,, New lork, 19ii0, p. 8. 
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on the horizon — one v.-hich vrais later to become the most po'.7erful labor 
organization Ln Jlauerica — the American Federation of Labor. It offered 
many attractions to workers! membership consisting of skilled craftsmen, 
"business unionism," decentralized organization, and political detaclBiont. 
Starting -path an enrollment of about 50,000 members in 1881, its member-
sl-iip more tlian doubled by 133 Ij. and continued to grov/ rapidly. 1 
tTith the strength of organized labor moiinting and further violence 
occurring, illustrated by the Flaymarket Hassacre of 1886, the esriployer 
found it expedient to call on the courts for further assistance. Since the 
conspiracy doctrino vfas gradually losing its effectiveness as a vreapon to 
prevent labor combinations, employers found corifort in a new Tireapon, first 
used successfxilly in 1877 — the injunction. "For half a century the in­
junction -was used more extensively and more effectively than conspiracy 
suits."2 But labor -was not caught napping. It quickly realized the dangers 
inherent in both the dog contract" and the injunction. As early as 
1387 labor successfully challenged the use of contracts requiring workers 
not to join uiiions snid canv:inced the 15ew York legislature that such con-
topacts should be declared illegal. However, modifications in the use of the 
injunction had to -wait for more, recent legislation. 
To further protect themselves, labor unions made adcitional demands 
to counteract the "union busting" cea^jaigns of employers. Immigrant 
Baylor, A#G., o]^« cit.» p» 66. 
^Ibid., p. 171* 
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labor Tras frequently used to foreatall unionization anci consequently the 
labor movement pressed Tor a revision of the law pcrmittini; i^.:ijirant labor 
to be contracted far on the Continent. Congress respoiided by passing the 
Alien Contract Labor Law of 1335 prohibitin£; the importation of contract 
laborers. Moreover, labor pressure succeeded in cxcluuinf; orientals in 1382, 
while as a preliminary safecuard the unioo-label idea was used for the first 
tljae in 1375 to differentiate the product of white cigar maktfrs <m the 
Pacific coast. 
The period of government intervention 
Prior to 1888 smch of the legislation dealing' rdth labor concerned 
itself with general welfare prc^sitions. It was essentially humanitarian 
in character. Coiirt decisions were used as the basis for settlirig industri­
al disputes, imd in most cases the "property right" of the entrepreneur 
seemed to be behind all legal decisions. Lventtially, however, the demand 
for equal rights on the part of all groups in society caused a modification 
of the inviolability of the rights of any particular group. 
To use Professor Coasaons* terminology, where one party has a 
'richt', all others have a 'no-right'. If employers have 
a right to freedom of access to the consmners' market, 
employees must necessarily have a 'no-right' to interfere with 
that 'right'. If an individual worker has a 'right' to freedom 
of access to tlie eE5<lo:,-ment market, his organized fellow-
workers must necessarily have a 'no-right' to interfere with 
his 'right'. If employees have a 'right' to bargain collectively, 
ea^jloyers must necessarily have a 'no-right' to interfere with 
such bargaining. But this 'right* of tte employees may well 
conflict, if it is to mean anything, with some already recognized 
'rights' of employers.1 
%itmer, R.J., "Concept of Property: Labor Cases," American Econoudc 
Review, vol. 2ha Decfflnber, 193^» P» 616. ~ 
In order to reconcile these claims and counterclainis of "rights", legisla­
tion at the close of the 1380's attempted to establish criteria for 
evaluating these rights and also to determine the obligations of both labor 
and manageiaent. The Arbitration Act of 1888 vras essentially the first step 
talcen by the Federal govemncnt to impose obligations on the part of labor 
and management in the settlement of railway disputes. TTTO methods of ad-
justini; disputes betvfeen railway companies and their employees tTere es­
tablished: (l) voluntaiy arldtration, (2) compulsory investigation. 
Although the act's provisions were never utilized, the general outline of 
governmental policy isas clarified. The intent of the law obviously was to 
limit the rights of the disputing parties and there -was a clearcut indica­
tion that in the future the "rights" of the conimunity at large were to be 
considered.. This latter concept -was forcibly'' illustrated twa years later 
in the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act not only intended to deal 
Tiith business combinations, but mth labor combinations as -»ell. Although 
the bill as originally framed and the ensuing etatements made by Senator 
Sherman indicate that the act might easily be construed so that labor 
combinations v/ould come under the act, the final draft as it emerged from 
the Judiciary Committee fras so -worded that the courts could later apply 
common law principles to eac2i specific case coning under the jurisdiction 
of the act.^ llason concludes by pointing out that, 
^The language of the bill as introduced by Senator Sherman on 
December 11, 1889 'went as folloTsrs: 
AH arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations 
between two or more citizens or coiporabions, or both ... made 
with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition 
(continued) 
39 
on the basis of the evidence disclosed in the Senatorial 
investigations, it is doubtless true that when the members 
of the Senate judiciary coi'jsiittee nrote into the first 
section of the bill the language -which appears in the 
Sherman Act today, they did so after deliberation and 
ladth full consciousness that they 'mre employing vrords 
broad enough to embrace ccanbinations of both capital 
and labor. The specific question as to whether its 
provisions vrould or should actually be invoked against 
labor. Congress did not answer, but chose rather to 
in the importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported 
into the United States «*. and all arranj-eaients, contracts, 
agreements, trusts or combinations between persons or corporations 
designed or which tend to advance the cost to the consximer of 
any articles are hereby declared to be against public policy, un­
lawful and void. 
After some debate on the floor of the Senate, where the possibilities 
of applying the act to labor were discussed. Senator Sherman added 
the foU.owing amendment, which was incorporated in the original bill: 
That this act shall not be construed to apply to any arrangements, 
agreements, or combinations between laborers made with the view 
of lessening the number of hours of labor or increasing their 
wages; nor to any arrangements, agreements or combinations among 
persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture made with the 
view of enhancing the price of agricultural or horticultural 
products• 
Ko sooner was the proviso embodied in the bill when Senator 
Edmvinds, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, attacked it as 
discriminatory legislation. 
V/hen the bill was finally reported out of committee it had been 
completely revised and it was enacted in the following form: 
Every contract, coiabination in the fona of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to 
be illegal. 
For a detailed account of senatorial discussions regarding the act, 
see: Mason, A.J., 0£« cit.j pp. II9-I3I1 cf• Berman, E., Labor 
and The Sherman Act, Harper and Bros., New York, 1930, for an 
opposing point of view. 
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leave that to be determined by the courts in 'each particular 
case as it might arise, 
Mason goes on to point out that the Sherman Act vras merely a "restatement 
of the coEimon law, regarding combinations of both capital and labor, and 
such legislation by Congress ims necessary, because there is no common 
law of the United States."^ 
"iThether the foregoing analysis is correct or not, one fact is clear; 
the Act "was interpreted by the courts and vas applied to specific labor 
cases. From that standpoint, the coxirt interpretations constitute policy 
decisions which apparently were accepted up to the passage of the Clayton 
Act in 191ii» 
In the year 1393 two decisions irere handed doTm involving the applica­
bility of the Sherman Act to labor disputes. The decisions, however, -srere 
inconclusive. In United States v. The Workingtaen' 3 Ainalgaiaated Council of 
New Orleans, Bh Fed. 9kh (E.D. La., 1893), the court held "that the ohemian 
Act iffas deliberately framed to include labor organisations, T^iose forces 
were diverted into unlawful channels",^ irtiile in United States v. 
Patterson, 55 Fed. 605 (D. Ilass., 1893)a the court 
maintained ?d.th equal asstirance that there vras no reason to 
believe that Congress intended to make the activities of 
labor unions amenable to the ppjvisions of the act, -without 
clear language to that effect.^ 
^Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
^Ibid,, p. lla. 
3lbid«, p. Ili6. 
^Ibid> 
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In the Debe oaat, 158 U.S. 56it (1B95}» crowing; out of tho l^liUaan 
Strike of the issue or uhs apiilioability oT the 6hoTmn Act wau 
suparseded by a much nore po^veri'ul ar^ruinant reatin^; on x'lnner legal 
foxindntions* Although the question raised by tho Slwrman Act vrsts :iot 
answered dii*ectlo', its inportsuce becau® prinnri2y aoadocdc vjlien tlic 
decision oi* the 3uprer:e G;urt provided the "CGsaarce . orcr" of tho roderal 
Eovomnont as « uore rojroidablc tmapon in the solution of labor conflict. 
In one sense. President ClovoLuid's use of Xedoral troops, to enforco the 
injunoticn issued by the courts against tha /ocsi-ican Hailisay Union, vc.5 in 
itself a policy decision, but aero Lcportant, however, is tho spur tho 
ease gave to tha use of injunctions In settliiig labor disputes. 
Svocnin^ the importance of the Dobs ease, Ll&son lists the foUoiring 
reascmst 
First of all, it removed tl« n&in points of doubt tc rrhioh tlie 
labor injunction had hitherto been exposed and placed thu use 
of injunctions in labor dilutes upon a fir:^ legal basis, liore 
than that, in sanctioning an injunction, unparalleled in scope, 
to end the strike, and in confinaing an extraordinary — not 
to say novel — extension of equity jurisdiction, this case 
becaae a precedent of serious iuport to labor. Here ras 
demonstrated for the first time tlie remarkable efficienc: rdth 
Tvhich the injunction can be invoked in lsl>or cases, lior lyas 
the assertion of the court's poner found iranting in all tho 
essentials of an effective sanction. Violations of the Ckturt's 
decree there sisy be, but the Debs ease broucht to light a 
conmon-laTr doctrine that has scarcely yet ^nt its force, 
namely, that it is an inherent power of the court, as a con­
comitant of its authority to issue a restraining order, to 
punish all violations of the order as for conten^t.^ 
President Cleveland, in appointine a cccncittee to investigate the PuUaan 
strike, apparently realized that samething more constructive than mere 
^Ibid., pp. I51i-155. 
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punishment was necessaiy to prevent labor strife. As a result of the 
coranittee'3 iwork the Erdman Act "was passed in I898 superseding the 
Arbitration Act of 1888, iri'iich vras wholly inoperative ariyway. The Act 
provided again for mediation and arbitration, but Tias applied only 
once prior to I906. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. I6I (I908), 
the foiuidations of the Erdcian Act were being chipped away by the courts. 
In this case 
that part of the Erdman Act ... referring to interstate 
railroads, which made it a crime for an employer to 
discharge an employee for belonging to a labor union, 
Tras declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as 
beixig a regulation of commerce and in ^aolation of the 
Fifth Amendment 
The decisive blow cane in the same year (l?08) -when the issue raised 
by the Sherman Act was unequivocally settled by the Supreme Court in Loewe 
V. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 271; (I908). The court held that the union was liable 
under the act and enforced the treble damages section of the Act Tdth respect 
to the union. "The court placed itself squarely on record as favoring the 
view that Congress must have intended that labor unions be brought Ydthin 
the p\irview of the Anti-Trust Act or else language broad enough to do that 
very thing would not have been used«"2 Labor's reaction was at once de­
finitive. They set to work immediately to establish a more favorable govern­
mental policy toward the workingmen — their slogan was: "The Sherman 
^^senfarb, J., 0£. cit., pp. k-$-
^M&son, A.T., 0£. cit., p. I6I. 
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Law — anend it or end it." 
Shortly after the Danbury decision the freedom of trade unions was 
again attacked in Gompers v. Duck Stove and Ilan{:;e Co., 221 U.S. 1^18 (1911). 
The chief significance of this case lies in the fact that 
it impressively illustrates the tremendous effect which the 
doctrine of conspiracy, as employed in tlie Sherman Act, 
exerts upon the activities of organized labor. More specifi­
cally it drives home •». this one fact that any boycott 
which affects interstate trade is condemned under the Shenaan 
Act as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and the fact that 
a boycott is a conspiracy renders all acts performed in pur-
stirancc of it, however laudable or innocent they may be in 
themselves, unla'vvful and indictable.^ 
After the United Hatters -were forced to pay nearly a quarter of a million 
dollars in damages to the Loewe Company, and Gonpers, as well as other taaion 
leaders, trere threatened Td.th prison sentences in the Buck Stove case, labor 
made a deteranined effort to safeguard its "rights". VJith persistent agitation 
as their raa^jor Yjeapon they Trere able to secure the passage in l^lii. of the 
Clayton Antitrust Act. Paradoxically, labor legislation in the railroad in­
dustry, took a raore positive tacJc vdth the passage of the "iJewlands Act of 
1913* ViTiile the Clayton Act apparently execapted labor unions froii being 
prosecuted under the Sherman Act, the Kevdaatis Act was more detailed in its 
recognition of existing procedures in the settlement of labor disputes. 
A permanent board of mediation and conciliation to settle 
labor disputes in the railroad industry was established... 
and gave the board the po\ver to render opinions on the 
meaning and application of agreements yiiich had been arrived 
at by the process of mediation. Arbitration was also provided 
for in this act ...2 
^Ibid., p. 167• 
^Bosenfarb, J., 0£. cit.j p. 11. 
In comparison, the passage of the Clayton Act ostensibly placed labor 
organizations outside the pale of combinations in restraint of trade. How­
ever, no real program was established to deal rdth labor disputes. New 
ri[:hts vrery merely conferred on labor, but unfortxmately there were other 
"rights" in existence iwhich conflicted v/ith those given labor. Hence it is 
not surprising that the Clayton Act went the way of its predecessor •— it 
too was reinterpreted by the courts. Modifications of the Clayton Act 
grew out of decisions rendered in Duplex Printing Press v. Peering» 
251i *0.3. l4]43 (1921) and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Iline W orkers of 
America, 268 U.S. 295 (192^)» These vdll be taken up in detail later. 
It woiild not be correct to assume that the Federal govemment was not 
cognizant of the need for an integrated labor policy. One year prior to 
the enactment of the Clayton Act steps were taken to give labor problems 
their due emphasis by establishing a separate Department of Labor of equal 
rank and status T-dth the other executive departments of the Federal 
Government. Although an act of Congress established a Department of 
Conmerce and Labor in 1903 j it was not until 1913 that the Department of 
Labor became a separate executive department. The purpose of the department 
was "to foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage-earners of the 
United States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their 
opportunities for profitable employment."^ In addition, the newlj'' created 
department was charged with the problem of integrating the various programs 
and policies dealing with labor administered by other governmental agencies. 
3jiJounce, (editor). Labor Course, Prentice-fell, Inc., New York, 
19li6, p. 203. 
Amonc the various bureaua set up "within the Deparfaiont, the Bureau of Labor 
statistics and the Conciliation tiervice wore both charged Trith special 
responsibilities* It yraa not until 1?17| however« that the Conciliation 
Service vms establiahod officially as a separate unit. World :/ar 1 gave 
the Departuent a treaendous iaputua. 
Bj the time the •war ended, in l^lS, the Departssent had 
developed into a War Labor Administration composed of 
13 separate bureaus and services and two functional 
boards# The 'Har Labor Policies Board was created to 
harmonise adidLnistrr.tive labor reli-tiona in the various 
branches of the Government engaGC<i in the production of 
war materials* And the '.Var Labor Board was foracd as a 
court of last resort to attempt the settleraent of in­
dustrial disputes thet involved war production.^ 
The Bureau of U<ibor Statistics foras the core of tlie Departnieat. In 
fact, it was the need for specific infomation relating to labor's relative 
position in the econonQ^ that prompted Cangross to establish the Labor 
Department. Kepresentatives of organised labor made this clear at the 
Congressional hearings held in 1910* A representative of the A.F. of L. 
pointed outt **•.. we ^ould have a departsient that would IQIOW absolutely 
at all times what we were paying for comrcodities and what was being paid 
for labor."2 He continued to point out that "productive value of American 
labor in ccsapai'ison vdth the productive value of labor in other lands ••• 
is one of the things we really do not know and ... is one of the facts 
^Ibid.» p. 20ii. 
2u.S. Department of Labor, United States Departntent of labor, Tvrenty-
five Years of Service^ 1913-1938> V^ashington, D.G.,T[93ij, pp. 3-ii. 
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that we want a department of this kind to ascertain so that -vre Tdll Imow 
Yifhat Tje are talldJig about.Obviously labor felt that tl^irough the avail­
ability of adequate inTormaticn its fight for better •wcjrlcLng conditions 
and favorable legislation -.TOuld be enhanced. 
Prior to Vfilson's Administration, the Federal govemaent endeavored 
to cope vdtli labor problems primarily by settiJig up special conmissions to 
investiga'.e the causes of industrial conflict* Apart from the lav;s 
relating to tlie railv/ay induati-y, in Tfhich bona fide mediation and arbi­
tration procedures WBre applied, there vrere established four conmissions 
organized to study labor problems: The Industrial Comiaission of 1898; 
the Anthracite Coal Goaiidssion of 1902j the U.3» CoHiEiission on Industrial 
Relations in 1912; and the earliest action, the Senate Co;.ffidttee on 
Education and Labor of 1882«2 
The V/orld 'Mar 1 period signified the emergence of a new labor policy 
on the part of the T/ilson Administration. This policy tfas carried out 
through a tenporary war agency referred to as tte National /.'ar Labor Board. 
^Ibid.j p. U 
^osenfarb sumarizes the investigations carried on by these 
commissions in his book The National Labor Policy axul Hoy It 
Works, op. clt., pp. 7-8• He jnakes^the following observations: 
The facts of labor histozy isere iiiustei:^d by investigating coio-
missions appointed by Congress, the President, or both. In­
vestigations of labor relations by the federal government date 
back to 1876. 
In 1882 the Caamittee on Education and Labor of the Senate "ssas 
directed by that body to undertake a study of the nature and 
causes of labor disputes and to recommend appropriate legislation. 
(Continued) 
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The National War Labor Board of I918, however, -was an 
outgrowth of a national policy to develop an attitude of 
cooperation on the part of laborj and to this end to pemit, 
but to discourage, strikes. Instead of prohibiting strikes 
in accordance ^vith the deiaands of the entploying interests. 
Under authority of the Act of October 1, 1888, the President of 
the United States appointed the United States Strike Commission 
to study the causes of the Pullman railroad strike of iB^it in 
Chicago. The commission in its report condemned the anti-union 
policy of the Pullman Company and deprecated that the courts in 
the United States, unlike those in England, were still con-
aiderinc labor unions as conspiracies. The repoz't rectanmended 
the pi'oscription of yellow-dog contracts requiring men to agree 
not to join labor organizations or leave them as a condition of 
employment. The commission also urged employers to recognize 
labor organizations — that such organizations be dealt I'dth 
through representatives 
To investigate the anthracite coal strike of 1902, President 
Theodore Hoosevelt appointed the Anthracite Coal Strike 
Commission. The report of the commission declaredi *The 
occasion of the strike of 1902 "was the demand for an increase 
in Tiages, and a decrease in time. The cause lies deeper than 
the occasion, and it is to be found in the desire for recog­
nition by the operators of the miners' union.' The report 
also found that freedom to join a union is meaningless i?d.thout 
the right to be represented by the union. It recoraaended con­
ferences between employers and representatives of employees 
freely chosen to settle differences, and the enactment of a 
lav/ to set up investigating conmissions rdth subpoena poviers. 
It -was in a period of great industrial tuirest and strilces in 
steel, coal, building, textiles and metal that President VJilson, 
under an act passed d\iring Taft's administration, appointed in 
1912 the Canmission on Industrial Relations. In its two re­
ports the inequality of bargaining power betrreen the individiial 
eu^jloyee and his employer, the desirability of collective 
bargaining, and labor organizations on a national scale -were 
recognized. It also found that the labor unrest was due to 
efforts by employers to defeat the organization of employees ... 
The investigating commissions that made reports on labor 
relations functioned in different periods, were appointed under 
diffearent administrations, did not have the same personnel, and 
(Continued) 
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tlie Government sought to accom^jlish the same end throu£;h the 
recognition of labor's rights. Separate mediation boai-da in 
shipbuilding, railroads, cantonment construction, and a ferr 
other leading induatrics, aided materially in the sotolemant 
of disputes. 
The National t.'ar Labor Board was charged iTith the task of 
settling controversies by mediation or arbitration in TTOT 
industries and related fields. The body was composed of 
representatives from the eajjloying group and from organized 
labor, with two Joint chairmen. The Board formulated a 
nuial;er of guiding principles, including the policy thet no 
strike or lookout should be conducted during th. i.ar period; 
that the right of collective bargaining should be protectedj 
and that the status quo should be preserved in both open and 
closed shops. The Board *as given no power to enforce its 
decisions, though all a>rards were binding upon contestants 
•who volmtarily submitted to arbitration. Despite the in­
ability of the vn'ar Labor Board to coerce either party in 
a conflict, it was very successful in preserving industi-ial 
peace, as it proved by the fact that no strike or lockout rras 
undertaken in opposition to its aiwards xmtil after the sign­
ing of the Armistice.! 
The success, ho-viever, of the Y/ar Labor Board cannot be attributed 
solely to the machinery set up to deal -iTith disputes. Patriotism, in­
creased security prevalent in a full entploynent econoiry, growing union 
membership, higher wages and profits all contributed to the labor 
harmony prevailing dxiring the trar. But as Taylor points out: 
The National "uar Labor Board -nent out of existence in August, 
1919, leaving no Federal adjustmeiit machinery to cope rrith 
the nation-wide coal strike of the foUoTdng Uovember. 
Attempts to perpet\iate the spirit of "tTarbime adjustments proved 
sterile in peacetime, and -were not forced upon industry again 
investigated different labor disputes, nevertheless they were 
unanimous in their conclusions that employers' antagonism to 
labor organi.zation has not availed to eliminate unionism bat 
has served only to cause wasteful labor unrest, and that there­
fore collective bargaining and strcaig unionism ought to be en­
couraged as a matter of poliqy. 
^Taylor, A.G., cit., p. $78. 
until the war upon depression fourteen years later.1 
Nevertheless, in one axea, an attempt was made to provide more permanent 
arbitration procedures ~ the railway industry. Dut the reason for this 
needs little e:q)lanation. The Erdnan Act of 1890, the IleiTlands Act of 
1913, and the Adanson Act of 1S>16 vrare all links in a chain of legislation 
relating' to the settlement of labor disputes in a single industry, 'ith 
the experience gained durinc V.'orld /;ar 1 in the settlement of railt/ay 
labor disputes, the Transportation Act of 1920 assured continued public 
supervision even thou£;h tlte roads wore once a^ain in the hando of their 
former owners. But the liailway Labor Board, created mder the Act, luider-
went a stormy existence. Although it investigated nearlj'' fourteen thousand 
cases during its five years of existence it was generally considered by 
labor as being partial to the employers. Consequently, the /aaerican 
Federation of Labor sponsored the V/atson-Parker iiailway Labor Disputes 
Act of 1926. In spite of the opposition of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, Congress enacted the Bill into law. The new measure 
abolished the Railway Labor Board and set up a system based more upon 
voluntary methods of conciliation between the railroads and their em­
ployees, upon mediation, and upon arbitration. The ITatson-Parker iict is 
important prl'aarily because it provided the basis for much of the later 
legislation. It outlavred the company xmion, and the "yellow-dog contract" 
and safeguarded collective bargaining. 
While labor in the railroad industry fared well at the hands of 
^Ibld.. p. 579 
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Congress .and the courts, labor decisions generally viBre not favorable 
toward the worker. At the close of V/orld Ts'ar 1, the anti-trust laws 
again vrere considered by the courts in relation to labor combinations. 
Two cases, mentioned earlier, namely the Duplex case and the Coronado 
case, rrere considered by the Supreme Court. In both instances labor 
suffered new defeats. The Duplex case established four points: 
first, that the employer's business is a property right •tfnich, 
under Section 20 of the Clayton Act, may be protected by the 
injunction; second, that the limitations placed upon the 
issuance of the in3unction by Section 20 apply solely to dis­
putes between the employer and his enroloyees, thus providing 
no protection for union members not in his employ; thii^i, that 
Section 20 TTas not intended to legalize the secondary boycottj 
and fourth, that a labor organization becomes an illegal com­
bination in restraint of trade if and irhen it departs from its 
la-wful objects 
As a result of this case labor realized that the Clayton Act had not 
provided the immunity -sdiich it had hoped for. Confirming labor's sus­
picions, the ruling of the court in the Coronado Coal Company case ims 
even more detrimental. The decision substantiated the fiaancial lia­
bility of labor organizations even though they vrere unincorporated bodies. 
Althovigh the union was not charged Tsith restraining interstate comiaerce, 
the court held that if the evidence had indicated that such "was the case, 
the union -would have been liable for damages. 
Further inroads -were made on union rights in 1921 as a result of 
decisions rendered in American Steel Foundries v. Tz-i-City Central Trades 
Council, 257 U.S. 181; (l92l) and Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
^Ibid.. p. 529. 
51. 
Both involved questions of picketing. ]ii the .American Steel Foundries 
case the court "outlined a kind of peaceful picketing in T^hich only 
the strikers and laid-off employees might indulge."^ 
The Truax decision is even more significant. The Supreme Court "de­
clared the state supreme courts' decision imconstitutional in so far as it 
interpreted ... (the Arizona anti-injunction law) to prohibit injunctions 
against tortious and unlawful picketing."^ The number of pickets used was 
also to be determined by the particular circuraataiices involved in the strike. 
State supreme courts, in many instances, adopted a rather narrow interpreta­
tion of the limitations imposed on picketing in the Truax case and applied 
similar restrictions to cases coming under their purview. 
Vifith the success of the "American Plan" for the open shop, sponsored by 
the National Association of Manufacturers, labor union membership declined 
markedly duriiag the 1920's. Moreover, the relative prosf)erity of the period 
and the willingness of the courts to grant employer's requests for injunc­
tions held labor disputes to a minimm. Altho\igh the injunction was used 
frequently by employers during the 1920' s its effect on trade union growth 
is subject to much speculation. As Frankfurter and Greene point out; 
The organized labor movement in the United States reached its 
peak immediateny following the Y/orld V'ar. But for twenty 
years injunctions had paralleled growth in union meiabership.^ 
Gregory, C.O., Labor and the Law, 1Y.W. Norton and Co., New York, 
19k6, p. 172. 
2lbid., p. 173« 
^Frankfurter, F. and Greene, N., The Labor Injunction, llacmillaii Co., 
New York, 1930, p. 130-131. 
^2, 
But the ingjact of the injunction on the union noveraent ia \jninistakab2y 
clear. It evoked the hostility and indignation of the trade union leader­
ship and rank and file. Again Frankfurter and Greene provide a lucid 
comentary: 
The history of the labor injunction in action puts some matters 
beyond question. In large part, dissatisfaction and re3enti^.ent 
are caused, first, by the refusal of the courts to recognize that 
breaches of the peace may be redressed through criminal pro­
secution and civil action for daiaages, and, second, by the ex­
pansion of a simple, judicial device to an enveloping code of 
prohibited conduct, absorbing, en masse, executive and police 
functions and affecting the livehihood, and even lives, of 
multitudes.^ 
With the onslatight of the depression American labor policy Tras forced to 
meet an extreme einergency. It required a corgjlete "about face". Labor policy 
had to adjust itself to the exigencies of a complex econony. Furthermore, 
considerations based on econondc as well as ethical criteria "were required. 
Labor policy in a coaplex econcggr 
The depression of the 1930's brought with it many circumstances of a 
legal and economic nature which -wore not coagjatible with each other. Unless 
drastic actions were taken, the severity of the depression threatened the 
existence of many of our institutions. These actions can be conveniently 
classified according to the objective of the particular program pursued: 
equality of status through collective bargaining, prevention of exploitation 
of the unorganized •vsorker, security against unenployment and old age, and 
remedying the economic crisis. 
^Ibid.» p. 200. 
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Ey the very natxire of these objectives, great dii'Xiculties were 
inevitable. Conflicting objectives of a political and econotaic nature 
•were iiiherent in the proposals. The aiiu of industrial democracy, for 
exaiaple, was essentially a political consideration. The prevention of 
exploitation of the unorganised worker on the other hand combined both 
political and economic considerations. Exploitation, of course, could be 
re:aoved by fostering greater industrial democracy, but at the same time 
the econonic consequences were primarily in the realm of resource allocation. 
In fostering equality of status through collective bergaining, a 
further conflict of objectives arose. In the past the laaintenance of the 
employer's property right had been paramount in the minds of legislators. 
iVith the vVagner Labor Act a new "right" was recognized, namely, ths-t of the 
worker. But apparently one "right" had to be modified in order to create 
another "right"; i.e. the right of the employer was restricted in order to 
recognise a "labor right". As Douglas has pointed out: 
The fundamental purpose of the Kailway Labor Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, and the various state labor relations 
acts, is to make the legal right of the vjorkers to organize 
and bargain collectively through representatives of their ovin 
choosing an effective right which employers are obligated to 
accord.* 
In regard to American labor policy affecting collective bargaining, the 
stage was set during the 1920's with the enactnent of the Transportation Act 
of 1920 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926. 
^Douglas, ?.H., "American Labor Relations Acts", American liiconomic Review, 
December, vol. 27, 1937* 735• 
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Out of the experience gained by the government during iVorld iVar 1 in 
its operation of the railroads, further foundations -were laid for the labor 
policy enacted in the 1930's. The satisfactory labor relfitions in the 
railroad industiy during the war grew out of the policy of recognizing the 
rights of vjorkers to organize and bargain collectively. The Transportation 
Act of 1920 translated this policy into statute law. President V/ilson also 
attempted to extend the -wartiiae metliod of dealing iiTlth labor disputes to 
other industries. To this end he convened tVi© First Industrial Ccnference 
in October, 1919. Although this conference failed, Viilson's persistence 
resxxlted in the convening of a second conference in December, 1919* It was 
cojaposed of Herbert Hoover, Julius Hosen-k^ald, Owen D. Young and others. The 
report of March 6, 1920 unanimously recraKnended 
the establishment of a Hational Industrial Board, local regional 
conferences, and boards of inquiry charged with settling dilutes 
through mediation and, in case of failure of mediatory efforts, 
through compulsory investigation and report by impartial agencies.^ 
It TOs one thing to reccaamend a rational labor policy and another to have 
it accepted by employers generally. Given the prosperity of the twenties and 
the anti-union sentiment prevalent snong eji^loyers, it was not difficult to 
convince entrepreneurs that the "American Plan" of breaking unions was more 
desirable than collective bargaining as a method of guaranteeing labor peace .2 
iRosenfarb, J., ogi. cit., p. 12. 
^Brady, H.A., Business As A System Cf Power, Columbia university PresG, 
New York, 19ii3# PP* 19T"f?. 
It is this background and the onslaught of the depression, during 
President Hoover' a adniriistration, that lod to the swing of the pendulm in 
the other direction. The first step seemed mild indeed as compared to later 
developments under the Rooeevelt administration* Bj' the tiuie depression 
came, not only -was the business man in disrepxite, but his frequent resort to 
the injunction during the previous decade led to a inaction. The force of 
public opinion found its expression iii the IIorris-IaGuax-dia Act of 1932. 
As Taylor puts it: 
The Act was evidently intended to apply to labor the same 
rule of reason -gdaich has been applied to corporations, for 
it enumerated specific acts Tf<hich might not be enjoined nor 
considered as evidence of interest to restrain trade un­
reasonably,^ 
Unions, under the act, -were not to be enjoined from engaging in strikes, 
violations of yellow dog contracts, picketing not involving fraud or vio­
lence, secondary boycotts, aiding strikers financially and all collective 
acts Trtiich are legal Tidien done by a single person. Apparently the act in­
tended to prevent a recxrrrence of such court decisions as the Danbuiyj 
Coronado, and Duplex cases. By 1933 the character of the Suprene Court had 
changed sufficiently so that the Horria-LaGuardia Act Tiras held constitution­
al in Lauf v. 3.G. Sliinner and Co. Inc., 303 U.S. 323 (1933). 
Tellotr dog contracts and the use of injunctions t?cre now outlaired, or 
limited in their application, but it was not until 1933 when the National 
Industrial Recovery Act was passed that the right to bargain collectively 
as such was generally guaranteed. Prior to this tiae 
the employed workers of this country had the legal right to 
^Taylor, G.A., op. cit., p. 539* 
^6. 
ssek collective bargaining by laiiful means, but there TOS 
no reoiproeal duty for the employers to accord it# The 
workers', therefore, had to win collective bargainiiig solely 
through such economic strength as they Trere able to muster, 
except in those eoaparative]y infrequent cases -rrhere it 
was ci'anted voluntarily by the employers.^ 
Honever, there verc many Tteapons available to the eiBployer enabling him to 
prevent bona fide unions fron au3L,oring sufficient strength to engage in 
collective bargaining. The follov<lng methods Tjere most frequently en^iloyed: 
1* lie could refuse to meet in conference ndth representatives 
of the workers or to discuss the issues at stake. 
2. HQ coiilc discharge, denote or discipline Trorkers In his 
employ TSIO were active in promoting the cause of the union. 
3« Jfe could persuade, advise and threaten employees •with 
possible consequences in order to induce them either not 
to join a union or to give 15) their membership therein.2 
In addition, the ec^sloyer could titilize labor ^ies to detenalne tJie 
activities of his "workers or of union organizers in his plant. Blacklisting, 
although illegal, also tols frequently tised and the creation, financing, and 
encouragoncnt of company unions -was an effective way of keeping outside 
organizations from penetrating the plant. 
Considering the insecurity of employed workers during the depression 
and the powerful techniques of "union busting" available to the entrepreneur, 
it is not surprising that large areas of American vrorkmen were actually 
afraid to ;Join unions. VJith surprising rapidity, the Roosevelt Administrv.tion 
effected revolutionary changes in the relationship of emplc^r and en^jloyee. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act through Section 7A encouraged workers 
^Douglas, P.H., o£. clt., p. 735-
^Ibid.. p. 735. 
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to affiliate Tdth unions of their am choosing but did not adequately protect 
•workers from the possible consequences of such activities. In 193h, the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926 was amended 
imposing an obligation upon the eiigjloyer to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of the employees, forbidding employers 
to maintain company-dominated unions, and generally strengthening 
the poTvcrs of the National Mediation Board to protect collective 
bargaining in a "way that presaged the provisions of the National 
Labor Relations Act»l 
One year later the V/agner National Labor delations Act -was passed. It grew 
out of the obvious -weaknesses of Section 7A and the resolution of 193h "which 
es"tablished the first National Labor Uelations Board* Public Resolution Uo-. kk 
apprcved June 19, 193U 
did not define any set of unfair labor practices, but mere3y 
authori2sed the boards TJhich the President laight set up, to 
certify groups vjhich represented the iworkers for collective 
bargaining, and authorized them to hold elections if necessary 
to determine "whoni the "workers real3y wanted to represent them* 
This resolution grew out of a bill drafted by Senator Wagner and 
introduced in March of that year, which was the forerunner of 
the act passed a year later 
The Wagner Act of 1935 establishes a landmark in American labor history. 
It "was partially modeled after the railway act of the preceding year and apart 
from affirming the stipulations embodied in the H.I.E.A., which xvas declared 
unconstitutional, specific unfair practices "were also enumerated.3 
^osenfarb, J. 0£. cit«, pp. 11-12• 
^See Douglas, P»H», 0£» cit.» p« 736n. 
^According to the statute, an employer may not engage in the following 
practices: 
(1) interfere "with, restrain, or coerce en^ployees in the exercise of 




In the spring of 1937 the question of the constitutionality of the Vfagner 
Act TCis settled in a series of cases,! the key decision being rendered in 
N»L.R.B» V. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp»J 301 U.S. 1 (1937)• 
The provisions of the V/agner Act "vrere to be administered by the Nation­
al Labor Relations Board. An interesting sidelight vdth respect to the 
functioning of the Board should be noted at this point, evidently the tre­
mendous sweep of labor legislation during this period Tsas not easily accept­
ed by the eaployers. It vras too much of a brealc iwith the past and entre­
preneurs, as a class, vrere not convinced that the courts Trould sustain such 
legislative enactiaents. This can be seen from the estperiences of the 
Board after the Act was passed. 
For over a year and a half after the Board -was set up, its 
decisions vrere ineffective becaxise of a cotmon belief that 
the Act -vsould be declared unconstitutional £md because large 
numbers of injunctions Trere obtained from the courts by 
employers which restrained the Board, from putting its rulings 
into effect.^ 
(2) Dominate or Interfere •vdth the formation or administration of any 
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. 
(3) Encourage or discoxirage union membership by discrimination in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or condition of -work, except 
such discrimination as may be involved in a closed-shop agreement 
•with a bona fide union. 
(li) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for filing 
charges or testifying under the Act, 
(5) liefuse to bargain collectively mth tiie representatives of his 
en^jloyees. 
^.L.R.B. V. Jones and Laxighlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)} H.L.R.B. 
Z* yrushatif Trailer Co., 301 U.S. I4.9 (1937)j U.L.R.B. v. Friedman-
Hariy Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. ^  (1937); Associated Press v. 
II.L.R.B., 301 U.S. (I937); 'iVashington, Virginia and Maiyland Coach Co. 
V. i'i.L.R.B.. 301 U.S. lh2 (1937). 
2Douglas, F.H. 0£. cit., p. 7h^» 
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V/lth the constitutionality of the /vet sustained, the Board gained respect­
ability and the voluiae of cases coming under its jurisdiction increased 
enonriously. As Herrick has pointed out: 
Four factors sharply influenced the fom of the National Labor 
Relations Act, its effectiveness, and the character of its 
administration. These vrere (l) the brief eaq^orience vrith 
Section 7 (a) of the National industrial Eecovery Act (passed 
June 1933); (2) the revelations of employer anti-union activities 
by the La FolletteCivil Liberties Goiumitteej (3) the anti-
N.L.IL.A. tactics of the Liberty League; and (It) the bitter 
rivalry betTreen A.f.L. and C.I.O, groups.1 
The major purpose of the Act was obviously to equate the bargaining 
power between labor and management. Its great failure hot^-ever, v/as that it 
did not anticipate the variety of problems which ivere certain to arise, 
should it successfully achieve its purpose. No real provision for the 
settlement of iiidustrial disputes betweiin tiro equally powerful groups iras 
provided for. Moreover, there isere other difficulties Trfiich "were not 
recognized at the time. 
1/Vhen the Congress yielded to the pressure -which forced the 
passage of the Act, it only approved a generally conceded 
right and created the machinery for enforcing that right 
Tfri-thout sufficient endeavor to provide for the disposition 
or resolution of the extremely difficult minority problem. 
That problem, let it be remembered and eiaphasized, crops up 
in relation to the closed-shop issue, the run-off election, 
the majority rule, and the unit problem.2 
Although the N.L.S..3. tried desperately to overcame the limitations of 
the Act and frequently gave -way under political pressure, the foundations 
^Herrick, E ,M., "The National Labor Relations Act", Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 22^8, November, 
19U6, pp. S2-83. 
%oyiraan, D.O.- Public Control of Labor Relations, llacmillan Co., 
NeT.v York, 19u2, p. ii69^ 
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or its authority wre slowly beinj* chij peel «wiy by groxi^ .s acvcrsoly afroctad 
by its daoiaions* u:^ >loyeri}« through their om associations, deizanded the 
repeal ol' t)w Act. The A.F.L* sug. estod azoaondaents hoping to end the l/oords 
"favoritiaa" tonard the C.I.O. Those dftnonds continued to grovr and during 
'•orId "or II the pooaibilities of tuminfi Lack the clock received enccurage-
Qont trith tlio pass&co o£ the :^ th-Con:ially '^ ot. • ith -orld V.ar II over there 
were indications oT a repeat perlormance of the /uau-rican Plan expressed in 
the fona of tlM Taft-Hartley Labor Lav. 
In tracing, the development of labor legislf^ tion vro have described the 
publics' crtrsinc interest in laLor-oanagocient relations. That interest ex­
pressed itsolf in terns of two ditoetrioaUy opposed vieT^oints, over the 
short ^an of twelve years. The I^ ational labor Relations Act of 1935* apart 
froc attonptint. to "equate bargaining power", assuacd that govemaont should 
undertake no furthtir responsibilities in the affairs of labor and nana^cnent, 
with the possible exception of providing conciliation activities.^  
The Labor llanagcnent Relations Act of 19li7 reflected a marked change in 
the public's twi^ r and philosophy. According to Taylor* 
The fundao&ntal significance of the Taft-Hartley Act is in 
its far-reaching extension of govemnient control over in­
dustrial relations. So broad is the Jurisdiction of govern-
loent under that Act that it raises serious questions about 
whether or not collective bargaining is destined to be 
largely supplanted by govomznent directive. For the present 
at least, the notion that 'there ought to be a law* is in the 
ascendency over the idea that 'he governs best who governs 
least* 
Baylor, G.o., Govemnent Sefylation of Industrial Relations  ^Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., Hew York, 191;8, pp. 3^» 
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In its declaration of policy, the Taft-IIartley law offers to "promote 
the full flow of coBEierce" • This it proposes to accomplish by specifying 
procedural, administrative and legal proscriptions concerning the rights 
and duties of labor and management as they affect "the floTY of cojraiierce" and 
the public vrelfare. 
Since the Taft-Hartley Law viev/s the "flow of commerce" as being ulti­
mately related to the state of "industrial relations," ne shall limit our-
selvos to this brief description of t}K3 law's policy declaration, ".'e propose 
to show in the remainder of this study that (1) public policy has failed to 
recognize the full ic§>lications of such vaguely identified concepts as "the 
flow of coiaaerce," (2) concretely, "the flow of coramerce" laust be defined in 
teims of the level of full ea^loyment, national incoine am the optium 
alloc.-tion of resources; (3) "industrial relations" policy is only remotely 
associated vrith the foregoing requirements. 
Davey makes the following distinction: 
Collective bargaining has its inherent liiuitations» It may 
not be equipped to handle such 'organic' problems as 
1, The prevention of any appreciable amount of involuntary 
uneiigjlcyment * 
2, Assuming full enployment is attained, the raaintenance of 
economic stability by checking inflationary pressures, 
3, The attainment and maintenance of a more equal distribution 
of the national income. 
But collective bargaining is unquestionably the best instrument 
at hand for sol^.dng the numerous rxmctional problems of pxire 
labor relations Tfeich, by their very nature, lend themselves to 
a private solution .1 
It is our contention that these "organic problems" are major determinants 
^Davey, H,W,, "Future Patterns in Collective Bargaining", Speech delivered 
before the MidT/est iiconoiaics Association, 3t. Louis, llo., April 23, 194?. 
(Mimeo, p* 16,) 
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of the "functional problems" which may arise. 
only passing comment will be made on American labor policy dealing with 
the other objectives enumerated earlier. Specific analysis and documentation 
will be provided in later sections *fliere these policies fall appropriately 
within the scope of this study. 
To prevent the exploitation of unorganized labor attempts were made to 
establish minimum wages and maximum hours of work, prior to the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 there was no Federal wage and hour legislation 
covering workers in private industry. The «• floors" under wages and "ceilings" 
over hours of labor under the NIR&> however, were short lived as a result of 
the supren» court decision declaring the Act unconstitutional. In 1936 the 
Walsh-flealey Public Contracts Act was passed providing for a basic eight hour 
day and forty-hour week with time and one-half overtime pay in all industries 
having Federal contracts of more than $10,000. Of course, Van Buren as early 
as IBUO had established a precedent for such action, but in 1938 the Roosevelt 
administration embarked on a program involving rights traditionally reserved 
to the states. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides for a rigid scale of 
wages and hours for workers engaged in or producing for interstate commerce. 
Workers under the Act are now provided with a minimum wage of forty cents per 
hour with time and one-half for hjurs worked in excess of forty hours. In addi­
tion child labor under l6 years of age is prohibited and ia hazardous occupations 
the minimum age requirement is 18 years of age. Obviously the purposes of the 
Act were mixed — to raise the level of living of low paid workers and also 
to help bring back prosperity by increasing the spending power of those 
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workers having a liigh propensity to consume. 
Federal policy in the area of social insurance marks a veritable rev­
olution in the responsibilities of the state to its citizenry. Early in 
our history the general attitude of society toward the specter of poverty 
in old age or industrial injury was not only one of apathy but also of 
resignation. It required a major economic debacle such as that of the 
early 1930«s to motivate a great transformation in our policy toward tl© 
misfortunes affecting industrial workers in our coa^jlex society. The 
Roosevelt Administration utilized a two-pronged attack in dealing with 
problems of social insurance. Taking over the job of caring for the needy 
and unemployed from tne wavering private and state-local administrative 
uiiits it instituted first, a vast federal "work relief" program and second, 
social security legislation. The work relief program, based originally on 
the necessity of feeding the unemployed, was soon transformed into a pro­
gram having a more significant objective, namely, that of remedying the 
economic crisis. However, the objective of social insurance was provided 
for in the Social Security Act of 1935. Provision was made under the Act 
for unemployment insurance (essentially administered by the states), old 
age insurance, and special aid to needy persons such as dependent children, 
rehabilitation for the physically disabled, and so on. fao years previously 
the Wagem-p^rser Act provided for the establishment of employment exchanges 
in order to increase the mobililgr of labor and provide the worker with in­
formation regarding the labor market, paralleling similar senrices provided 
for other groups in the economy, e.g., agriculture, commerce, and industry. 
6h. 
In sinaaarlBinc the policy of the Federal govemmoat in this area it 
need only be pointed out that the Tfhole social seciirity program rests 
largely upon cthioal and moral fovindationsj the premise is that it is the 
responsibility of aocioty to care for those "rtio for some reason are tempo­
rarily or permanently unable to care for thomselvoa* As ouch it represents 
the greatest departure in public policy yet experienced by our federal 
government in its attocipt to regiilate the econoqy. 
Uo attei:5)t has been laade in this stud:/- to give a detailed account of 
all the policy proposals enacted during our historj-. Moreover, many con­
siderations of an economic nature affecting labor policy -were only touched on. 
Nevertheless, a continuous thread seems to underlie the fabric of labor policy 
from colonial tiices to the present. At times it tras difficult to detorndiie 
the direction or goal of legislative enactoents, covart decisions or adminis­
trative orders. But as Jevons has said: 
• •• tie mu3t remember that, do what T?e will, we are not to 
expect approach to perfection in social affairs, '."e must 
recognize the fact clearly that ^ re have to deal Tdth corrolex 
aggregates of people and institutions, vAich we cannot usually 
dissect and treat piecemeal. v;e must often take 'all in all 
or not at all* • Tolerance therefore is indispensable. VJ^e 
may be obliged to bear with evil for a time that -we may avoid 
a worse evil, or that we maj'" not extinguish the beginnings of 
good. In tlie end we shall not be disappointed if our efforts 
are really directed towards that good of the people vrtiich Tras 
long ago pronounced to be the highest lair.^ 
Ijevons, Vr.S., The State in Relation to Labour, loacmillan and Co., 
London, 1882, p. iM. 
Economic Gxiideposts For Policy Decisions 
Policy Defined! The term "policy" may be defined as any action or 
procedure -vrfaich conforms to or takes cognizance of prudence or expediency. 
Government policy therefore, suggests such action or procedure directed 
toward individue.ls or groups and designed to re^julate their mode of 
conduct vdth reject to each other• 
Democratic governments are delimited in their procedures, hoaTOver, by 
two major considerations. The objectives of policy must be consistent with 
the generally accepted ends of society. But this is only a necessary 
condition. It may not be sufficient, however, if certaiia means, apaart from 
the end in view, are barred, or if the connsunity has certain preferences 
with regard to the alternative means utilized. Uany of the difficulties 
encountered by policy makers today stem from these sources. They are not 
only required to carry out policies based on acceptable ends, but the means 
of implementing these policies are also selected for them, 'iihy then 
is it necessary to frame a policy or enact a laur if society already has 
passed judgment on such matters and presumably acts in accordance tilth those 
rules of conduct "vjhich it would advocate? Admittedly public sentiment 
is a far more effective method of social control than the most carefully 
draisn legal enactments. But in i^ite of the t-wo foregoing restrictions 
placed on the policy maker there are good reasons for atteK5»ting to regulate 
the activities of individuals and other economic units. First, society may 
agree that fundamental changes in behavior are desirable but that action 
must require all units to change tiieir behavior simultaneously lest the 
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laore ventxiresoae are taken advantage of by those v.-ho have much to gain by 
maintaining the status QUO* Secondly, although society may in the aggregate 
behave in a particiilar fashion, individuals or groups iray on occasion deviate 
from the accepted norm imless restrained by lair or the mores of society. In 
this case laira are dravai essentially for the non-conformist. 
The Natxu'e of Lavri In any case lairs are frequently drawn in an effort 
to substantiate public desire, V/hitehead lists several reasons for tlie en­
actment of legislation for this purpose: 
(1) Certain persons may be tempted to ignore public sentiment, 
or even their own usual sentiments, for an inmiediate personal 
sain 
(2) People are forgetful and public sentiments cannot al^i-ays 
be mobilized or ascertained on the spur of tho moment 5 they 
require dramatic and formal statement ••• 
(3) Public sentiment is directed towards a desired end; it 
often fails to indicate the means. In fact, the latter some­
times involve highly con^lex matters requiring technical 
knowledge 
(ii) Public sentiment may be sufficiently coherent but be out 
of touch Tvith a group whose actions it wishes to guide ••• 
(5) Vihere the actions of a number of people, often strangers 
to each other, interlock, it is iiiqiortant to taioiw isrhat each 
member is going to do. Sometimes certainty of expectation 
is more important than the precise code adopted. The public 
sentiment is merely that there shall be some reasonable code 
universally adopted ••• 
(6) An actTial situation requiring immediate public attention 
is always local both in space and in time, The local sentiment 
may be temporarily biased and fail to represent the more stable 
sentiments of society at large 
Hole of Administrator: Any discussion of government intervention in the 
economic affairs of individuals or groups must consider the vehicle by -which 
^TShitehead, Leadership In A Free Society, tlarvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1937* pp. 20U-2b6T 
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policies are impleiaented» We have alreatJy mentioned the nature of the legal 
process, but intentionally li^y-passed the adjEinistrator of the It is 
therefore necessary to consider the role of the administrator in the carrj'ing 
out of any program, "The purpose of all law is to inpose fixed patterns of 
behavior upon the life of society. Ho fixed pattern can ever hope to be 
comprehensive enough to make adequate provision for all contingencies*"^ 
Hence, the aciiainistrator must be given siuTicient discretionary power to cope 
^vith problems Hying -Pfithin tho area affected by the legi3l?tion. It -jrould be 
a rare phenomenon indeed to find a law so framed that interpretations of one 
sort or another isrere found unnecessary. Yet too frequently administrators 
are accused of being arbitrary and dictatorial -when iii fact critics are re­
questing that the law administer itself. 
In recent years, as a result of the many outcries against vesting 
administrators Tsith arbitrary poiror, a pattern of legislation has growx up 
which attempts to accomplish two major objectives: (l) law by formula, 
TOiereby I'elatively simple calculati. ns can provide appropriate courses of 
action and (2) legal inflexibility, 'vdaereby legislators as suae the partial 
function of the administrator and consequently limit the discretionary 
authority of the appointed administrator. 
It is obvious that the two foregoing objectives are someishat inconsistent. 
Although the dangers of vesting individuals with arbitrary administrative 
authority have been perhaps und\ily snphasized, it must not be forgotten that 
^i/atkins, "The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship"^ in Public 
Policy, edited by Friedrich, C.J. and Mason, S.S., Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 19iiO, p. 330.. 
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legislTition by ronaula aay be juat as arbitrary. The latter is unquestionably 
the noro dangerous approach, since no s;bigle individual can be held responsible 
for the "uistakes" iirliich may take place, and it is protected by the cloalc of 
legislative ononysiity. A nore fruitful approach has been sugcested by Hart: 
A pmaisint conproniise lies in rrhat may be tagged 'fraiiiework —-
incentive' plaming. Uuch of our planriing intelligence should 
£•0 into aappirig out a 'fraj.iev/orlc' of rules for economic affairs, 
designed to serve with only gradual changest But there has to 
be a variable elenent in policy — particulej^ly economic stabi­
lization policy. The 'fraaework-incentive* approach tries to 
limi t this variable element to injjjersonal and impartial measures, 
carried out -sdth full publicity and miniaizing the dan^^:er that 
individuals will be 'puslied around' by officials — or by other 
individuals wiio know hov to take advantage of quirks in the rules 
and bheir enforcecent. These measures, then, mil not consist of 
*directives' from government to particular firms or households. 
They vdll influence private decisions by chan£in£ the 'incentives' 
Tv-hich underlie those decisions ~largelj'- by affecting markets.^ 
It is Tdthin this general context that economic analysis is to provide 
the guidepoots for policy decisions. 
Acceptability of rinds t There are cerbain broad objectives v^iich the 
citisens of any society seek to fulfill. In the selection of alternative 
means to be used in achieving these goals the economist can provide a valuable 
service to the comminity. Siibject to the restrictions placed on the means to 
be utilised, a maSber of ends can be taken as given. Various -writers have 
attempted to set forth the major values held by democratic societies. Other 
value systems might be used just as -well to guide economic policy. These 
include value systems irtiich are held by fecial interest groups Tsithin a 
%art, A.G« Money. Debt and i:.conomic Activity. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Hew 
lork, 19u8, p. kZO* 
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democratic society as well as those held by societies not i^ipressed with 
the democratic ideal. Many of the difficiilties encountered by policy 
makers in the United States, however, grow out of the dual system of values 
supported by individuals as members of society at large aiid as menibers of 
special interest groups. One coTj.d in fact saj" that there exists a 
"priority of loyalties", each category havinj:- its o\m set of values, the 
conponents of T.-hich may agree or conflict ivith those of another set. In 
evaluating a set of ends it is not on3y necessary to question its Internal 
consistency but also the coiiipatibility of one set rrith other sets adhered 
to by individuals. 
Several questions are raised by the foregoing discussion. Do -vve 
assume too isruch in describing the behavior of individuals in terms of 
rational conduct? If the components of several sets of value ^sterns con­
flict, can •we conclude that the individual is acting irrationally? 
Harniheiin in discussing the "crisis in valuation" sets forth the major 
contradictions facing our contemporai^-- social environment. 
First, there is the religion of love and universal brotherhood, 
mainly inspired by Christian tradition, as a measuring-rod for 
our activities* Then there is the philosophj'' of Enlightenment 
and Liberalism, -with its esiphasis on fpeedcai and personality^ 
and its appreciation of Tfealth, 3ec\irity, happiness, tolerance 
and philanthropy as the means of achieving them. Then -we have 
the challenge of the Socialists, T^O rate equality, social 
justice, basic sectirity and a planned social order as the chief 
desiderata of the age. Bub beyond all this we have ... the 
most recent philosopty, vdtb the demoniac image of man empha­
sizing fertility, race, power, and the tribal and military 
virtues of conquest, discipline and blini obedience.1 
Mannheim, K», Diagnosis of Our Time, Oxford University Press, Hew 
York, 1914;, pTa^I 
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This cleavage of goals rms soine-vjhat deeper than the mere recounting of 
formal value systems. For as Mannheim points out, 
it is not only "srork but also leisure that is subjected to 
entirely different inteipretations and valuations. The 
puritan sense of guilt in connection ivith leisure and re­
creation is still at vfar -with the emerging hedonistic cult 
of vitality and health. The idea of privacy and conteixplaticn, 
and of their value, is at v/ar with that of mass enjoyment and 
mass ecstasy.l 
Yet this too, according to llannheijn, is not the whole story. There are 
even more fundamental differences: 
Thus there is nothing in our lives, not even on the level of 
basic habits such as food, manners, behavior, about -which our 
views are not at variance. V/e do not even agree as to whether 
this great variety of opinions is good or bad, whether the 
greater comformity of the past or the modem emphasis on choice 
is to be preferred.2 
It is fundamental therefore that we reopen completely the wiiole matter 
of ends which are presimed to be acceptable to society. There have been 
innumerable discussions recently of policy and planning T<hich take specific 
goals as given and propose alternative means to achieve these ends. 
Copland, for exaiaple, lists the following acceptable ends as guides for 
the policy maker: 
(1) Stable employjient at a high level. 
(2) A more equitable distribution of the products of industry. 
(3) A rising standard of living. 
(li) A wide scope for private enterprise within the framework 
of social control* 
(5) The maintenance of a vigorous system of private enterprise.3 
^Ibid., p. 17. 
Sidem., p. 17« 
3Copland, D.B., The Soad to High Eng)loymentj Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 19h5s P* 67. 
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Boa-mn and Bach provide another llat of acceptable objectives: 
1. Allocation of resources in accordance with consumer preferences. 
2. Freedom in the choice of a job or business. 
3. Equity in the distribution of income. 
i;. Pinagress in raisinc planes of livintr, elimination of iraste. 
5- Stability and security. 1 
A third list of objectives is provided by Allen and urownlee: 
(1) Econom-c policy and economic efl'iciency. 
(2) Full production and employnent. 
(3) Freedom in resource disposal* 
(it) Economic progress. 
(5) i^uity in the distribution of income .2 
In each case the rariters admit that there are many difficulties to be 
encountered in determining acceptable policy. They also admit that a 
particular wrd (e.g., equity) or phrase (e.g., stability and security) may 
mean different things to different people. Yet all infer that society does 
in fact have a system of values and the task of the policy maker involves 
the discovei^^ of that set having "universal" appeal. There are reasons for 
believing that much of the "means-ends" discussion taking place among 
economists today presents a vast over-simplification of the concept. In 
fact the goals of a society are nebulous phenomena involving perhaps as 
much in the way of "process" as they do in the iTay of "principle". A scjne-
Yfhat clearer restatement of the foregoing is provided by Uannheini. 
There is definitely a coherent system of social and 
psychological activities -which constitute the process 
of valuation; among them value creation, value 
iBoTEnan, H.J. and Bach, G.L.j Economic Analysis and Public Policy, 
Prentice-Hall, Kew York, 19116, p. lijl. 
^Allen, E.D. and Bromnlee, O.H., Economics of Public Finance, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 19U1, l^T" 
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dissemination, value reconciliation, value standardization, 
value assimilation -which favoui' or upsetthe smooth v/orking 
of the process of valuation.^ 
He then goes on to say that the process no longer works smootUy because 
fundamental social factors on which the process depended have broken doY?n.2 
If then policy decisions and planning are to take place in a veritable 
Tsildemess of values, the role of the economist takes on new significance. 
As Mannheim sees it, (and as the field of welfare economics provides 
tecliniquea of analysis), the economist 
should tell us "which classes and groups will profit, which 
uill lose most, if one scheme or another is carried out. 
... If T?e knoTT T(jho will suffer most from any necessary 
alterations, it is possible to provide for them, to conqjen-
sate them, to re-train them, to give them new functions in 
society.3 
Insofar as values are concerned, the economist can only recognize the 
existence of three broad areas of valuation, taking the first area as the 
frameirork for policy decisions and the cocpensation principle of trelfare 
economics as the major device in reconciling conflicts -kThich may arise 
between the other two. For example, ends or goals may be classified 
under the foUoTring three main headings:4 
(1) General Ethics 
(2) Ethics of personal relationships 
(3) Ethics of organized relationships. 
^Ijiannheim, K., 0£. clt., p. 20. 
2lbid. 
3lbid.. p. 158. 
^Ibid., p. 165. 
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The selection of means attempting to acliieve goals -vjhich confonB to 
(l) above are appropriate and do not necessitate compensation if (2) and 
(3) remain unaffected as a resxilt of the action taken» Any policies, how­
ever, •R'hich of necessity directly involve (2) and (3) may be legitimate, 
providing compensation is made to the individuals or groups adversely 
affected. 
The allocation problem 
Amid the maze of conflicting values, one end or goal in the realm of 
"general ethics" that most citiaens wuld stibscribeito, in principle at 
least, is that -sraste and inefficiency in a trorld of scarcity is unjustified 
and should not be tolerated. Since "smste and inefficiency exist, however, 
and individuals or groups earn their liviiig by engaging in such activities, 
any reorgaiiisation designed to eliminate isasteftilness laust iKsediately talae 
account of the value system guiding the behavior of individuals thereby 
affected. 
As Talcott Parsons points out in connection "sdth his description of 
^ax Y^eber's analysis* 
It is at this point that v;eber introduces one of the 
fuj^daraental elesients of tension in the modern economy, 
TJhat he calls the tension betisreen the ^formal" and 'sub­
stantive* (laaterial) rationality of the economy. the 
unfamiliar term formal rationality he means the extent to 
which it is possible to carry through accurate rational 
calculation of the quantities involved in economic orienta­
tion of either of the above types, and hence to act won 
the results of such calculation* By substantive rationality, 
on the other hand, he means the extent to which it is possible 
to secure what, according to a given system of values, is an 
adequate provision of a population -wi-tii goods and services, 
and in the process remain in accord vfith the ethical 
requirements of the system of norms. 
The tension arises from the fact that a high level of formal 
rationality can be attained oniy under certain specific sub­
stantive conditions, wliich are almys in some iiaportant viays 
in conflict -with the interests and moral sentiments implied 
in a high level of substantive rationality.^ 
For the policy mater, a less sophisticated statement of the problem of 
efficiency must do. This is not to say that the tensions enumerated by 
Weber are imiiiiportant. Disregarding them nay in fact sabotage any effort 
to improve on the manner in which the economic process is to be reorientated. 
One -my of minimiaing these tensions, i.e. by attempting a reallocation of 
resources in a full employment enviroment, tdll be taken later. For the 
present, ho-wever, it -sTill be useful to r^ecify more rigorously the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of an optimum allocation of resources, a3S\iring 
the absence of restriction on resource mobility and the availability of 
adequate knowledge on which economic decisions are to be based. Under these 
circumstances the major purpose of economic analysis is one of comparison — 
between the present situation and v<hat might be achieved under the same 
circumstances. And, as Johtison has pointed out, "Vie'sred in this light, the 
major problems arise as discrepancies between, the tw) circumstances ."2 
V/e must therefore investigate the character of our labor markets and the 
I  •  •  1  I  •  •  I I  . 1  I  ,  •  ,  •  
%eber. Max, The Theory of Social And £conomic Organization, translated 
by A ji. Henderson and T^cdtt Parsons, Oxford University'' Press, Kew York, 
19h7, pp. 3^-36. 
2Johnson, D»G#, "Contribution Of Price Policy To the Ihcome And Resource 
Problems In Agricixlture", Jotaraal of Farm Economics, 1jtol» 26, November, 
l^iOt, p. 631. 
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extent to vriiioh Traige policy can contribute to a better alloci-.tion of labor 
resources than vre now find prevalent. Kundamontally, in an enteri)riw*JO 
econorc', the price ncchanisffl (as it applies to both factor and coaiodity 
prices) has a tlireofold function* (1) it detemines the raaniior in vhioh 
goods and services idll be distributed anong conauners, (2) it determines 
how the factors of production rdll be distributed among their many alter­
native uses, (3) it deteminoa Tihat share of the total income produced will 
go to the owners of productive resources. V.ith respect to resoiffce allo­
cation, an optimum division of the factors of production is reached when 
it is no longer possible to increase total output shifting a factor of 
production from one use to another. Or, as Lemer describes it, "The 
optimum division of a factor among different uses irrolies that the value 
of its marginal product is not lesii than the value of aagr alternative 
marginal product."^ 
In our labor markets thes« conditions are not fulfilled because! 
(1) Mobility of labor is restricted due to trade union regulations, 
iii^jerfect knowledge concemirg Job opportunities, social and economic 
costs of movement and the heterogeneous character of the labor market 
(i.e. skill ?nd experience requirements attached to different kinds of 
enployaent). 
(2) There are izoperfecticns in the cossaoditgr siarl»ts (i«e« the 
existence of monopoly, oligc^o]^ and laonopolistic coi^etition) • 
^Lemer, A.P., The Kconcaaics of Control, Macmillan Company, New York, 
19i4it, p. $9* 
(3) ^her© are imperfections in the factor markets, apart from those 
resulting from labor iiaaobility (i.e. the existence of monopsony, oligopsony 
and monopsonistic competition)> 
Labor policy, as seen from the vantage point of the policy-siaker, must 
therefore attempt to rectifj' (l) and (3) above if an e:jrolicit resource 
problem is to be recognized. Other policies, outside the scope of labor 
policy, are reqtiired to deal vrith (2). But in any case it must be recognized 
that a govemnent program designed to meet the allocation problem must be 
an integrated one. It toll not do to attenipt to cope -rith one or the other 
of the components listed above* Many of our labor problems today grow out 
of the difx'erential treiataent accorded business groups or agricultural groups 
as conpared to laboring groups# Obviously in a complex economy such as ours, 
"monopoly" breeds "monopoly" — unhampered restriction on the part of one 
group i^rovides the incentive and "justification" for all other groups in 
society to use the same techniques. *'ie can preach, if we like, about industry, 
labor, or agriculture making the initial sacrifice, but no one groi^) -willingly 
•vjill give ig) restriction merely to prove to the others that it recognizes the 
harm its actions have caused the general urelfare and would like the others to 
follow its exan^le. As Sir Oliver Franks has recently suggested. 
Central planning means that it is no longer possible for 
a Government to have a nimber of policies each of -sshich can 
be pursued to some extent independently of the others. 
fbusing, social security, e:^orts and defense are all factors 
in the general plan: the extent to ^ ich resources can be 
devoted to each is determined -sjhen the gexieral balance is struck*^ 
^Franks, Sir Oliver, Central Planning and Control in "((ax and Peacej 
Harvard University Press, Canfcridge, 1^7> P* 33• 
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Partially responsible for the resource problem in our labor markets 
is the coxif-usion is-hich exists with respect to the dual fundtion of the 
wage mechanism# ^Vage rates not only allocate labor but also determine, 
in part, the income of laborers. Analytically, hmvever, & useful sepa­
ration can be made betvreen the income problem and the jresoiarce problem.^ 
This separation however seems to he ignored, for example, in the framing 
of minimum "wage legislation and trade union leaders are necessarilj'- oblivious 
to the employment effects of their mage bargains It is therefore itapera-
tive that policy-siakers understand clearly the nature of the incooe problem. 
The income problem 
Dr» Johnson provides the following definition: 
The divergence bet'seen the actual distribution of personal incomes 
resulting from resource prices and the existit:g ovnaership of re­
sources, and tha^ fulfilling adequate democratic social -BfeUare 
criteria constitutes income problem.3 
Frequently, labor economists and policy-makers fail to distinguish adequately 
betTjeen the wage rate and the ^mge income received by -.vorliers. It is not sur­
prising thiat this distinction should be confused since the iTage rate is an 
in^ortant, but not sufficient, component of income. The income of an individual 
^Johnson, D.G., o£. cit«j p. 633* This distinction is also made by 
Schultz, Nichols and other -writers in the field of agricultural policy. 
2seej Ross, A.IS., Trade Union Wage Policy, University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los AngelssT'lplIB, pp. 80 ff., for a discussion of the •wage-
employment elements in collective bargaining* 
3 
Johnson, D.G., og. cit>, p. 633* 
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in a private enterprise econony, however, is detersiined by several criteria: 
(a) the existing distribution of rescm-ce ovaiership (physical property, 
etc.); 
(b) the existing distribution of personal property (including personal 
skill and capacity); 
(c) payment'4 made by society for the use of these resources. 
The actual distribution of income can be altered, of course, by altering 
any one or some combination of the above incojue components. It should be 
noticed, hov/ever, that even in a perfectly competitive enterprise economy, 
•where all factors are fully en^loyed and factor prices coincide vdth the 
economic contribution of each factor at the margin, indi\^idual incomes ^ ^X)uld 
not necessarily meet the Trelfare standards usually accepted as the Aaerican 
ideal. This is so because of tiie great divergence of resource owiership as 
betfreen one individual and another in society. Althov^h Euch can be done to 
alter the owiership of physical pr<^erty — all men are not created equal — 
there are i?ide differences to be found among individuals with regard to 
aptitude, intelligence, and inherited skills. And since these elesients of 
personal property are offered to society at a price, th-e relatively scarce 
offerings Tdll obtain a preiaiun over the nore abundant. In the real Tforld 
these differential payments are further accentuated by the attea^jts of in­
dividuals and groups to deny others free access to those opportunities Tsihich 
would enable them to maximize their econoiaic contribution. 
The great advantage of giving the price mechanisni free reign rests on 
its superioidty as an allocative device. Society has shoifm that mdesirable 
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ineoiae efreots which may be attributable to its oethod of operation oan 
be dealt ".vith by othur nean3« xundaaentcU^i the graduated ^personal income 
tax, the provision of free education, siodicol ^iervices, and the like are 
all designed to oltlgato the distortions of incooe distributed on the basis 
of economic contribution and exiatinc resource otmership. 
Govonnoat labor oolicy haa aiad the resource and incosie problem badly 
in the; past, and if it follows the present procedures used in acricultural 
policy as a £nii«lG -or future labor policy it tfould indeed be unfortunate. 
In "What follows a separation of the incoao problea anc; the resource 
problem idll be undertaken in an ef. ort to clarify the major problems con­
fronting labor aarketa. 1MB analytic separation, elthoucb someTrhat arti­
ficial, since attecpts to influence income msy also lead to allocative effects 
as well, nevertheless has the lacrit of etmhasiaine tho particular objectives 
requiring attention. It also avoids certain rather naive notions concerning 
the applicability of policies affecting the inconie problem to the further 
use of dealing with problems of allocati(»i* Admittedly, there are restricted 
areas in which improvements in the distribution of incocae vdJLl at the same 
time contribute to the more efficient utilization of the human agent; for 
exEusple, greater mobility may as a consequence be achieved or b>etter education 
may enhance the value of the vrorl^r in the labor market. But there are 
limitations to the usefulness of such techniques in dealing T<-ith the more 
cougjlex features of the resource problem. In a similar fashion, efforts to 
enhance the income of individuals by increasing the price (wage) of the 
service they have to sell may fall short of achievsincait, since the quantity 
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of the service that can be sold at the higher price may not be sufficient 
to provide aix adequate inccme. 
It T/'ould seem preferable, therefore, to permit the TOge mechanism to 
fimction vinhau^ered in our labor markets, meeting the income problem specifi­
cally "Whenever or -Rherever it arises. 
From Tfhat has been said thus far it should not be inferred that rational 
labor policy can provide a cure for the other economic ills affecting society, 
but a consistent overall economic program must Include a public -wage policy 
geared to these larger objectives. 
¥e shall, therefore, restrict ourselves to the folio?,-ing relevant con­
siderations: 
(1) The activities of trade unions as they facilitate or inhibit 
the most efficient utilization of labor. 
(2) Governmental labor policies idiich are suited to deal VTith 
problems created by such activities* 
(3) The areas of conflict between policies attenpting to meet 
the income problem and those designed to solve the resource problem. 
Aim And Scope Of Study 
Vihat mjor labor problems lie specifically within the realm of govern­
ment intervention? How may government cope mth industrial conflict, yet 
remain xjithin the bounds prescribed by an tenterprise economy? Under ^ at 
circumstances is it legitimate for government to overstep these bounds, 
providing the individual's relative freedom iii the disposition of his 
81. 
resources is safeguarded? 
These are policy'" questions Tjhich the economist can say something about. 
The difficxilties to be encountered in providing solutions, however, are not 
to be minimized. As one author has pointed out: 
Of all the possible points of conflict between conscious 
planning of priorities and traditional freedoms, the reg­
ulation of wages is likel)r to prove the most stornQr, 
Successful planning may indeed be dependent here upon deep 
changes in social attitudes. For if certain jobs are in 
fact to be done, it is obvious that there cannot both be 
complete freedom to choose and to refuse your job, and 
equal freedom to choose and refuse the -arages that you are 
to be paid, except in the sense that free choice of en^jloy-
ment necessarily iniplies the right to turn a job doroi on 
the ground that the wages offered are insufficient, "here, 
however, ••• the practice of independent collective bar~ 
gaining is well established, organized wrkers are accustomed 
to claim much more than this. They expect the rates of 
•wages paj'-able in different trades and occupations to be 
fixed by a process of free collective bargaindjig bet"ween 
the enqployers and vrarkers in which nobody else has meddled.^ 
Much that has been said in recent years about the role of the social 
scientist in dealing with policy matters bears repetition even at the risk 
of belaboring the argument. The "means-ends schema" has a peculiar signi­
ficance triien applied to labor policy, inasmuch as the generally accepted 
"ends" of society manifest many inconsistencies. Indeed, the economist is 
required to skate on thin ice, dotted TO-th special interests "fishing" in 
a multitude of economic crevices. There are not merely conflicts of 
interest to be reconciled between labor and management. There are deep 
conflicts to be reconciled between sldJLled and unskilled organized vrorkersj 
•workers belonging to •trade unions and the unorganized isorkerj "srorkers in one 
^Vibotton, B., Freedcan Under Plm-mingj University of Uorth Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, IpliS, p • 
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geographical area aiid those located olsetfhere, and £30 on. More difficult 
perhaps is the conflict of iiitereat inherent in the Trorker as worlcer and 
the vrorker as consumer. Nevertheless, ^ovemment must either take direct 
action or provide the necessary econojuic environment in -which these self-
iiiflicted wounds aay heal. 
Because of the natiare of the subject, niuch of the argument vrhich 
follows "Will confine itself to the broader questions of policyj namely^ 
the optimum allocation of labor resources and the achievement of full 
employment. Frequently, hovfever, it will be necessary to investigate the 
behavior of the individual trade union or fim aa the motivations of these 
organisms bear directly-- upon the questioii at hand. 
For the most part, the theoretical principles ujiderl^dng each of the 
major areas of investigation •will precede the policy recommendations made. 
No attempt •vriJLl be made to cover anaDytically the entire field of 
legislation affecting labor since this study contemplates problems rdiich 
are bound to arise as a result of past enactments, have in effect only 
set the stage for isaportant policy decisions, now that a substantial balance 
of ponmr has been achieved between labor and management. The use of the 
term "balance of power" in no way reflects any judgement on the part of the 
author -^ri-th respect to its desirability as a continuing policy. It is also 
recognized that a "balance of power" policy in the field of industrial 
relations is subject to the same criticism as it has been in international 
affairs,^ 
Baylor, GGoverrmient Regulation of Industrial Relations, Prentice-
Hall, inc.. New lork, 19li{3, pp. 336 
Perhaps the major reaaon for re;)octing the "balance of power" concept 
is that it involves a precarious arrant;ement and is extremeljr unstable. This 
vaa:r or may not be true. Much depends on -what society does about removing 
the forces nrhich accoimt for the instability. It is o\ir contention that a 
"labor policy" Tdll contrilute toward this end. 
The uncertain courae of economic events in our econorny has provided 
the major econojaic groups afiocted v/ith two prliiarj'' incentives. In the first 
place, T/herevor disturbances of an oconomic nature are imi.iinent or antici­
pated, attempts are made to "cushion" the shocks Tdth a aainimuat of sacrifice. 
These endeavors are illustrated by the activities of workers, organised or 
not, to protect onployaunt opportunities, investment in skill, occupational 
preferences, and earning power groTiing out of technological change. Labor 
iumobility is also soiaeTthat related to this first incentive. The "lun?) of 
labor" principle and the fear of cyclical unemployaent are in part an out­
growth of this initial motivation. They all represent a behavior pattern 
designed to prevent any deterioration in the econoaic status of the grox^). 
Secondly, all groups have aspirations designed to improve their immediate 
economic status. Considerable gains can be achieved without ioiposing losses 
on other groups, but frequently success is measured by gains achieved at the 
e3q>ense of others. The economic problems that stem from this soiirce, however, 
are made difficult fundamentally because of the existing mores and "codes of 
conduct" prevalent in our society. The sociological investigations dealing 
with "•?4iibe-collar and business crimebear out this contention. Hence, 
Vor a definition of "ivhite-collar crine" see infira p. HI. 
v/hat govemmenti policies are appropriate to deal 'with econoEiic •weli'are when 
individual satiafacbions are measuxed not only in teras of net gains to 
the groxip concerned but losses inflicted on opposing groups as vjell?^ 
Pi'ofound chanties of a secular nature invol'ving population and technology 
are constant!!;/ affecting the nwnber of vx>rkQr3 seekhig jobs in the aggregate 
and fJie kinds of jobs the.y arc- lilcelj'- to find. Cver night a vrorlwr my find 
his skill obsolete as a result of some teolmological innovation. In the 
business coiamunity, such obsolescence can be taken care of by amoi'tiaaticn 
schemes, tax deductions, etc. Can government provide siiailar allowances on 
a reasonably comparable basis for m)rkers subject to such risks? It would 
appear, from a policy standpoint, that a "secular manpower budget", which 
•would indicate the required increases and decreases in occupational categories, 
over a ten~year period, could easily be draim up to meet the fluctuating re~ 
quirements of o;xr labor markets. The recent Twentieth Century Fund survey 
Tjould provide much of the basis for such a budget.^ 
Although the eraphasis thus far has been related to the institutional 
and secrilar forces at vrork in o'ur labor markets and the goverximental 
policies required to meet the problems these create, our apparently chronic 
deviations frtjm full emplojnaent suggest a more imiicediate task. let in thia 
area the gravity of the problem is somerfhat more difficult to alleviate 
^An elaboration of this point can be found in Tintner, G"A Note Cn 
Welfare Economics", Bconometrica» vol. II4, Ko. 1, Janucry, 191^6, p. 7li» 
Sjie'wh'ur-st, J ., et. al, ^ erica' s Needs And Besources, The Tvrentieth 
Century Fuhd, Kevr York, 194^. 
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since economic thooiy is not able to provide an adequate solution, and 
certain governmental policies that ma;^' prove fruitful are not coiiipletely 
acceptable to society* 
Tlie iiaal section ol' this stud^^*" atte.'apts to 3ug';e3t a unified labor 
policy to be followed by the Federal Governnient under varyL^.g x)olitical 
circumstaiices and sorae of the specil'ic obstacles to be overcoiae. 
3C. 
Tho rroblen oi' Adaptation 
Uoth labor ai;U Kar"ui^;u;:c;it arc jubjvct to oJ 
co:.at.'iritli' upaetwirij.^ fc^;t£blli;h>-d CiJtUQii ojl boiiivisr. The vv;ry proceaa 
of chazi e is rcipu;j:au.it 5>t ::ili iaiititLiticaa .-^cl ;3t«i;'.LLkrci3 ci" j..-rocecli.u'e whi-Ch 
have b&tift predicated on the oiiiat-Qriaiioe oi" the jt-^bus quo. por aCj 
aot only thr^sateaa tlia cxclc-sive i-^oaitioria obtai.i<i<I i:i rrujiiiy by 
i&rgce iiivestaeats! ci" inoae^' anu e-fforfc.- It also caui>til3 iiiuivicluala a:id 
groups to aacrii'ice operat/ioaal wrocseclured ingrainet". thrjutli i'orco c£ h£.bit. 
Ill order to iivoic the conXusioaitj a^jioociatyd rdth choixc,'^, a.Oot iri<.Iividuala 
ajid nroups attea.pt either to pro'/isjit c]iani;c iilto£v,thor or ac'opt praciticea 
•pfhich TSrill ialnl'r>i?<e th'S coricooitar.t dialocstioua. That ia to gfj;*, chan;:« 
ma^'- be u. nriittfed to co-iws about f^adu&lly vtj.la uivvisi^n is sinultazieo-aaly 
be uifc ziLce £cr <iujiistutait. This latter procudur-o, boKever, ia aot ixlxnxjs 
*eas5icle if the proceas of adjaataout involyea ulie cooper. ".Ion of cxtcm&l 
Torces over vexich iihw {;roup subject to clxango haa no coji^rol. lu ch^it 
evsat, cosipltite resistance Kill iiivarie.b!ii' be the policy rollowed. 
occiety has a Lirge sti^ke in the eiicotu'iigeiient or eco.'ioniic pro^iress* 
Frequently, ho?,"ever, tiiare is eere recognition or the iiuv.mtages to be 
obtained, without coxjsdxJeration of the coaditiona necessary for its 
ultimate Tiniversal acceptability. Tjjdrfc are four -iajor sources of insta­
bility in an eoosionsy which reqiJ-re alternative fcxras of adjustment on the 
part of tho individuala or groups affected. They can be cles-idfied according 
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to the following catagorles; 
(a) Adaptation to technological innovation. 
(b) Adaptation to labor iomobility. 
(c) Adaptation to non-economic "codes of conduct". 
(d) Adaptation to cyclical insecurity. 
Each of these categories raises special problems of a policy nature 
and will be discussed in the order presented above. 
Technological innovations 
The in5)act of technology on society, and more specifically on labor, has 
many facets. One could, of course, approach t^ problem from as many different 
points of view.^ Here, however, we are concerned with only two aspects of the 
problem: (1) what factors enter into the decisions of entrepreneurs with 
respect to thsir adoption of iimovations, and (2) what is the reaction of 
labor to such changes. Government policy, of course, can provide the necessary 
environment in which technological improveaents may be facilitated. Secondly, 
government polity can create a favorable economic climate in w^dcii labor 
unions would feel leas obligated to safeguard the job tenure and investments 
in skill of their membera. 
perhaps the most satisfactory analysis yet to appear of entrepreneurial 
behavior with regard to the application of innovations is that provided by 
Lange. previous attempts on tMs subject, notably the analysis provided by 
^Gourvitch, A.. Survey of Economic Theory on Technological change And 
Employment, Work Projects Administration,1fational Research proj6*5^7 
Report No. Q-6, May, 19ijO. 
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Joan Robinson,1 omit the important elements of risk and Tmcertainty attached 
to such decisions. 
Lange proceeds in the follomng fashion. Ke first points out that: 
"As a rule, future receipts and future esqpenses are ejspected mth a minor 
or major degree of uncertajjity, and this uncertainty is taken into account 
by the firm v/hen planning its activities«"2 The entrepreneur, in making 
his decisions, has some notion regarding "the most probable ovitocme of the 
decision and the range mthin which the actual outcome may deviate from 
the most probable one."3 It is further assumed that firms are willing to 
pay for reduced uncertainty by sacrificing a portion of their most proba­
ble value of expected receipts or by incui'i-ing a somewhat greater most 




^Hobinson, J., "The Classification of Inventions", Heview of Sconomic 
Studies, vol. 5, 1937-1938, pp. 139-ll;2, 
Sliange, 0., "A Note on Innovations", in Readings In The Theory of 
Income Distribution, Blakiston Co., Philadelphia, 1946, p. iSl. 
3lbid., p. 182 n. 
89 
Professor Lange calls 00 the "effective receipts" of a firm e:q3ecting 
most probable receipts of OA ivith a range of OB. This is so because 00 
represents subjectively certain receipts (zero range of possible outcomes) 
and represents the value of the most probable receipts that a firm f^ovld 
be vriLlling to accept iri exchange for some higher most probable value but 
subject to a certain amount of risk (OB). The amount necessary to compen­
sate for the difference between complete certainty and the range of un­
certainty, OB, is referred to as the risk premium and is equal to AG in 
Figure 1. 






The indifference curves ia the above case are such that III >11 >1 and 
represent expenditures. The I axis measures most probable expenditure 
values ^ Jhile the X axis represents, again, the range of most probable ex­
penditure values. As in the previous illustration, OC is the effective 
expenditure -while AC is the risk premium. Effective profits therefore are 
calculated by deducting the risk premiums from ail receipts and expenditures 
and it is assumed that the firm seeks to maximize the discounted value of 
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thla efrectivo profit# Lange novr defines iruiovations as "such chant:es in 
production functions wliich make it possible for the finii to increase the 
discounted value of the maximua efx'ective profit obtainable under given 
market conditions*"^ 
linploying the above atxalyais in an efi'ort bo determi.;e the efi'ecta of 
in:iovc.tions i-ihen utilized by oligopolists anc oligopsoniats raise some 
iiuportcait questions of a policy nature. For example, is it sufficient to 
prevent tirade imions frcxii imposing vork restriotions or limitations on the 
introduction of new procea:5es in order bo achieve a better allocation of 
resources? 
Lange goes on to show that, under oligopsonistic conditions, firms prefer 
ioiiovations T;hich are "output-increasing" and at the satae time "factornieutral" • 
He also argues that under oligopoly "output-neutral" and "factor-saving" 
innovations are preferred. These circunstances are then corapared Tdth the 
perfectly coo^etitive case in -Bhich, for the induati^' at least, innovations 
are said to be "output—increasing" but may be either "output-increasing or 
decreasing" for the individual firm* V;ith regard to factors, the net effect, 
however, may be in either direction in the perfectlj'" competitive case .2 
These propositions are easily proved by noticing, in the ease of pur# 
ccarpetition, how new firms are attracted to the industry as a result of 
increased discounted effective profits being available to firms already in 
the industry. ITith respect to oligopoly and oligopsony, the kinked demand 
^Ibid,, p. 185. 
^Ibid.i p. 195. 
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and supply curves •would lead to a lack of response on the part of the firm 
to changes in the marginal cost curves or changes in marginal productivities• 
In any case, the assumption underlying Lange's analysis presupposes 
gains to entrepreneurs in terms of effective profit before innovations are 
adopted, or losses, if they are not adopted. 
Labor, on the other hand, may either gain, lose, or remain unaffected 
as a result of a particular innovation, "hero labor feels that a particular 
innovation vdll affect its -vrelfare adversely, measures are taken to mininiize 
the insecurity resulting from the adoption of the new techniques. Ober, for 
example, points out that trade union policy today seeks the "control, 
regulation, aiid alleviation of the effects of technological change."1 More 
specifically these policies have taken the follordng forms: 
V/here changes in occupations, skills and operations are 
involved, trade-unions have soxight to control the jobs, 
no matter how much they may have been modified by tech­
nological change, through inclusion of the new jobs under 
union jurisdiction. It has now become a central feature 
of trade-union policy that without such control and re­
cognized jurisdiction it is practically impossible to 
make an adjustment under collective bargaining. Along 
with control over the changing jobs there were developed 
policies for regulation of the rate of iiitroduction of 
improvements so that displacement, if it cannot be prevented, 
may at least be reduced to a iaininium. Closely related to 
regulation and control of the number of jobs and -who should 
operate them are a group of policies which have been adopted 
in order to regulate job tenure. The aim of job-beniire 
regulation has been to establish some control over lay-off. 
lOber, HTrade-Union Policy and Technological Change, 'Jork Projects 
Administration, National Research Project, Report No. L-8, April, 
I9U0, p. 7; See also Slichter, S.H., Union Policies and Industri^ 
Management, Brookings Institution, V/ashington, D.C., I9IJ., pp. 201-281. 
Slichter uses a somewhat similar classification in describing trade 
xinion behavior — "obstruction", ''competition", and "control". 
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disoisaal, promoticn, and re-smployinent. Vihere >Torkers have been 
ellamated fr-on an isidustzy as a result of technological changes, 
trade-unions have souj;ht and occasionally obtained dismissal 
compenaation 
It is iuiportant to recognize how the major objectives of trade-unions 
concerning technological change control, regulate, alleviate — coisspare 
nvith the objectives, one Tfould suppose, the couauamity v.-ovild hold in this 
same regard. Fundamentallj'', the coianrunity -y^ould want to achieve these 
identical goals* Hence the governmental policynaalosr Trould presumably util­
ize the alternative means available to achieve these ends. But -KOiild he 
use the saae means employed by the trade unions? Obviously, there may bo 
a conflict of interest between the conimunitiy, the firm, and labor in their 
general preference for the utilization of particular means. 
In the past it TOS generally asstmed that a harmony of interest pre­
vailed among the varioiis groups concerned. The argument would invariably 
take the foUo-alng form: 
On an historical scale, the steady march of technical progress 
TO.11 be reflected, through the reduction of production costs 
all along the line, in a growth of both consumers' demand and 
entrepreneurs' profits — a growth sufficient to assure such 
an expansion of production as tsill maintain the demand, for 
labor in a volume -which -will at least offset the effects of 
increasing labor productivity.^ 
Today the treaknesses of the argtaaent are quite apparent. An increase in 
the demand for goods, for example, need not result in the increased engjloy-
ment of labor but may singly lead to higher prices for goods or perliaps 
to an increased demand for other productive agents. Furthermore, unless 
^Ibid», 
Soourvitch, A., ogi. cit., p» ?• 
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ivivcstJiicnt iiicr(ia£5es or a shirt iji the coasvmjjtion rimction takes place, 
full ev.iplojTTiont looi'- not \.e iiiaintaisied wiien the prochiction fuiictlon chmges. 
These issues, liOTicver, paiiiiallir- c:cplai:; the fears and doubts e^^irossed by 
trade mdoias. 
liven under a policy of full eiaployment, specific la. or groups Jiave 
much to lose v/hen techiiologicnl cl-ciige tlireatens to Trirje out their skills. 
Ho?; then are tlie losses incurred by these groups to 1x3 Tfei^i'hed ai;ainst the 
gains to be derived fro:a a technological reorganization? -iTas iihcrrox 
earlier, Lange iiolds tliat entrepreneurs introduce neiv techniques •vTith the 
expectation of increased profit. Tlie co^aauziity genei'all^'- favors new 
techniques if as a result prices ax-e reduced, or nevr products become avail­
able •which tend to increase satisfactions, iieder lias atteriijted to deal 
•with 'this problejii and j>rovides one possible solution; 
It Liust be not^d -bhat if a reorganization can conceivabli'-
reduce a community's income, this possible loss mst be 
•sreirhed in the bala;ice aj^^ainst any increases that -niiglit 
e-yentuate froa it. And if the individuals in -the coinmiuiity 
are unmlliag to bear the risk of loss consequent upon a 
given reor{]:anization, imposint- the risk upon then -srill 
i-educe v/elfai-e. Theriifore, if rrelfare is to be a !;iaxiuiura, 
opportunities must be given for hedging risks, e.g., 
persons must be free ... to trade their ov.n \iiice;-tain 
cojae (for a given period) for a guaranteed one (or guaranteed 
be'bween certain lisiits) if they can fiiid soneone •'.Tilling 
to mke the trade 
The comaunity of co-urse has a -vital stai:e in seeilig that the "trade" 
is consummated. Ey assuming a portion of the risks it may convince a 
^.eder, M.Yf., Studies in the Theors'- of V/elfare Kconomics, Columbia 
University Press, New York, l^i;?, p. 30. 
particular workers to ijive up tiieir pi'rticular 3ld.ll or cnplojini.it 
i:i favor of a norr devioc or product. % refuaing to aasuae aiij- or the risk 
the coraraunity sinplj'' liivitea tlie v/orker to protect his own intereat. r\m<Ia-
nentally, this portially explains the behavior of the Huaicimia Union, for 
example. 
IfoiT caji bhe connunity assuaic the risks crovdug out of technolo;, leal 
change aa they affect the v;orker? Several surcestions oa this account have 
been made. They ranjje froni the simple re^onsibility of ijovenxaent to pro­
vide "jobs for all" to a nore complex proposal involving joint responsibility 
of aanajrecent as Tiell as governnent. This latter proposal is of particular 
interest since it apparently reflects the official position of t!:e CIO. The 
asaunption of risk is also divided so tliat n^rt of the gains accruing to the 
entrepreneur and the conammity are used to compensate labor directli* for 
losses incurred, rhilip Hurray loas suggested the foUoydng responsibility 
of the entrepreneur: 
1» The Tjorkers to be displaced by technological changes 
should be areabsorbed in the aregular labor turnover of 
the companies installing them. 
2. The •workers to be displaced should be notified at 
least six months in advance. From then until they are 
finally displaced they should be given opportunities 
to leam how to do other jobs where openings develop 
periodilcally. where necessary, expert vocational 
guidance and training should be provided for those 
•workers who cannot easily adjust themselves to other 
jobs* 
3* Those T?orkers for -whoa there are no openings vshen they 
are finaUy displaced, should be employed in some 
capacity \mtil regular jobs open tip for them. The 
imges paid these wrkers until they are placed on reg­
ular Jobs should be charged •fco the original cost of 
the technological change. 
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li. Di^laced -workera -svho suffer a reduction of ten or 
more percent in their average daily earnings aa a 
result of being absorbed on lovrer pa^.-'ing jobs than 
their original ones, should be paid a compensation 
of three percent of tlieir earnings while in the 
service of the company. The job coiapensation pay-
laents should be charged to the cost of the tech­
nological change. 
I'he displaced T/orkers •who, for various reasons, 
cannot be reabsorbed in otiier jobs s?iould be paid 
a disiaissal yrage of ten percent of their earnings 
for a ten-year period, "but not less than OSOO.OO 
to those vrorkers -Rith less than ten years of 
service. The dismisoal Vfages shall be charged to 
the cost of the teciinological change.^ 
This part of Hurray's suggestions is to be incorporated in collective 
bargaining agreements and lie ftirther recommends that industry set aside 
suns of laoney each year for such "social contingencies". Hecogniaing, how-
% 
ever, that inventions affecting -Khole industries, rather than individual 
firms, zisy reqiiire more extensive treatment, Murray goes on to recomiiiend 
legislation regulating the introduction of ixuiovations and the treatment of 
displaced •jsoricers. 
1. It should be ccaajiulsory for industry to pay adequate 
dismissal wages to all "srorkers uriio are displaced as 
the result of technological changes. 
2. The Federal Government should conduct a large-scale 
vocational training program for displaced workers 
"Who are paid dismissal -wages, so that they Tdll be 
better adapted for other jobs in industrj' that they 
might be able to secxu-e, isrhen their dismissal -wages 
are exhaasfced. It is essential that labor should 
participate in the administration of such a vocation­
al training, ' 
^-urray, Philip, Teclmologic^ Pnemploym^t, Steel T/orkers Organising 
Coimaittee, Publication Ho. 3j April, 191^0, pp. 37-1^0, sunmarized dji 
Unions, Manageiaent i'md The Fuolic, edited by Bakke, and Kerr, G., 
Harcoiirt, Brace and Co iJeW'York, 19ii8, pp. 559-560. 
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3. In addition to compulsory dismissal wages, other 
measures designed to have industry inunediately 
reabsorb workers displaced by technological changes 
should be adopted.! 
The foregoing scherae can be criticized on several grounds. On the 
positive side, the entrepreneurs' responsibility can be justified, since 
functionally he attracts labor to his firm by offering lucrative employ­
ment for specialized skills. Should he eventually change his mind about 
the kind and number of workers he vdshes to employ, (i.e. as a result of 
a new invention becoming rather profitable) individuals making investments 
in specific skills at the behest of the employer vdll now be forced to 
liquidate their skills. Yet society has a vital interest in economic 
progress, and negatively, Murray's program can be criticized for the 
obstacles it places in the -way of entrepreneurial decisions vAth respect 
to the introduction of innovations. 
Furthermore there is an implicit denial in the proposal of any respon­
sibility on the part of labor. If, for example, as a result of a wage in­
crease obtained tlirough trade union pressure, machinery becomes relatively 
cheaper than labor and the entrepreneur prefers to substitute machines for 
men, should he still be required to compensate his displaced employees? 
More impoirtant perhaps is the question involving the "incidence" of 
Murray's proposal. There seems to be a rather naive notion that the 
employer vdll bear the additional expense. Realistically, the risk 
premium Tdll probably be shifted forward to consuEters in the form of 
higher prices, backward to the -workars in the plant, and perhaps the 
^Ibid., p. 561 
employer •will bear part of the burden as vrcll. the evunt that the 
en^loyer bears part of the burden, it laay manifest itself in the form 
of overly cautious riak-ta',:ing iTith regard to the introduction of 
innovations. For as Lange pointed i:.iut, the eJ5>octation of increased 
i^rofits pro'i'ldes the incentive for reorganizations, and charging 
the cost of displacement off in the fashion suggested by the GIC may 
reduce that incentive. 
Finally'', any atteisgpt to reduce labor mobility to the environs of a 
single plant or firm can only accentuate the problem of r'esoitrce allocation. 
Since the cost of technological change can be borne in several ways, 
i.e. by the employer, by the workers, or by society as a -^fhole, it remains 
to be seen Tihat advantages there are in shifting the cost to any one of 
the groups referred to above. 
In the case of the employer, he is primarily the "risk-taker" in a 
capitalist society. He stands to gain most if the reorganization he 
decides to make proves successful. If the reorganization is not successful 
he incurs losses but in any case all decisions made are his ovna. Hence it 
may be argued that all costs attached to the introduction of innovations 
should be carried by the individual making such decisions. 
In the case of the -worker, there are certain risks he undertakes volun­
tarily. The selection of a particular job or occT:5)ation is his ovm. He 
has alternative forms of employment (in a full enployment econoiny) frcm 
•Riiich he can make a selection. Bearing the costs of technological change, 
provided full employment is an accepted policy of government, merely means 
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chiUiHiai; frcr. cnt oir.plo^j^iicnt -vT^icrG h!: productivity has been i^ediicod, to aouae 
otlicr caijloy:.:c:r.t rlicrtj he car. rirJrc leaner contribution. 
Th.ore are certain dif.'ioxiltici! coinccted i-dth tJie employee's P-sormption 
of tlic.';c coats, hoYiEver. The :p.c);jt obvio'^s, of coursc, involves trie altema-
tiVL' covraes of notion open t: hia. T]ir.t is to say, he vaxf chooso to shift 
thei:o r.ooto to society by pxx:venting, the introduction of the innovation, 
t ^ oreby denj'lnc' .-jociety the Edvantii^*c3 thct might have bcin r.chieved vdth 
the nev: product or devicc. But s-iiftin;; those costs to the caTrtunitj'' at 
Inrge ma;' siaoly involve an act of desperation. Thero are obstacles attached 
to occupational transfers, and the individual worker might very yrell make the 
move if doaieone paid iho cost of moving. These cob-ts of novin^,' Involve ex­
penditures of various tj^jesi re draining, loss of incoii:e -v"iiilo caking the 
transfer, actual physical movenent to a new cocsaunity ant: the costs thereby 
incurred (sionetary, social and psychological) • 
Reder, in discussing the problea, provides the foUov/ing argiztent and 
solution: 
As our society is at present organised, everyone is 
compelled, Trilly-nilly, to become an entrepreneur — 
an entrepreneur in his oto talents, i^reparing oneself 
for an occupation involves imdertaking an investment 
which can fare badl;/- for reasons quite apart from 
individual merit, e.g., change in tastes and techniques. 
And if the investment turns out to have been unTdse, 
the result is like3y to be a ruined career and perhaps 
a -nasted life. It is no vronder that there should be 
a demand for guaranteeing people jobs in their ovaa 
occupation. 
Hofwever, there is reaUy no need to do this in order to 
grant the individual security. ViTiat •ne Trould suggest 
is that persons attached to industries or occupations 
that are overcrowded, be offered opportunities to 
re-tradn themselves for fields in need of additional personnel. 
At goverraaent expense, they woiild be i^aid the current reward 
of their cm-rent occupation v.'hile re-tra;'ming. Thus uneiiroloy-
Kent YTOVild not involve way personal loss to the unemployed or 
diiidnution in e:y,)endit\ire on 2:)roduct8» 
Those who Vilshed to stay at their old occupation vrould, of 
course, be free to do so, but they •ivould have to accept the 
consequences. If more than the optizaun nuiaber chose to 
leave an occupation, the ^overjinent' s re-training sub.jidy 
ivould be given aainly to the younger v/orkers, since the 
investaont in their talents vraiild be more productive than in 
the case of the older workers. Coaverselj^, Tforkers too old 
to re-traiti advantageously could be subsidized to stay at 
their jobs. 
Such a scheiue as this touIcI obviate much of the fear of uneiuploy-
raent vdthout destroying the laobiliby of the labor force or 
•svastiiig; its power in performing tasks less productive tiian it 
is able.^ 
The superiority of ilecLer's approach can be seen at once. Apart froa the 
difficulties to be encountered at the bargaining table, the allocative effects 
of liurray's proposal, if it wsre, in fact, appended, to all trade agreements, 
certainly vrould lead to a los«er level of output for any given level of inputs. 
Effects of Murray's proposal are showz in Figure 3» The ordinate re­
presents quantity of labor, abscissa represents quantity of capital. Output 
X is shoimi as an iso-quant and it is assumed th«!t the fim chooses to pro­
duce that quantity. The slope of the expenditure line AE represents the 
initial price ratio of labor to capital, hence the fina T?(ould employ OE units 
of labor and OB units of capital in order to produce X units of output. 
Suppose noYf thi't the firm decides to utilize more capital (iaachi.neiy) because 
^^ieder, 0£. cit., p. 203• 
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an iiinovation has resulted ixi a drastic reduction in the price of jiiachines 
Illative to labor. The chanf^e in the price ratio is shov«n as AC. In order 
to coiitinuo prod-aciRg output X the firn would reduce its expenditures on 
both labor and capital, the new e^qseuditure line being Li^ (parallel to AC). 
The quantity of labor purchased would fall froa Oii to OG and the quantity of 
capital eaplojed wovdd increase from OH to OJ. 
Fig. 3* Graphic Analysis Of The "I^urray Proposal" 
to Alleviate Technological Unen^loymeat. 
Under Murra;/"' s proposal the price of capital wo^lld not be persiitted to 
fall as far as it othertvise would since any unemployment resulting from 
capital acquisitions vrould have to be added bo the cost of the additional 
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capital. That is to say the price of capital instead of falling froa JJ3 
to AC \irould fall orJLj'" from AD to AD. L^jroeiiditure on labor and capitsl 
•vTOTild therefore fall to (parallel to /JD) and hence OF mits of labor 
and 01 vmits of capital would be employed. Clearly tlie amovtnt oi" labor 
•unemployed wiiild be leos \mder the Murray proposal but at the expense 
of reduced technological change. It is also quite possible that no tech­
nological change TOUIU take place at all if tho amount to be set aside 
for social contingencies is just enough to offset the price advantage of 
the relatively cheaper machinery vdLthout the contingenqy added. 
Labor Immobility 
One vrealmess of Iteder's proposed solution Involves the question of 
geographical labor nobility. Technological inproveinents may involve the 
loss of job opporburiities in one area and the opening up of job opportuni­
ties in some other area. There are several Traj''3 of dealing rith this 
problem. As Hoover has pointed out: 
interoocupational mobility is often a substitute for migration^ 
Labor left unemployed by the closing of one type of plant may 
be employed by a ne-vr industry in the old location rather than 
by the old type of industry in a new location. The need for 
migration is greatly lessened if local labor supplies ai-e made 
more versatile, and this can be accomplished by training 
However, the problem is somei^t more complex than one -mould gather from 
the above argument for increased versatility. Basically the discussion 
^Hoover, E.M», The Location of iiiconomic Activity, KcGrarf-Hill Book Ccffig)any 
I9ii8, pp. 268-269. 
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turns on the foUovdng question: Should Job opportunities be provided 
sonehov; for people seekiiig ea5)loynicnt in an area or should people be 
encouraged to move to areas experiencing a labor shortage? .jibher alterna­
tive can be justified viith some force* 
The case for encouraging: nigration rests on the arj^aent 
that lovr living standards in an area mark it as an un­
economic location for the nuraber of people it has; the 
fact that better employment is available else-where shows 
that some of those people would be not only better off 
but more useful elsewhere and should move A 
In opposition to the above altejmative there are argicaents to be made 
in favor of "bringing jobs to people"* 'fhe following list does not exhaust 
all of the possible effects* 
1* The magni tude of the movement may be much greater 
than superficial appearances may warrant since tlae movement 
of a large enterprise out of an area may affect workers in 
industries dependent on that enterprise for business and 
other establishments ministering to the needs of the ini­
tially di^laced workers* 
2* If the more productive individuals form the bulk of 
tiie emigrants the remainder of the comnninity may soon 
become a new depressed area* 
3* There are social and political effects that need to 
be taken into account when a populace becomss extremely 
mobile *2 
For the polipy-maker the dilemma is not an insuperable one. Sub­
sidizing indvistries to move into areas iriiere an excess supply of labor 
exists should be based on purely economic grounds, 'rthere an area requires 
a teii?>orary subsidy because it has certain "threshold characteristics". 
the infant industries argument wy hold, and jobs should be provided or 
brought to people, but only ii' the developmental potential justifies 
such action. Fundaiaentally, hovrever, sncoxiraging th£ movement of individuals 
by offering to piay their costs o£ movement and retraining reiaains the sounder 
policy. As an iraportant adjunct, specific policies designed to meet the 
social and political consequences of iiicreased mobility also appear warranted. 
But in any case, these policies have yet to be applied for purposes other 
than the consequences of mobility, name2y, improved housing, t^olescme family 
life, religious and recreational facilities, etc. 
Apart from the in^jact of technology on labor mobility, there are other 
considerations to be taken into account. The divergence betiveen the number 
of available jobs in a particular area and the number of job seekers (assuming 
full emplojTJient in the rest of the economy) may be a function of trade union 
behavior, existing wage structure in the market^ and non-economic rigidities, 
i*e., location of relatives and friends, investment in a home, inertia, etc. 
V/here this divergence grows out of restrictive practices on the part 
of trade unions or the activities of monopsonistic employers, obviously en­
couraging the movement of T/orkers out of the area simply accentixates the 
misallocation of resources. This illustration is shown in Figure i+» 
Assume a given amount of input (labor) to be divided in such a fashion 
betvneen industries I and II, so that OA units of output are produced by 
Industry I and OB units of output are produced by Industry II. Further assume 
that this division of output (and labor) corresponds to the preferences of 
consumers. Now siQ)pose as a result of trade union restriction. Industry I is 
only able to obtain enough labor to produce OC units of output, and the excess 
loll. 
labor finds employment in Industry II causing output there to increase to 
OD xmits (due to a fall in wages reducing coats suf-xciontl;^'- to encourage 
greater output) * This nevr coiiibiriation of outputs fails bo i^rovide the 
coiisuaer with the same level of satisfaction Trhich prevailed prior to the 
advent of trade union restrictions. Another possibility, of course, yrould 
be the existence of •aneiaployment in the area surrounding Indxis"^ I if labor 
were not sufficiently mobile to move to Industry II * 
Public policies designed to prevent such restriction on the part of 
trade unions (or monopsonistic eaployers) has taken the forn of baruoing the 
closed shc^, featherbedding, and so on. These regulations, however, are not 
adequate "sshen the same results are achieved by trade unions v/hen they raise 
•wages high enough to cause a decline in esiployKent in a particiilar industry. 
Lemer has made a proposal ^ Aich has a double objective: one is designed to 
deal tsith misallocations of labor, the other to pre'vent inflationary •ifage 
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CoNSomif(s 
\ ImiFfeftef/ce. Curyss 
O & I) OUTPUT S 
lHU*sTt{iJir 
The Misallocation "of^bor 
iN ^ RAUfSPOHtA^no/^ 
FoNCTtOV 
10$ * 
pressures. For the moment, vre ah&ll consider the proposal only in terns 
of its former ob;3ective. Its usefi^Lneas as aii anti-inflationary device 
\'ri.ll be considered in a later section. 
Lemer siig^ests the establislmont of specific geographical ai-eas as 
labor markets. For each area the porccntage of uneaployed wrkern rrill 
then be determined and compared rdth the relative vaxeirploynent existing 
in the econoccr as a v/hole. Lemer then assumes that Twrkers Tdll shift 
from one srea to another if the irage differentials are adjusted to attract 
trorkers from surplus to deficit areas. A concrete illustration "STUI clarify 
the nechanisn he vdshes to use. This is shown in Figure 5* 
Percentage Unea^loyed, U«S. Average CoE5)ared '.Vith* 
Three Arbitrarj'- Geographical Areas. 
Assume the percentage unenployed for the U.S. as a i^iole to be five percent 
of the total labor force. Area 1 has an unemployiaent percentage of ^ per~ 
cent of its total labor force. Area 2 has ten i^ercent of its labor force 
unemployed and Area 3 has five percent unemployed. 
According to Lenicr these figures would indicato tlie folloring: in 
Area 2 vfaces arc apparently too high and consequently worke.-D ai-e being 
attracted to the area but are not able to find einployuQnt* In /'irea 1 
there is a scai'city of labor because -vrages are too lov/. Area 3' s wage 
structure seems to be in accord trith the remainder of the econoc^. As a 
proposed rcncdi' Lemer suggests that Tfage control be taken out of the hands 
of both unions and ecgjloyers and instead all wages should be adjusted 
according to a simple rule. A'ages nomally are to increase one percent 
every four months period (three percent per -year) except in those areas 
isiiere unemploynent is at least tKrice the United States average. In Area 2 
for exan^le ao wage increases istould be permitted. Where unemploymBnt is 
at least half the United States average -Bages will be permitted to increase 
by trro percent each foizr month period (six percent per year). 
It can be readily seen that labor will tend to flaw from Area 2 to 
Area 1 since no wage increases are occurring in the surplus area Y^iile 
twice the TTagc increase for the economy as a -ahole is being permitted in 
the labor deficit areasAlthough in principle it is not difficult to 
agree -with Lerner's proposal, particularly in view of its anti-inflationary 
virtues, there are major shortcoaings in the plan as an allocative device. 
Reynolds provides soiae rather interesting considerations. 
^See: Lemer, A.P., "An Litegrated Full 2mployiaent Policy", 
International Postwar Problena, vol. 3* January 19k^, p. 127. Although 
only a "hint" is provided of this scheme in this article, Lemer 
elaborated on the idea in a private discussion "Bith the author. 
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The relation bet^ween geographical wage differentials and 
labor mobility is difficult to evaluate, since i^i'age differences 
usually ocfiur along with differences in ;3ob opportunities and 
other factors. A fevf things, however, can perhaps be said. 
First, high wages in an area do not seem to have very great 
attractive power unless accompanied by job openings; and while 
we might expect the tvfo to occur together, this will not always 
be the case. Second, most people who have jobs are sui'xicient3y 
attached to their home communities so that they have little in­
terest in jobs elsewhere, even at considerably higher wages. 
Interest in opportunities elsewhere is usxially awakened by the 
loss of emploinnent at home or by some personal or family dis­
turbance. Third, even when the person is predisposed toward 
movement for one reason or another, his movement is about as 
likely to follow lines of personal contact as it is to follow 
wage contour lines. 
It should be noted also that geographical mobility is quite 
selective with respect to personal and occupational chsurac-
teristics. Mobility is highest among the young, single, and 
unattached; it is reduced by age, family responsibilities, aiid 
home ownership. Among occupational groups, professional people 
are much more mobile than any otliers, followed by executives 
and other white-collar workers# Skilled manual workers appear 
to be some-nSiat more mobile -yian the semi-skilled and unskilled.l 
It would appear that supplementary techniques need to be used in 
achieving a reasonable fluidity in labor markets. Huch of the thinking 
on this subject is sameidiat clouded by a "less-than-full employment-
psychosis". The war eaqperience, in which the number of job opportunities 
exceeded the number of job seekers provides an illuminating lesson. 
Apparently with sufficient jobs available, wage differentials do work 
fairli'- vrell as an allocative device. This is further substantiated when 
coupled with the practice used by many corporations during V.orld "war II 
of paying for the transportation of the worker and his family as well as 
providing adequate housing. 
^Reynolds, L.G., "Economics of Labor", in A Survey Of Contemporary 
Economics, edited by Ellis, H.S., Blikiston Comoany, Philadelphia, 
19i48, pp. 273-271;. 
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Only recently has the BL3 made data dealing with regional wage rate 
differentials available. The statistics, hoiiever, are not complete and 
provide information for irregular time intervals. Even so, it is possible 
to sliow the bare outlines of a relationship \'7hich has been subject to much 
speculation. Table 1 and Figure 6 indicate the broad allocative effects 
of changes in wage rates and v/age rate differentials on movements in the 
labor force. Of particular interest are the data relating to the de­
pression period. Although net migration is somesviiat less marked during 
1930-liO, •wage differences between areas seem to coincide with the direction 
of movements in the labor force. Additional data, not yet available, how­
ever, Tdll be required before the exact nature of the relationship can be 
determined. 
Table 1. Median regional differences in occupational -wage 
rates in manufacturing Industries and net regional 
migrations, se^cted periods. 
RDK arw NETf RDJt !iETt 
IKDSX MIGRATION INDEX MIGRATION INDEX Mim/iTION 





NORTHEAST 100 f 1,1;j66,000 100 - 379,000 100 + 27,Uoo 
MID-W'EST 97 + 762,000 97 - 940,900 101 - 28ii,900 
SOUTH 87 - 882,000 7k - 102,000 85 - 831,600 
FAR lEST 115 + 1,711.000 + 1,020.000 115 + 1.39it.liOO 
•J©D = Median relation to Northeast in percent. (Source: Bloch, J.W., 
"Regional Tifage Differentials: 1907-i+6, "Monthly Labor iievievf, 
April, 19i;8, p. 375. 
-j-Net migration computed from data, by states. (Sources Deriiurst, J.F. 
and Associates, America's Meeds and Resources, The Tvrentieth Century 
Fund, New York, 19ii7, pp. Ii6-it7« 
To "What exbent the practices of trade unions in rGstrictizip; member­
ship affect the allocation cf labor adversely is still subject to much 
speculation. The magnitude of the effect, however, can only be determined 
by empirical investigation. It vfoiild not be surprising :iX some cf these 
restrictions vrere consistent ivith the kind of allocation society would 
prefer, but fiindarientally, the arbitrary selection vriiich high initiation 
fees, for example, irapose on the labor market is not in accord with the 
selection that would obtain in the absence of such fees. It -would, there­
fore, seem that a ceiling on initiation fees would remove one further 
obstacle to mobility. 
Frequently, the employer makes a contribution to 7^orker iiaraoiality. 
The groTfing interest among employers and induijtrial psychologists in the 
field of "hu^iisn relations" jnay eventually add still another barrier to 
labor mobility. The desire on the part of many firms to attract and hold 
the "loyalty" of 7«3rkers throxigh the use of pension schemes and other 
benefits may discourage the movement of -workers to jobs involving a better 
utilization of their skills. Hence, from a policy standpoint, the en-
cotiragement of uniformity and the transferability of accumulated pension 
benefits among firms Twould lead to a superior allocation of labor. It 
may even be desirable to prevent private pension schemes altogether 
substituting some Federal scheme. A tax on pension funds accijimilatedj for 
exanple, would easily discourage their introduction by firms -without 
involving direct governmental prohibitions. 
It is interesting to no-te at this point the frequent conflicts -which 
occur betYjeen the desire on the part of the coummnity for increased security 
and the desire for increased efficiency. The latter, of course, involves 
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greater mobility. In order to satiafy the deaire for seciirity, the 
corununity may be conpelled to tolerate some miste of labor resources. 
Kon-Economic "Codes of Conduct" 
One frequently overlooked aspect of the labor problem which the policy­
maker can do little about involves the "ethics" of the business community 
and its general acceptance by other segments of society. The devious 
methods used by businessmen to enhance their incomes or the criiainal 
practices used by both businessmen and labor leaders to gain potver and 
prestige are part of our contemporary ciilture pattern. 
Although primarily an area of investigation for the sociologist, such 
forms of behavior raise inroortant economic questions. In order to encourage 
a trade union to give up certain restrictive practices or strategic monopoly 
positions in labor markets, vrelfare economists advocate the use of the 
"corgjensation principle". Should the element of "criminality" be used as a 
criterion in determining uhether a monopoly group should be compensated? 
Under -vshat circumstances should monopoly positions be expropriated Tdthout 
compensation? Suppose a monopoly groi^) asks for too large a bribe as its 
price for giving up special privileges — a not too unreasonable assim^)-
tion, given current standards of business morality? 
White-collar crinel and activities bortering on criminality, i.e. 
pulling a shreijd deal, occur frequently among businessmen in our society. 
ly/hite-collar crime is defined as "a violation of criminal lay/ by a 
person of the upper socio-economic class in the course of Ms 
occupational activities". See; Sutherland, E.H., "Crime and 
Business", Annals of the ilmerican Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 217j September, ipitl, pp» 112-llB. 
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L'any of these practices have been adopted by other se£?!ieats of oiir society. 
As one observer has pointed out: 
The same ideals of cojiiijetitlve avarice seeped doTwn to labor 
also# It has been observed that the competitive ideal has 
been to sell as lai'ge a voliime as possible of all poorest 
marketable goods at the highest possible price* Conservative 
and powerful labor unions liave accepted this siuiie doctrine in 
terms of the shortest possible -work day, mth the £;rei.test 
permissible aiacunt of loafing, at the hi^ihest possible vfages* 
But this is not the vrorst of the offenses of labor. As pluto­
crats sold out their ovm investors ejid stripped theia of their 
investments, so dishonest labor organiisers have extorted or 
confiscated funds from their ovm unions. They have held up 
employers id-th threats of strikes and have at times, even 
furnished stri!ce-breal<ers against union labor. They 'got 
theirs*, as the plutocrats did when they robbed a soxmd oper­
ating coiiipany of its eai'nings throii{;;h the holding cotapsny 
teclinique.l 
Among trade unions, not only the leadership, but rank and file as wellj 
adopt the attitude of "let's get our share before somebody else tips the 
gravy boat" • /md invariably ethical considerations are based solely on 
precedent, i.e. has a similar teclinique been used successfully elseishere? 
This, of course, is not surprising in view of the con^ietitive nature of 
modem society* But dealing •Kith the problem is sorae^vsiiat moi^ complicated 
than one •vrotild at first suppose. Eliminating the racketeer or the dishonest 
leader in trade unions is not an easy mat-ter when the membership •willingly 
tolerates such guidance as long as the rank and file "get their cut as vrell". 
Many of the issues raised previously, such as increased mobility, the 
application of new innovations, and so on, presi5)pose a degree of flexibility 
in accepting new trade mion members •which in some ic^jortant cases does not 
%ar-nes, H.E. and Teeters, N.K., Ke-yy Horizons in Criminology, Prentice-
Hall Inc., New York, I9I+6, p. 2^ 
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exist. Hence, as a matter of policy these restraints on trade union entry 
must be removed.^ 
The attitude of "keeping up rdth the Joneses" also has its aanifejtation 
in the labor market. Union leaders are constantly'' under presauixj to obtain 
for their ovin menbers a contract v/hich ccnpares favorably v.lth that secured 
by a close rival. This partially e:}q.-)lains the phenomenon of "wajL'e leader­
ship" found dui-ing contract re-negotiation periods each year, Anc". also ac­
counts for Kvage patterns spreading; rapidli"- froia industry' to industry# From 
the standpoint of inflationary •sage Increases, it is neceaspri' to keep tliis 
beliavior pattern ±a mind. Moreover, policy recouoendations which assune 
that it is only necessary to coordinate -srag© changes, Trithin the structure 
of a centralized trade union bodj-, for responsible imge policy to tal» 
place, fail to recognize the internal contradictions governing the actions 
of the labor movement. 
The theory of the firm, in Tp-hich entrepreneurs ostensibly- seuk to 
mayimize profit, has recent!^'- been applied to trade unions. Lunlop, for 
exanmle, tries to escplain trade iinion behavior in terms of "naxiaizing the 
vrage bill".^ Fellner uses the maxinization principle along the lines of 
bilateral monopoly in an effort to describe the bargaining process #3 
^See infra.J p. 229* 
^See: Dunlqp, J.T., Viaro Determination Under Trade Unions. ilacaillan 
Go35)Eny, New York, 19iJ|. ——— 
fellner, W., "Prices and V.'ages Under Bilateral Ilonopoly", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 61, August, 19i;7, PP» ^03-532« 
nli. 
Althoxi^h the arjproach is useful as a first approjdmiition, significant non-
econoaic elements (lust for power, inertia, xmcertainty, complacency, etc.) 
are not incorporated in the deciaion-roalcing acheiae. Gcnsequentlj'", the policy-
JT^aker vd.ll frequentlj'" be confronted r/ith situotions in Tfhich it is not 
possible to bribe a monopolist out of a position of special advantage merely 
by offering conrpensations of a peciuiir.ry natxire.^ For this reason, it nay 
be necessary'- for society to compel nonopolists to accept a aor.etars'' settle-
nent or suffer either outright ej^proprit-tion or a legel prohibition against 
certain forms of action. 
In a free enterprise aystem neither of the above alternatives may be 
acceptablc. A ncdified coapensation technique, horrever, aa;)- provide a 
reasonable coiapromise. The form of coaroenaation can be either a direct sub­
sidy or an expenditure Tdiich indirectly affects the monopolist by providing 
him Yd-th less of an incentive to maintain his position of exclusion# The 
former method suffers fron the limitations discussed above; the latter iTill 
not completely eliminate restriction but has the advantage of iaini:;ii2ing 
such behavior* 
A policy of full engjloynent ?dth a relativejly stable price level, for 
exai'ple, may lessen the fears and uncertainties of individuals and groups 
sufficiently bo obviate the necessity a" their engaging in restrictive 
practices. But again, it Tfould be dangerous to generalize as to the benefits 
of such a program since there ai'e altfays workers aiid entrepi'eneurs in ^ecifio 
industries, subject to technological displaceiaent and changes in consumer 
^See infra., p. 2k7» 
preferences, vrho are threatened ivith the loss of their inveistment in plant 
or skill. Admittedly, the availability of emploiTa&nt or ne-.r forms of 
investruent v.nould tend to lessen their discomfort, but earnings elsevrhere 
r;iay not be as high as their fonn^r ;..:ositions provided. The status of tlie 
nevr occupation ma;'" not af.'oi'd the esteen and privileges attached to the 
old ILne of endeavor. Hence the problem of rerioving iaonopo3;y activities 
in both product and factor markets is si25)3y one of degree. 
In a "free", dezaocratic enterprise system people are not '.vilLtnE to 
pay the price required for the conplete erradication of restriction. let 
the greatest danger lies in society's 'willingness to follow the path of 
least resistance — "to pluck the feathers of monopoly- tdiere t}ie squaidc is 
least". In the past, this usually applied to trade unions. If the problem 
of nionopoHy is handled iii this manner, vre can hope for periodic retaliatory 
brairls, vdth each group seeking to subdue its foimost opponent, but offering 
no solution of a relatively pernianent nature. Retaliation then becomes the 
most fruitfxil "code of conduct" acceptable to society. 
Qyclical Insecurity 
Periodic fluctuations in econorJLc activity encourage all groups to erect 
barriers designed to prevent the flo»y of poverty and insecurity from spilling 
over into their chosen, fields of endeavor. Although such barriers are ef­
fective -R^ien constructed by relatively fe\y groupsj success cannot be achieved 
Ti^ien all groves engage in similar activity* 
The economic organism is an ejctremelly "fissionable" and unstable one. 
Chain reactions, once a disturbance affects the econcaay, are set off mth a 
myriad of inbGmol shocks having their efroots literally "in all dii'ectiontj 
at once"» V/ore it not for the fact that some of the components of the 
econontr are so large (in the organizational sense) and make adjustment rather 
sloTis-3y, our economic e:^losions -vrould undoubtedly be more frequent and per­
haps more devastating than past experience -woxild indicate. Nevertheless, it 
is important to shovr hovr these internal shocks tend to perpetuate themselves 
and to recognize the iij^iortance of preventing the initial distnibances from 
first, leading either to inflation or deflation and second, causing tzie in­
ternal cca3ai;onents to react in a nai-u-jer consistent vrith their special interests. 
A few remarks perhaps shoxild be made about the inherent instability 
of the economic oi'ganism. 3trict3;j'" speaking, a disturbance can be classified 
as either exogenous or endogenous» Moreover, it has beon shovm that cyclical 
instability may, for example, arise merely as a result of a lagged relation­
ship e:d.stine between the savings and investment functions.^ The disturbances 
noted above, therefore, accentuate the oscillations and also affect the allo­
cation of x^esources as •well. Hence cyclical fluctuations, from the stand-
i 
point of laljor poliqjr, need to be considered in terms of the resource problem 
as vrell as the income problem. 
The resource problem turns largely on the techniques utilised by trade 
unions, business films and govemment for the purpose of meeting the exi­
gencies grovdng out of cyclical instability. This then is itfiiat vre mean 
"adaptation". It implies conforming Tdth rather tlian changing the economic 
^Samuelson, P.A., Foundations of Sconomic Analysis» Harvaard University 
Press, Cambridge, 19Uif p» 3li f^* 
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climate prevailing at any particular moment. By adaptation v.e also mean 
that each segment of the economy anticipates the kind of role it -AIU play 
in a particular phase of the cycle and manifests its behavior either in the 
form of denaiids to be inaxie on other groups, e»g. trade unions deaasiding 
increases in vrage rates to cottpensate for an increase in tFie cost of living, 
or overt acts designed to protect the group, e.g. restriction of output on 
the part of building trades tinions in oi*der to safeguard their inveatsient in 
occupational skill. 
In the discussion that follcws we shall investigate the problem of 
cyclical adaptation frcci the standpoint of the trade union, the business 
fira and the govei^iient as it relates to the que is t ion of labor policy. Tlie 
process of adaptation takes a variety of forms but fundaiT.ontally falls into 
tvro broad categories: (l) Income stafc'^T^nation; (2) i^inployaent stabilization. 
Incoiae stabillzaticgi: Perhaps one of the major causes of concern during 
fluct'oations in business actiTd.t\* is the xazcertaintj •jdtii -svhich individoals 
view tiieii' futui*e earnings. Labor unions and businessmen alilce attempt to 
miniaiiae tliis uncertainty by regularizing the flow of income to themselves. 
Hence, they resist an^" changes -wJiich may affect the reg\ilarity of th.eir 
"Income flow". Even the public (tho government) has some notion as to tlie 
magnitude of the flow to be guaranteed individual workers, and legislation 
making such guarantees has been enacted. 
In order to maintain these flows in the face of economic instability, 
trade unions, public agencies and es^jloyers use seven principal criteria in 
evaluating a change in •wages. Slichter lists th3 follorwdng: 
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1. The minimum necessities of wrlosi's. 
2. Changes in the cost of living. 
3* The maintenance of taks-home pay in the face of 
reductions in hours. 
]+. Changes in the productivity of labor. 
fj. The -ability (or inability) of tlie employer to pay. 
6. The alleged effect of higher or lower wages upon 
consuaer purchasing power and employment. 
7» The Tragea paid in other industries or places.i 
Since the first represents a basis upon which expressed public policy 
is foiinded, it ^vill be useful to analyze that criterion in terms of the 
bench marks established earlier, i.e. from the point of view of the income 
problem and the resource problem. Although minimum i»age legislation 
has been general3y accepted by the American people as a particxilarly 
desirable method of establishing a lo-ner limit to the earnings of -workers, 
froa the economist's point of view it represents only one possible tech­
nique among several alternatives. As such it must be regarded as some-
•what inferior, since there are undesirable allocative effects inherent 
in the techniqiie. 
In principle, of coiorse, the desire on the part of the piiblic to 
ensxire earnings for the rrorker, sufficient to meet his minimal necessities 
of life, can be fulfilled only by considering the effect on enroloyment 
as -well as the -wage rate. As Slichter has pointed out: 
It is obvious, however, that -when the cOTimunity says that 
a -worker may not be paid less than a given amount, the 
community is in effect saying that aiiyone "who is not irorth 
that amount shall be regarded as uneii?3loyable .2 
^Slichter, S.II., Basic Criteria Used Wage Negotiations, Chicago 
Association of Commerce and Industry* Chicago, 191^7> PP • 8-9* 
2lbid., p. 11. 
Althoiagh there is a great deal of truth in this assertion, we must first 
clarify an assuEption iii l^icit in Slichter's argument. Clearly it assumes 
that all labor markets are so constituted that every worker automatically 
receives a vtage equal to his value contribution anticipated by the purchaser 
of his services. 
Evidently Slichter fails to realize that miniraum wage laws have been 
franed not only to guarantee minimal rates of pay (which they obviously 
cannot do) but also for the purpose of i^reventing exploitation. For this 
latter purpose it may cla±Q soiae justii'ication, but here too, there are 
better alternatives# 
For the raoraent -we shall assume that no ejjqploitation prevails in otar 
labor markets, ^hat then are the objections to using minitsum budgets in 
the establishment of basic rates of pay? It should be obvious that a 
rate of pay does not establish a -worker's income lanless account is also 
taken of the number of ho\irs worked. Since minimum yrage legislation 
merely sets a lo-wer limit to the hourly rate, the worker's actual earnings 
are still determiiied at the en5>loyer's option. That is to say, since only 
one of the congjonents of earnings, namely, hoxirly rates, is controlled, no 
lower limit to earnings can be determined by such legislation. The use 
of minimum budgets in the establishment of basic rates of pay thearefore 
misses coinpletely the difference bet-ween "take home pay" and the hourly-
rate of pay. 
Perhaps more fundamental are the allocati-ve effects of such legal 
minima. Since all occupations and industries are not covered by such 
legislation, the imposition of a rate in excess of the value of the 
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•worker's services to the employer vri.ll res\ilt in the en^loyment of fe\7er 
•workers in the specific firm or industry affected. In turn, vrorkers -Bho 
are not sxifficiently productive to "pay their am. •way" at the higher wage 
rate trill find their services no longer required in the regulated industry 
and therefore -will need to find eiaployinent in the tuiregulated industries 
at lower rates of pay or siii?>ly remain •unemployed. 
Stigler, in discussing the problem, raises the follo-winc question: 
"(l) Does such legislation diminish poverty? (2) Are there efficient 
altematives?" 1 
It is rather revealing to compare Stigler's approach -with that of 
Slichter. The latter, for example, makes the follovdng generalization: 
The community must realize that in setting the standard 
of fi^tness for employees, it is limiting the volume of 
employment. The community nnist decide iHhether it is 
better that some •jrorkers -who cannot coitoand higher pay 
be employed at very low wages, or vfhether they should 
not be en^jloyed at all but supported by their relati'ves 
or by the ccaimiunity.2 
On the other hand, Stigler, in discussing the effects of a legal 
minimum wage on resource allocation, agrees fundamentally with the 
position taken by Slichter, ^  the argument applies to a purely coig-
petitlve market. But at this point Stigler makes it quite clear that 
under other circumstances minimum wage legislation can achieve desirable 
objecti^ves. 
^Stigler, G.J., "The Economics of Minimum Vvage Legislation", 
American Economic Revjeur, vol. 36, June, 19H6, p. 358. 
^Slichter, S.H., o£. cit», p. 12. 
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If an employer has a aignificant degree of control over the 
wage rate he pays for a fiven quality of labor, a skilfully-
set minimum wace nay increase his eraploynent and imge rate 
and, because the i*ofrc is brought closer to the value of the 
niarginal product, at the sajBie time increase aEfrregate output.^ 
Recoeniziiit: the possibility of a miniinura vjage preveating exploitation 
in particular labor niarkets, hov^evcr, is not, accoruing to Stigler, 
sufficient to justify its use. Its major disadvantage is the accuracy -vdth 
which it needs to.be com.iuted and applied according to the requirements 
of different firms, industries, geographical regions, occupations and even 
ijidividua 1 workers within a single occupation.2 
Lloreover, as the investigations in the field of agricultural policy 
have indicated, "manipulation of individual prices is neither an efricient 
nor an eqtdtable device for changing the distribution of personal income".3 
Schultz and others, for example, in discussing the effects of the "parity 
principle", as applied to agricvilture, have correctly emphasized this 
point. Minimum urage legislation is obviously the application of the 
"parity principle" to labor markets.^ Much of the attraction of full 
eiaploi'ment as a framerrork -rdthin idiich labor allocations function 
Istigler, G.J., o£. cit», p. 361. 
^Ibid. 
3lbid«, p. 362. 
^Although the parity principle, as defined by law, is strictly 
analogous to the sliding irage scale, adjusted for changes in 
the cost of living, it nuay be also considered in terms of its 
stated objective. The objective of the parity principle is to 
deal with the farm income problem via the price mechanism. 
effectively is vitiated, therefore, when increases in mintoiura Trages are 
realized. The alternatives to minimum wage legislation as a method of 
g\iaranteeing income -will be discussed in a later section. 
V'age increases based on the criterion of increases in the cost of 
living are frequently used by trade unions in negotiating new contracts. 
As a general proposition, it seems attractive to xmorganized isorkers as 
•well as trade union members. Moreover, particular trade union leaders 
view the problem in the micro-sense. They are not able to judge the 
effects of their own wage demands on the labor market or on the economy 
as a whole. Hence, contributing to inflation appears as a rather remote 
consequence of their demands. The proposition is also frequently sv^)-
ported by employers, and some governmeriis have incorporated the principle 
in their public policy pronouncements, e.g., the Canadian experience 
during the last war. Oddly enough, the supporters of this criterion 
are seldom willing to reverse the argument. Yet the futility of 
approaching the problem of maintaining the purchasing ponier of wages 
in the face of rising prices can only be exposed by tracing the operation 
of the variables in the downward direction. The flexible wage argument 
is analyzed by Lemer as f ollowsj 
If wages were as flexible as the other prices, the unemploy­
ment of the other factors would not be aLleviated by the 
fall in their prices. All prices would fall together in­
definitely until scaaething happened to change the underlying 
conditions - such as a fall in the rate of interest (which 
might be the result of lower prices) if this reduction were 
enough to offset the aggravating effect of falling prices 
both on the rate of interest and on the rate of investment 
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and consumption at any civen rate of interest.^ 
Increases in -wages as a aethod of counteracting rising living costs 
can be analysed by reversing Lerner's ai'gwaent or by considei'ine the effects 
of such a policy in terms of the demand for coixiodities. At fvill employ­
ment, a rising price level manifests an excess demand for ooi-aiaodities in 
relation to forthcoEiing supplies. Since the rate at vdrich consumers' 
coffijaodities are coining onto the market cannot be accelerated unless (a) an 
expansion occurs in the labor force, or (b) resources are diverted from 
investment goods to consumption goods, rising wages tend to increase this 
excess demand. As a consequence, the price level will continue to rise 
leaving the wage earner no better off than he urats before. 
In addition, a rising -wage level has its ic^jact on the anticipations of 
businessmen. iVith costs mounting, firms have every incentive to produce for 
inventory, kno-^ving that their ws.,.e bill, for e>:3mple, vdll be still higher 
in the future. Moreover, -livith prices rising rapidly, they }iave the i'urther 
esqpectation of selling these accumulated stocks at even hirrher pi'ices in 
the future. Such behavior obviously accelei-ates the entire proccss. 
It is also necessary to note that a rising v/ate level sterns not only 
from the pressures exerted by trade unions but also from employers as rrell. 
'^ith fully employed I'esources and rapidli'- rising prices, competition among 
firms for labor vdll tend to accelerate the rate at T^iiich iffages are in­
creasing. However, since the rate of ph^'-sical output is at its maximum, 
real wages cannot be increased. 
iLemer, A.P., 0£. ext., p. 272 n. 
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Figtire 7 illustrates the foregoi^ig discussion. 
V 
Fig, 7, Effects of an Increase in 
Money Wages at Full Employment 
Let X represent physical output, N • number of workers, V • real vrages. 
Wo • money -wages determiaed autonomously, P = price level, Y » national 
income expressed in money terms, D -• demand for labor. 
Equilibrium of the system at full engjloynent is shoTOi by the solid 
line. Hp represents the number of -workers at full employment resulting 
in the correi^onding physical output Xp. The price level is showi as Po. 
An increase in tmges from Wo to Wo' increases the price level from Po to 
Pi and the national income rises from X to T'. Vp, the real wage, remains 
unchanged. National income, 1 is defined as: IsPXsC+'I'f-G timers 
C represents constiiEption, I represents private investment and G represents 
public investment. 
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another criterion used to justliy an increase in -.vages is the 
notion that take-home pay ahoula be,' jnalntslnad i:i the face of reductions 
in h-^urs. ijaployera, on the obh-r hand, counter this ar£\u;ient 07 ce-
aiajidln;:: incrcaai:ig productivity on the pai't of their labor force as a 
necessary condition for naintaininc take-hocae ^-ay. Li one sense, the 
last tliree criteria are all interi-elafced in terms of public v/age policy. 
As Slichter has pointed cut: 
These facts point to the need of a national -nage i^olicy 
TMch vrould treat a risinc; cost oi' living as a reason 
for teaporarily pemittin{^ no yfaga increases except for 
certain special reasons, sucK as the correction of in-
eqizalities or the attraction of workers into certain 
industries "vAiere lagginG production ns.s croatiiig a 'bottle 
neck'. Hotrever, neither employers nor isnions vrould 
tolerate the enforcement of sucli a policy in tijiie of 
peacc. Consequently, if increases in the cost of laving 
are not to cause upward irage-price spirals, employers 
and unions must prevent then by increasing output per 
man-hour.^ 
The problem of luages, prices and ea^jloyjient tdll be considered in greater 
detail in a later section, x-'or t.he present it aay sLupli"" serve to il­
lustrate the desii'e for income stabilization groTslng out of cyclical 
insecurity. 
Inflation, apart f3X>m its effects on particular workers and firms, 
generally shifts income from wages to profits. That is to say, profits tend 
to increase more rapidly than T^ages. V/'orkers usualli^ demand liigher wages 
on such occasions, pointijig to the employer's ability to pay. As a general 
proposition, the argument, of course, is quite irrelevant. A case can be 
made for 3:«duced profits as en anti-inflationaiy device, but this does not 
Slichter, S.H., 0£. cit.« p. 16 
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mean that tho profits taken from f ima should be given to labor in tlie 
fona of higher T.mges# ' High profits, once fxQl employiaent has been 
achieved, enable the more fox'tmate firms to bid up the prices of pro­
ductive a^-ents, including labor, thereby ccaitributing to further price 
rises# 
If a portion of these profits were transferred to wage earners, 
several possibilities arises (a) expectation of fijrther reductions in 
profits may lead businessmen to reduce investment, thereby leading to 
deflation} (b) •with no reduction in investment, income wuld simply be 
transferred fjrom profit receivers to -wage earners but the total quantity 
of consumers' goods -mould remain unchanged, flence, prices Trould rise, 
since no additional quantities of consumers' goods iTOuld be foi-thcoming, 
but eixpenditures on such goods •would be somewhat greater than was pre­
viously the case, otring to the greater marginal propensity to consume 
of TiToge earners. 
By End large, hoover, the "ability to pay" argument for "wage in­
creases is bcised on the naive notion that increases in -wages come out 
of profits i The esiperience of trade unions during the iQ)-swing of the 
<^le vftjuld seem to confirm the "higher vrages out of profits" notion 
on3y because of the relative ease Tdth -stiich wage increases are obtained* 
This error, of course, is frequently made by labor economists too. Most 
of the literattjre in the field of labor economics "tacitly assumes -that 
real -siages can be increased by trade unions by the siuple device of 
effective collective bargaining. Although tliia may be true for a 
particular occt5)ation or industry ten5)orarily, its truth needs to be 
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substantiated as a general proposition, Dunlop, for exauiple, points 
out "that a p&rt oi' bhs rise iii real wage-rates observed durinc the up-
swiiig could be accounted for hy a i'all in the 'degree of monopoly'" A 
Kalecki in his investigation of the significioat factors detemining the 
share of the national income going to wage earners reaches the saae 
conclusion.^ 
At this point it is also useful to discuss the ii:$)licabions of 
expressed public policy in the general area of collective bargainiiTg. 
Although much of the earljr rJew Deal legislation, encourasiiig trade union 
organization, v^as based perhaps as jnuch on social and political grounds 
as it -was on purely economic criteria, it is useful to investigate the 
effects of such a T)olicy. Legitimate doubts maj'- bs expressed as to the 
ability" of trade unions to increase real yrages by raising money wages, 
but pez'haps nore iaportsnt are the positive allocative effects grorring 
out of the greater equality of bargaining pov/er betw^eji employer end 
employee. 
The great advantage of a competitive market is that it results in a 
pattern of resource allocation wiiich is consistent with consu'cer's pre­
ferences. iVhen markets are imperfect, that is to say, when various 
degrees of monopoly prevail among firms, this allocation is not achieved. 
•4)unlop, J.T., "Price Flexibility And The Degree of Monopoly" Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. ^ 3* August, 1939* p. 532. 
^Kalecki, M., Ess^s in The Theory Of Economic FluctTiation, Farrar and 
Rinehart, Inc., New York,1939> pp• l8-23. 
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This, of course, is also the case when monopsonistic firms buy their labor in 
unorganized labor markets or where some industries are organized while others 
are not. Allen and iiroraalee make the follovdng generalization: 
A private producer -will be maximizing his profits when his 
marginal revenue from output is equal to his marginal cost 
of output. However, it is only under perfect competition 
that marcinal revenue and price of the product ivill be 
identical. It is only under conditions vrtiei-e the price of 
the product is eq^lal to marginal revenue (and the price of 
the resource is equal to its marginal cost) that equatdug 
marginal revenue and marginal cost of output vdll eq\:iate 
also the value of the marginal product of an increment of 
a resource and the price of that resource. Thus, if the 
product-demand schedules and resource-supplj'" schedules 
that face the firm are not perfectly elastic, product 
prices via 11 not be equal to marginal revenue of output and 
factor prices irlll not be equal to marginal cost of input. 
Unless the elasticities of the product-demand schedules 
facing every firm are exactly the same and the elasticities 
of the factor-supply schedules are also equal for every 
firm, the best allocation of resources -will not result from 
each firm maximizing its prof it s.^ 
The "ability to pay" argument therefore can only be used by organized 
•workers who, through enabling legislation, have been able to meet employers 
on equal terms. It should be noted, however, that fraa the standpoint of 
resource allocation, the existence of strong trade unions may result in 
economically desirable effects. 
But nothing has been said about the ability of a trade union to in­
crease money wages -when its position is sufficiently strong to force an 
employer to meet an increased iitage demand. Here the employer has the 
alternative of offering the union a higher money -vrage and oon^Densating for 
1.,^ " " " " The authors present the arguaient 
CTapMcally in thefollovriLng fashion: 
CContinued) 
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the added vmge expense by raising' the price oi' the coai^iodity being sold. 
This obviously does not leave the employer as -well ofi' as he -was before. 
> 
Effects of £iionopo!ly on Resource Allocation 
The competitive demand for A in I is f""hile the competitive demand 
for A in Y is T^ere fa is the marginal physical product of A in 
X, is the marginal physical product of A in X, P^^s the price of X, 
and Py is the price of Y. 
•Rhen X is monoplized (fa remaining unchanged), the demand for A in X 
becomes fa^x "• "S^) iriiere Px (l - is the marginal revenue frcxa 
X andv^x is the elsticity of demand %r X. Similarly, the monoplistic 
demand for A in Y is (l - is the marginal revenue for Y and 
*^y is the elasticity of demand for Y. 
^a^xCl " ~ ^ at Ai on3y if*^x «n^y. (p. II46) 
since the nervr price is not of his o^in choosinc but merely an adjustment 
Tyhich he prefers to make in order to Hcoimize profits, given new cost 
conditions. 
How wuch pressure can the union exert if the leaders suspect that 
an ej-.'iploi.'er is able bo increase waoes becaiiBe rather high profits are 
beirijr earned? Clearly the case at hand manifests mny of the character­
istics of bilateral monopoQy and previous investigators have attempted 
to deal rdth the problem on this basis* The argument still reiaains un­
convincing, ii: spite of the inauy attempts that have been made to provide 
a solution. It is important, therefore, to trace the argur^ent to its 
present status, noting particularly how each approach is formulated' es­
sentially in micro-static terms. The contributions of Hicks, Bronfenbrenner, 
Dunlop and Fellner -vvill be used for purposes of illustration. 
Hicks attacks the problem by compartog the relative costs to the 
employer of resisting a wage demand Tdth the costs to be incurred by giving 
in to the union. According to lEcks: "If resistance appears less costly 
thcin concession, he Trvill resist, if concession seems cheaper, he will meet 
the Union's claims"#^ On ishat basis •sdll the employer make his choice vdLth 
respect to the foregoing alternatives? The author then considered the two 
most important variables involved (a) the magnitude of the wage demand, and 
(b) the expected length of the threatened strike. He goes on to says 
"We can then construct a schedule of vrages and lengths 
. of strike, setting opposite to each period of stoppage 
the highest imge an employer inill be -willing to pay 
^Hicka, J.H., The Theory of YiTages, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 
1932, p. lia. 
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rather than endure a stoppage of that period. At this 
wage, the escpected cost of the stoppage and the expected 
cost of concession (acoumulated at the current rate o£ 
interest) Just balance. At aaay lower wage, tte employer 
would prefer to give in, at ani"" higher iwage, he -wDuld 
prefer that a stoppage shoidd take place. 
This tre may call aa 'employer's concession schediile', 
7/e can e^qjress it graphically by an ' employer' a con~ 
cession curve'. It •vdll leave the y-axis at the point 
Z, where OZ is the wage T^iich the employer •mould have 
paid if unconstrained by Trade Union pressure. (It 
maj"- be the same or different from the wage which lie had 
been paying T?hen the dispute arose). The curve cajfinot 
rise higher than some fixed level, since evidently there 
is some irage beyond whj.ch no Trade Union can compel an 
employer to go. If vrages are to swallow profits completely, 
he Tdll prefer to close dovjn his works and leave the in­
dustry. 
Novr just as the expected period of stoppage -Rill govern 
the wage an employer is prepared to pay to avoid a 
strike, so the wage offered will govern the length of 
tijne the men are prepared to stand out. They, in turn, 
are makijig a choice betisean present and future evils -
present unemployment end future low wages - and thus 
the length of time they are prepared to stand out will 
vary according to the prospect of gain from doing so. 
... So in their case, too, we can draw up s, schedule, 
a resistance schedule, giving the length of tine they 
TTOuld be willing to stand out rather than allow their 
remuneration to fall below the corresponding wage. 










At its lower end, the resistance curve mist cut 22' at 
some finite distance along it, for there must be some 
naxmtun time beyond 7.^iich the Union cannot last out 
•doatever be the terms offered. At the upper end, it 
•will usually cut the y-axis, because there is usually, 
thougli not alvrtJO.'s, some v/age beyond which the Union Tvill 
not desire to go, hof»vever easily, in tems of strilcing 
titae, it can be secured* Very oHen, the reaistanoe 
curve will be nearly horizontal over a considerable part 
of its length, since thera is some level of wages to 
TiYhich in psrtic^ila^ the men consider themselves entitled. 
In order to secure this level they ydll stand out for a 
long -while, but they vd.ll not be much concerned to raise 
wages above it. 
The employer's concession curve and the Union's resistance 
curve will cut at point P, and the wage OA corresponding 
to this point is the highest wage which skilful negoti­
ation can extract from the employer. If the Union re­
presentatives demand a wage higher than this, the employer 
•will refuse it, because he concludes that a strike, under­
taken to obtain so high a wage as this, will not last 
long enough to make it worth while for him to give way. 
A strike is the lesser evil. If the union demands a wage 
less than OA, the demand rdll be conceded without much 
difficulty, but the negotiators will have done badly for 
their clients.1 
Ilicks then proceeds to discuss the circumstances under -ftMch the 
employer would prefer to negotiate rather than endure a work stoppage, 
and also, once a strike talces placc, hov/ the most probable wage the 
union can erigject to achieve continues to fall, the longer the strike 
lasts. The fifaal outcome, however, is always subject to unexpected 
occurrences whidi may shift one curve or the other, changing the staying 
power of either party from the original position. This may take place, 
for example, if the market conditions facing the eii5>loyer should suddenly 
^Ibid.j pp. ll(l-llilt# 
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•worsen or if additional resources and support should suddenly be made 
available to the union 
In an effort to explain the bargaininE povier of iirorkers and eni-
ployers in different labor market situations, Bronfonbrenner attempts 
to provide greater generality to Hicks* approach# He endeavors, there­
fore, "to determine, in each of several type cases, the effects of 
trade union collective bargaajiing upon vrage rates, employment and labor 
p incosiG, in the absence of effective resistajtice by employers.'"' 
Bronfenbrenner concludes frofci his analysis: 
(1) Collective bargaining by unions may benefit Trorkers 
vathout departing £tom atomistic cocgjetition botTfjeen 
workers for iDositions. At tho same tijae, it induces 
the area of indeterminacy in a con?)etitive labor narl®t» 
(2) Workers* gains through collective bargaining under 
atomistic coaroetition may be Increased further by xmion 
•jTEge-f ixing. 
(3) Union yizge fixing counteracts the effects of aon-
opsonistic but not monopolistic e35>loitation of labor, 
(li) Unionists' and non-unionists* incoBSs are maximised 
simultaneously ufader the open shop, in the absence of 
employer discrimination. 
(5) The union closed shop, besides concentrating the 
burden of unemployment on non-unionists, decreases total 
labor incono, •t^enever the union membership is too sznfill 
to meet the ecgsloyers' demand at a wage -rfiich maximizes 
labor income. 
(6) iimployer discrimination against unionists can be 
^vided into tvTo types, differing in their relation to 
the desirability of the closed shop* 
(7) En5)loyer quantity discrnmination leads to a situation 
in Tfhich the closed shop may increase total labor income. 
Even so, gains above the atomistically competitive level 
may be possible in its absence. 
3>Ibid., p. Iit5. 
^Bronfenbrenner, M., "Economics Of Collective Bargaining," Quarterly 
Journal of £conoraics» vol. 53# August, 1939» P* 535* 
I3h* 
(3) Under ejiixjloyer price discrinination, the closed shop 
teiids to lower labor income in all cases. It is less 
desirable here than under a sitxiation rath no discriLiination 
•niiat soever 
AlthoTjgh Bronfenbrenner deals lidth various labor market sitxiations 
and incidentallj recognizes the relationships T.'hich mai;- exist botv/een the 
factor rind product inc'irlcets,^ he fails to elaborate sufficientlir on the 
latter relationship and lijrJLts his ai-gumeiit to the yreifce i'ixing activities 
of unions. To this extent, tjierefore, his discussion coes not add a (rreat 
deal more than Hicks' presentation. 
The "ability to ptiy argiaaent" for -srage increase laay take several 
forms. The union may recognize that the Ciaployer, under existing circum­
stances, is not iimaediateli'- able to pay, but if certain adjustments in 
the marlcet are acliieved, vfage increases nay be realized. The analyses of 
Hicks aiid Bronfenbi-enner do not consider such possibiljLties. 
Dunlop attempts to show that vuiions .'aay, in fact, attempt to r.alce an 
employer better able to pay a higher tsage by cooperating T.'ith him in the 
manipulation of the product market. This he does by classifying such at­
tempts according to the folloviing analytical scheme. Trade unions nay pxirsue 
(1) policies designed to shift product deriand fuiictionsj 
(2) policies affecting supply conditions in product nai'kets, 
a for:a of affecting factor supplj^ conditions, and (3) policies 
affecting competitive conditions in product markets.5 
^Ibid., pp. 250-551. 
^Ibid., p. 5U0. 
^Dunlop, J. T., "linage Policies of Trade Unions", in Readings In The 
Theory of Income Distribution, Blakiston Co., Philadelphia, 19l;6,' p. 314-6. 
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Dunlop also eurohasizes tlie importance of trade union wage policy in 
the T/ider context of "tho total labor bargain", •which includes non~incon© 
as well as pecuniary objectives. Moreover, a deiaand for a israge increase 
may disregard completely the eaaployer's ability to pay ii' "changes in 
•!«age structure have been intended to promote menbersliip in a trade union". 1 
From the standpoint of public labor policy, iKinlop malces still another 
contribution. Too often, the activities of mions are vieived in the 
narrow sense of being fundamentally occupied v.lth inccrae objectives -when 
actually- the 7mge structure being bargained for has more subtle overtones. 
In attempting to regulate the conduct of labor organizations, as Dunlop 
points out. 
It -will be fruitful to exaiaine in every case the possibility 
that 7vage structure may be directed towards union organi­
zation, division of 'work, specific aeans of renruneration, 
like vacations vdth pay, affecting the rate of techiiical 
change, desirable isorking conditions, and partial contz-ol 
over entrance to the trade and quality of training recruits.^ 
Althoi;igh the economic effects of a change in the rsage structia^e laay be 
paramount in the niind of the policy maker, regardless of the particular 
union objective, it is extreaaely important to recognize the motivation 
of the union in framing the appropriate action to be taken by the poli<^ 
maker. In the past, the simplest, and perhaps least effective, line of 
approach was outright prohibition of undesirable behavior. 
By taking into account the motivations of a trade union it should be 
llbid.> p. 338. 
^Ibid., p. 3la. 
possible to apply ilart's suggestion of 'Traitrework iiicentive plaiiniiit;" to 
•p.'orkers' organizations as -Rell as business fir.ti3.^ .'^ore isill be said on 
this point in a later section. 
Since workers' organijsations today pattern rather closely'- the sii:;© 
and concentration of business units, it would seem desirable to ai-ialj-ze 
the collective bargaining ia'Of^ess in ter^is of bilateral monopoljr. i:.arlier 
attaTipts to do so, by ai,plyinf; cAic theoi.^' i.i ibs traditional fcnr. of a 
single seller facing a single bur/'er, failed to account for certain peculiar­
ities of trade xinions as "sellers of labor". Haley, in describi.ic i''ellner'g 
approach, for exainple, attempts to clarify this difficu-lty. 
This application of the theory to the labor market, ho-.yever, 
differs froia its auulication to a coiamodity iriarket since in 
the case of a unionised supply of labor, the concept of a 
supply schedule is inappropriate. It may be assvaiied, hoiT-
ever, that there is soise level of vta'ces below v.'hich the 
union trould not accept eruployraent for its mcjcbers, and also 
it may be assumed that the -os-iion, to an extent which varies, 
Yfeigiis against one another the advantage of hii.:her for 
its luerabers and the disadvantage of increased meiaploynicnt 
that Eia;'- accompany higher wages »-
Fellner, using indifference curves representinc the union's preference 
for \ra,£:es and e;o.plo.7ment and tlie possibility of substituting one foi' the 
other, avoids the difficulty of the supply concept in dealing viith collective 
bargaining in terms of bilateral monopoly. The shapes of the indiiierence 
curves reflect tvra possible assursptions: (a) they may be horiisontal lines, 
indicat. ng that the union is fundamentally interested in higher wages and is 
%ee p» 68 J above. 
%aley, B.?., "Value and Disti'ibution", in A Survey of Conteniporary 
Sconoinics, edited by Ellis, K.S., Blakiston Co., Pb-tiarifllr-.h-'iaj p. 
137. 
not concerned T.lth eaploTment effects of such rrage increases and (b) they 
are convex to the origin, indicating that the union is conscious of any 
employi:ic;nt effects resiilting from i:icreafjes and conaiders wages and 
by the value product functions from any variations in its labor inputs. 
A total of four jjossible cases are distinguished by Fellner, tho first two 
deal with assumption (a) above in vihxch (i) the eiaployor is sui'ficioiitTy 
strong to fix the wage, and (ii) the union is sufficiently strong to fix 
the vrage. The last tiro deal vdth assumption (b) again, using siuiilar 
alternatives illustrated luider assumption (a). 
Case 1. iiiaploj'Ter stronger than trade union. It is assumed that the 
union disregards effects on engiloytiient and has seme mininrum Tivage below -sdiich 
it vd.ll not go. Since Oli is the lowest irage acceptable to the union, the 
employer -vTill fix the wage at that level, employing OB units of labor. 
employ-lent imperfect substitutes.^ The firm's deiiiaiid for labor is shoYm 
IV^U^ef^MUCT 
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Wmin a lonuer limit of 
bargaining range 
HKP «s marginal net productivity 
Tffinax = upper limit of 
bargaining range 
ANP « average net productivity 
Figure 8 
^Fellner, W«, o£. cit.^ p. 509. 
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Case 2» Trade union is stronger than employer. The same assumptions 
used in Case 1 apply. The union mil fix the wage at 01^, a higher vjage 
vftH cause the employer to incur losses per uiiit of input antl eventually 
iTOuld be forced out of business. OG units of labor -vfould be employed. One 
v/ould expect, hoivever, that the consequent unenployment resulting from the 
liigher vrage v/ould cause the union officials to reconsider their "vrnge policy. 
This is show, belov.*. 
Case 3* employer is stronger than the union. It is asamed how­
ever that the union recognizes the possible effects on employment of any 
change in its -wage deiaandg. The eaployer -stIII force the union to "accept 
VA6E Ri AT6 
MC\AKP 
• \mmKr — 1 ' jjtaivi ,v"' ' 
l3_ s loTirest indifference curve acceptable to union, 
hence it is equivalent to tfie stpply curve for labor. 
MC a xoargDJOial curve dravm to loTOst indifference curve, 
hence it is eqiiivalent to the firm's marginal <20 st 
of labor input. 
lo s highest indifference curve attainable by union 
•without forcing the firm out of business. 
Figure 9• 
the Tvage OD (on the 1 indifference curve) and OB workers will be emplc^ed 
(n^ere the MNP and MC curves intersect). 
Case 1|. The imion is stronger than the employer, again using the 
assutaptions made in the previous case. The union vriLll force the employer 
to pay a wage equal to OC but employaient -will faLl to OA (-where the I2 
curve is tangent to IIKP). 
Fellner's analysis, of course, deals only with the Timge - employment 
aspects of the labor bargain. Apart from the limitations imposed by 
leaving' out other significant factors •vriiich enter into labor agreements, 
there also exists a further nvesdoiess in his approach. Fellner assumes 
that the •wage-employment objectives of the trade union leaders are identical 
Ydth those held by the rank and file. This may be the case, but sufficient 
evidence exists to ir).dicate that the interests of union leaders and members 
frequently diverge. No difficulties will arise, during the process of 
negotiation, if the union leaders have the authority to conclude agreements 
Tfri.th employers, Tfsithout being required to submit new contracts to the member­
ship for approval. But "sfshere the membership does approve or reject the 
terms of a new agreement, it is necessary to take their influence into account. 
There are several reasons for the existence of differences between 
the leadership and rank and file -with respect to the specific terms in a 
collective agreement. Two laajor orders of disagreement can be distinguishedj 
(1) those resulting from the pei-sonal ambitions of the leadership and (2) 
those reflecting either ignorance on the part of the membership or their 
desire for immediate gain. As a first approximation, it would appear reason­
able to assume that the rank and file do not concern themselves tdth the 
employment effects of a wage bargidn. As Slichter has pointed out: 
The rank and file can easily visualize the benefits that 
li^o. 
will come to thcaa fror.i a wage increase or from certain 
changes in working' niles. These advantages are definite 
and imraediate, whereas the possibility of some loss in 
employment is remote, uncertain, and conjectural.! 
Moreover, Slichter elsev;hcre describes divergence of objectives between 
the leadership and the membership of trade unions in the follovdng terms: 
The temperament of the leader, his aggressiveness, his 
willingness to take chances or his disposition to be 
cautious, the relative importance which he attaches to 
the short-run or long-nm consequences of policies, his 
sense of responsibility to the public, his ambition to 
advance -within the labor movement, all influence the 
selection of policies, tjuite naturally the leader v/ho 
is eager to aidvance toward a place of greater power and 
prominence in the labor movement is lilcely to select 
policies with that end in view. These •prill not necessarily 
be the policies which will maximize the pres .nt value of 
the future incomes of union members. ... 
Despite the influence of the ambitions and rivalries of 
leaders upon union policies, the usual situation does 
not appear to have been that the leaders have been too 
aggressive for the rank and file. Cn the contrary, -s^en 
leaders have been displaced or when segments of unions 
have broken away from the parent organization, the re­
volt has almost invariably been against officers vdio 
were too consejrvative and slow-moving. ...2 
By combining the approaches used by Fellner in Cases 1, 2 and 3, i;* 
noted above, it should be possible to deal with this somewhat more compli­
cated model. Figure 10, below, shows the two conflicting preference 
systems of xinion rank and file, and the leadership, as well as the firm's 
^Slichter, S.H., Union Policies and ^dustrial Management, The 
Brookings Institution, V/ashington, STc77'l9l5!,"prr"37iri 
^Slichter, S.H., "Wage Policies", Proceedings of the Academy of 
Polit.-i f>al Science, May, I9I4.6, reprinted in Bakke, JS.vr. and Kerr, 
C., o^. P* 671. 
Ha. 
revenue product curves. It is assmed that the lorrest indifi'ercnce liii© 
acceptable to the ranlc and file is at a higher level, over part of its 
range, then the lov.-est accepta.ble indifference line of tlie leadership. 
To this extent the indii'ference line which has relevance to the actual 
bargaining process Tdll represent the combined preferences of these 
two groups. The curve SR-lIy is therefore the composite "least accepta­
ble indifference line", wiiere T-LIu is the least acceptable curve to the 
rank and file -while is the corresponding curve to the leadership. 
If the leadership did not concern itself Tidth the preferences of the rank 
- --Ui. AWP 
MC 
EMPLoyfAEhfT 
Figure 10. Divergence of Leader-4iember Preference System 
and file and were forced to yield to the employer's terms, the wage would 
be OD and employment 02. Similarly if the rank and file must be reckoned 
Td.th, the wage would not fall below OT and employment wou3jd equal OE.l 
p. 137» 
2h2* 
At the other exbreae, if the union is more :.-omTful than the employer and 
is able to fix tlie vrage to its ov/n satisfaction, the xipper wage limit, 
preferred by the leaders, y;oiild be OU and emplojiavint OV. The rank and 
file, hovrever, vfoiild not be content v;ith such an agreement siiice they would 
feel that the wage OK was obtainable and. their leaders ;¥ere not drivhig 
the hardest possible vrage bargain. 
liie can therefore conclude tiiat Fellner's analj'sis tends to neglect a 
rather iiaportant aspect of the bargaininr.; process, namely, the divergent 
preferences of union leaders sjid rseiabers vdth reinject to the -srage bai*gain. 
Ho-iffever, the approach he uses can be modified to take this pos^;ibility 
into account. 
Thus far the "abilitg^ to pay" criterion has been argued upon fundamentally 
ratior^ grounds. Both parties to the bargaining process are asswxed to be 
naxinizing some magnitude involving- but tm) variables, irages and employ;-ent. 
The employer presujnably attempts to laaxiiiusse profits per unit of iiiput pw-
chased while the union attempts to maximize subjective satisfaction. 
Some doiibt has been expressed recently as to the validity of the fore­
going assumptions.^ Ross, for exa:nple, vievrs the trade union as essentially 
a political entity and hence atter.ipts to describe their behavior in non-
econonio terms. Kis approach is vie-vired in marked contrast with the contri­
butions noted above J 
The model of the union as a monopolistic seller of labor 
activated by the desire to maximize some measurable end. 
^See Lester, R.A., "Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for i/age-Employment 
Problems", American Economic Keviev, vol. 36, March, 19li6, pp. 63-82. 
Ili3. 
connaonly the total wage bill, is a deeiily misleading one. The 
mion does not sell labor# It is a political agency representing 
the sellers of labor, led hj ofi'iciala •who stand in osseritially 
political relationships with the rank and file, the employers, 
the other organizational levels of the vtnion, the rest of the 
labor Laoveaent and the governnent.l 
Because Boss espressos a point of view grovdng in popularity amohg labor 
econoniats, his position is quoted extensively- in the material that follo\v3, 
Moreover, his argiEient provides valuable insights in terras of promulgating 
public labor po3LiQr. 
Despite the populfirity of analogies from physics, economic 
behavior remaiiis perversely intractable to mechanical analysis. 
Within the several branches of economic theory this is no-
\iheTQ better illustrated tiiasn in the theory of trages and 
collective bargaining. The apparatus of equilibrium anal^-ais 
has. been adopted in its entirety, ".'.ages are the 'price of 
labor' established in the 'labor-iiiarket', collective bargaining 
is 'bilateral monopoly't -"he union is conceived as a monopolistic 
seller of labor. V;agos are regarded as emerging froa the inter­
action of supply and demand in the labor market. In order to 
eo£i5)lete the analogy, it is held that competition among buyers 
and sellers of labor integrates snd unifies the wage structure, 
irahile imperfect competition inhibits the tendency torrards 
equalization* 
Foraally. the parallel appears reasonably good, iluch could be 
overlooked ii' the formal analysis -grorlced well, and if, as 
sometimes hapjjens, more or less correct conclusions "isere reached 
. from false premises. Eut if cun^ent mge doctrine is con­
ceptually msound, practically it is ic^possible. The results 
are poor and the lacunae manifold. Vdiere one price shoxxld pre­
vail in the labor market, tliere are many. Labor market theorists 
are so burdened v/ith the task of identifying z'igiditiea and 
in5)erfections that little time has been left to make a con­
structive theoretical reformulation. On balance tlie labor 
laarket concept is a net liability in wage analysis; there is 
fatal disjunction betiijeen the spatially limited character of 
supply and demand and the spatially unlimited characteristics 
of vfage determination under collective bargaining.. 
^Eoss, "The Ijynamics of T^ge Determination Under CollectiVB 
Bargaining", American Economic Itevjetr, vol. 37, Decmber, I9kl, p» 793» 
We are not onlichtoned as to why unions demand what they do, 
why eiaployers i^rant *hit they do, and -nhy arfiitrabors avmrd 
•what they do« "io are told thc.t the "wago structure is a living, 
breathing ox-gaaiam, but its ivay of lii'e retrains a nji'stcry. 
Viewed In the largo, -nfiat is euphemistically called our 
•national vrat;© structure' is a maae of distinctions aid 
differences. Sonc are more or lesa in accordance xitli coainonly 
accepted notions of equity, such as distinctions between skilled 
and unskilled Yforkors, or appear to follorr econaidc geography 
or to correspond rdth the profit position of eiqjloycrs. These 
we ci'll ineqvdtios* In still other situations vrith the soiuidest 
of econoniic bases for xrase distinctic^ns, none are found. Scxae 
differences persist indefinitely, others narrow gradually, and 
still others ore eliainated entirely. The 'national wage 
structure' seens to consist of little islands of rationality 
ill a sea of anarchy* 
Theoretical reconstruction must begin by recognizinj, a few 
elementary facts. The trade uhion is not a seller of labor. 
It is a politioal instrj-Mcntality not governed by the pecuniary 
calculus conventionally attributed to business enterprise. 
(Others are better qualified to ^udge whether this is also 
true of the business enterprise itself.) The infl\ionces 
determining wage;: run in political rather than geographical or 
industrial orbits. Vi ere a single price does emerge, there is 
established a prima facie case against the operation of market 
forces* 
There are forces in society and in the economy uaking for 
unifonnity in the wage structure, but they are not Eorely 
the forces of supply and demand. Ideas of equity and justice 
have long permeated industrial society, but the growth of 
organization has endowed them with conroelling force. They 
provide the substance of equitable comparisons and they govern 
the administration of ccmsolidated bargaining structures* 
These are the strongest equalising tendencies in wage determi­
nation. 
Equitable congjarisons are highly important to workers, employers, 
unions and arbitrators. They attain additional strength through 
the administrative and political ccnvenience of a ready-ciade 
settlement. They run in limited orbits, however, asid not in 
a single chain throughout the whole econony. It is when the 
several locals of a single international union centralize their 
wage policies and consolidate their strategies, wiien separate 
industrial establjjshnents are brought under conmon otnaership, 
when the state plays a more active role in setting rates of pay. 
when rival xmione negotiate together for mutual protection and 
isfhen eatployors organize into associations to preaei-ve a comnon 
front that comparisons become coercive in the detcnninatiou of 
wages. Under these circumstances anall differences becoEe 
large and equal treatment becomes the sine iiua non of industrial 
peace. A sixty-day abrilce over t^ra cents an hour siai"" be 
irrational iix the economic lericon, but viei^ed as political 
behavior it may have all the logic of survival.^ 
The deficiencies of curi*ent •wace theory siigf^ested by Ross do not lie 
fundancntally in our inability to explain trace union behavior in terms of 
economic rationality. Even as a political institution, Fellner's approach 
could serve as a first ar)proxijnation. The dii'ficulties connected vdth 
laaking jud£?aents concerning the ability to pa^^ ai'gujuent stem largely from 
the firm's behavior in the product and factor aiarkets. Current price theory, 
expressed in raicro-static terms, is not able to deal vdth the problesi. 
Hegardless of vrhat .'.orces there are detcr.uining the particular -wage 
demand put forward by the tra. e union, the matter of cinicial iEiportance 
involves the employer's reaction to that de:nand. economic theory, at 
present, is not prepared to e^qjlain the decisions reached by the fira and 
hence, the impact of T/at;e negotiations on such decisions. I-iejTiolds, for 
example, in discussing the shortcomings of current price theory as applied 
to vfages, malces the follovdng observations; 
First, the static theory of the fir.a cannot be used for 
the prediction of actual business behavior, both because 
of defects in the cost and revenue functions - exbreme 
instability, lack of continuity, lack of independence, 
and so on - and because of the basic inapplicability of 
static methods to changing conditions. Timeless cost-
arevenue diagrams should be restricted to problems to "ivhich 
they are appropriate, e.g. esqjosition of the meaning of 
ideal allocation of economic resources. 
^Ibid., pp. 820-822• 
3i^6. 
Second, actual busjjiess behavior should be analyzed by 
the use of period models ... (taking into account the 
effects of risk snd uncortainty). 
Third, it soems reasonable to escpect that the direct 
effect of a -wage change in a particular firm on output 
snd employment in that firm tail usually be very close 
to zero. The significance of this hypothesis (if correct) 
is that in models of the econoiri'- a.-, a whole, general 
chsjiges in money Y?a{.,e rates can safely be taken as 
changing wage pajTuenta in the first instance by the same 
percentaf/e as the change in rates 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the weaknesses connected -.nth 
atteinpting to deal -with wage-price problems in microstatic terms. The 
criteria used by trade unions to justifj"- wage increases .therefore need 
to be viewed in the larger context of full employment policy. Qj''clical 
insecurity raises many questions of public policy at this level of the 
individual firm and trade union, vrhich perhaps can be solved Tdthin a 
fuU-employiaent frame-vrork. It should not be assuiaed horrever that all 
labor problejns vfould thereby disappear. Cn the contrary, uevi difficulties 
of a more serious nature irould arise. 
Employment stabilization; The threat of memployment has frequently 
led government, business units and trade unions to support and put into 
practice programs designed to minimize the hardships coincident rdth the 
lack of job opportunities. There are two major techniques -which -we shall 
concern ourselves vrLth. Governiaent has used unemployment insurance as an 
ameliorative device for some time, dome business units have introduced 
guaranteed annual wage contracts at the behest of trade unions and recently 
^Reynolds, L.G., "Toward A Short-Rim Theory of Images", American 
Economic Review, vol. 38, June, ipliS, p. 308. 
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trade imioris have used politlcrjl pressure to gain adoption of such contracts. 
Since public pplicy is fairly -VTall established Tilth respect to unemploy-
raont insurance and recentlj'" pronouncements advocating the extension of 
guaranteed annual v.-age contracts have been made, an evaluation of iihese pro­
posals should contribute aiuch to om- understanding of an intOErated full 
employment procx'am* 
The great -nealcness of our present uneraplojiuent insurance system is that 
it does not fit into cxuTent proposals utilizing laonetaxy-fiscal techniques 
for the piu'pose of counteracting cyclical fluctuations in business activity. 
The tax contributions of firms, for exaniple, are too rigid, and hence tend 
to be deflationary when business activity" is depressed and ini'lationarj"" I'litien 
demand for consimption goods is excessive. Moreover, the e^aierience rating 
s5''steni does not dovetail vath suggestions currently beine nade for fleidLble 
income tax rates designed to increase purchasing povrer durin<,; depressions. 
A fundamental chaioge in the unesiiiloyment insurance systeir., prerequisite 
to its proper functioning, viould entail a revision in ths assu:.iptions under-
Ij'lng the program itself. At best any system of unenploiiTaent inaur^oice can 
do little, if anything, to stabilize the t'^iiieral level of business activity. 
Psychologically, it gives the tvorker a teaiporary feeling of security, should 
he be forced to find enployment elsewhere. This pre-supposes, however, the 
availability of jobs, and therefore "srorkers wcvild not find themselves 
destitute i-diile chan^jing from one eaployinent to another. 
The present system of unemployment insurance rnalces the foUondjag 
assumptions; 
1];8. 
(1) business units are, for the most •-.•rt, responsible Tor fluctuations 
in business activity; (2) business units are able to stabilise the volume 
of their o^m output, independently- of wliat other firms are doing} (3) the 
funds contributed by business units, to the insurance system, ar^ borne 
by the employer and have no effect on the level of employment. Obviously* 
these assumptions can/iot be substantiated. Although, in the aggregate, 
firas laake decisions -sThich determLie the level of output aid employment, 
any one fim cannot stabilize its ora level of production and emploiiaent 
in the face of a general reduction in business and consiuaption expenditures. 
Moreover, it seems likelj'- that employers tend to shift any tax contributions 
back to their employees in the form of correspondingly lotrer wages. During 
depressions the tax burden contributes to additional unemployment since 
firms can reduce their tax obligations by reducing their payrolls. 
The experience ratine system, -which offers loirer tax rates to employers 
maintaining relatively stable employment records, needs to be revised. 
There are several alternatives. One recocDuendation which has been made 
maintains that the underlying assumption of individual responsibility is 
still valid but the system should be revised so that it operates counter-
cyclically* The major features of this proposal are presented below: 
1* Preserve employer interest in unemplojinent insurance 
and employment stabilization. 
2. Maintain solvency of system as a whole* 
3* Have tax rates high in period of full esEployment and 
tax rates low in periods of unemployment to aid business 
stability* 
Basic RxilesJ 
1. In time of declining eraployraent, a tax rate paid 
by an employer shall not be increased, 
2. In times of rising employment a tax rate paid by 
an employer shall not be decreased.^ 
'Ihe disadvantages of this proposal are first, that it p'jrp'etuates the 
individual firm's responsibility for unemploiauent and its capacity to deal 
•with the problem; second, the tax rates are not flexible doTOi-y/ard during 
periods of declining employment and they ai'e not flexible upi/Tard in periods 
of high employment J third, the solvency of the system unnecessarily limits 
the disburseaents -which may be made during pariods of large-scale unemploy­
ment • 
An alternative 7<ell vnrth considering vfould remove the assumption of 
employer responsibility. Furthermore, contributions -would be made by bo'bh 
employers and the government and no attempt -wotild be made to maintain the 
solvency of the program in the usual sense. Goveriiment -would make large 
contributions during depressed business acti-vity while fii-ms rould malce the 
major payments during prosperity. Kxperience rating would be used to 
encourage firms to spread employment (reducing hours rather than the size 
of their labor force). This would then j:enait memployiaent insiircuice pay­
ments to be made to -workers -who are only partially tinemployed and -ffould 
also enable proposals for the reduction of income tax payments dxuring de­
pression to have a -wider impact since only that portion of the labor force 
^Second Annual Coherence on the Teaching of Labor Economics, He-?/- York 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 
Ithaca, N.y., August, 19a8, p. 95* 
•which is employed benefits from a reduction in income tax rates.^ 
The Old Age and Survival Insurance Program also has employiiient effects 
Tishich run counter to the teclmiques required for the operation of a full 
employ^ont program. Since both the employer and worker contribute to this 
insursnce fund, counter-cyclical flexibility in the rate structure would 
be desirable. In addition, the system is required to accumulate reserves, 
far exceeding its annual co.Tdnitments to pension receivers. It has been 
siiggested that the Social Security program function on a "pay-as-you-go" 
basis, thereby reducing the contributions required of employers and vrorkers 
and hence freeing funds for additional consumption or investment. One 
estimate of the accumulated reserve, by 1970, amounts to apuroxiinately thirty-
three billion dollars.2 
Still ajiother tecteiique for increasing the rrorker's Job security is the 
guaranteed annual wage. The supporters of this device range from extremists 
Tsho consider guaranteed wages as a business cycle panacea to the more 
moderate advocates vdio believe labor rels.tions would improve tremendously if 
such plans -were adopted. This latter point is ejgsressed in the OhilR study 
prepared in 19hT' The report states, for ex^ple, that employers could 
635)ect reduced labor turnover, lower training, hiring and employee injury 
costs, g3?eater efficiency in the plant, increased productivity of workers 
resulting from their feeling of security and so on. These benefits should 
offset a large share of the additional cost incurred by the employer i-dien 
^Hart, A.G., cit., p. l}86j cf. Harris, 3,2., Economics Of Social 
Security« Mc^jraw liill Book Co., Hew York, 19lil» 
20w6n, W.V., Labor ^^roblei^, Honald Press, Mew York, 19i;6, p. 530. 
the plan is adopted.^ The supporters of this contention, however, fail to 
realize that the advantages enumerated above may prevail ^ len some firms 
guarantee employment iiiiile others do not. Should all firms provide such 
guarantees, Yforkers vrould not consider employment in any particular firm 
attractive because of the job security offered. Hence the improved labor 
relations frequently used as an argument in support of the guaranteed 
armual v/age cannot be considered as an effective spur to increased vrorker 
loyalty and productivity. 
It has also been suggested that the general application of guaranteed 
v/age plans vrould tend to improve the allocation of labor resources some-
vrhat since seniority provisions in trade a^'reeiaents are iiiserted in order 
to remove the fear of insecurit/ on the part of t?ie Vrorker. Seniority 
provisions, however, attempt to cope vdth the problem of long-run insecuz-ity 
and to the extent that ivage guarantees are provided for periods ranging in 
length frcaa only three months to a year, the worker TOuld still fear the 
loss of his job at the end of the guarantee period. Consequently, the 
desire for seniority provisions TOuld not be eliminated by the introduction 
of employment guarantees. But insofar as employers are required to stabilize 
their production and inventory schedules in order to minimize the costs of 
guaranteeing employment, the size of the -work force attached to a particular 
firm TToxild tend to be a relatively stable one. 
In STBfta however, it wuld be reasonable to assume that: 
^Latimer, lil.W,, Guaranteed Wages, Report to the President by the Advisory 
Board,Office of "ffar kobiliaation and Reconversion, Office of Temporary 
Controls, U.S. Crovemment i^rinting Office, Washington, D.C., I9k7» p* 170» 
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Under the guaranteed wage plan the main effort is to 
provide Trork for the -worker on his old Job or at least 
in the firji to vjiiich he is attachedj under uneinploiTaent 
insurance the emphasis is placed upon connecting up 
workers and jobs in any firm, offering suitable -work.l 
The more extreme view concerning the viictues of annual -wages, namely, 
that the general level of etaplojraenfc and business activi'by -would Improve 
and cyclical fluctuations would thereby be eliminated requires special 
attention. At first glance, tixis argument seems reasonable. 
For, after all, markets and purchasing po"wer make jobs, and 
jobs in turn make income and markets. Therefore, vrhy shouldn't 
the universal announcement of a guarantee of steady -work 
fxilfill its OTOi confound and not only lead to steady employ­
ment but do so -without costing bxisiness anything?^ 
Upon closer obser'/ation, the attractiveness of the argument disappears as 
questions dealing -(ifith the consun^Jtion and investment effects of yrage 
guarantee are raised. Hansen and iJamuelson, for example, emphasize the 
limi-ted consumption effects which may be e::q)ected. They go on to say: 
Individuals rill not suddenly change long-established customs 
and habits with respect -bo the disposition of their incomes 
between consucqption and saving merely because, from the 
social standpoint, the turn in the cycle calls for an inci'ease 
in spending out of a reduced income. Thus an offsetting 
increase in consui!?>tion actually falls off -when investment 
declines, since unemployment and declining business pros­
pects induce a decline in private spending patterns ... 
Unfortunately, economic analysis of guaranteed -wages 
does not substantiate the claim that this de-viee -would, 
as a first approximation, necessarily tend to maintadn 
consunqption for any appreciable period of time at the 
iHansen, A.H. and Samuelson, P.A», "Economic Analysis of Guaranteed 
Annual ^ "ages", in Latimer, M.Ti',, og. cit., p. Ii32. 
2Hansen, A.II,, and Saitnielson, P.A., "Uaking the Annual Fage \7ork", New-
York Tojnea Magazine, Ju3y 13, 19h7s ^ Bakke and Kerr, o£. c^., p. 579. 
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appropriate full ejirployiaent lex'els, i.e. i'oughl^'- at sereii-
eights Ox the full-eiaploif:rient level of net national incoiae.l 
Vvith respect to the business cycle, Samuelson and Hansen re2ii:;d the 
supporters of guaranteed vrages that investment plays a xundajaental role in 
providing high er.iploy;r.ent levels, r.articulr'.rly investment in the capital 
goods induoti'ioa. '/ihat effects are likeli" if guaranteed vrage plans are 
iiistituted iu this sector of the econoiny? Host discussions of guaranteed 
Trage plans assume that they vdll be privately financed either on an 
accumulated reserve or paj^-as-you-go basis. In either caae, the capital 
goods industries TOuld, as a consequence, incur higher costs and prices. 
To this proposal Hansen and Samuelson malce the follomng assertion: 
To argue that costs and prices should be raised i:i such 
industries flies in the face of certain coiamonly accepted 
programs for fighting depression - programs which stress 
the need to reduce construction costs, interest rates, and 
capital costs in general so as to stiiirolate investment out­
lays. It -would be bad social accounting to discourage 
employ.uent in the capital goods industries by saddling 
additional costs on these jjadustries. Such a procedure is 
only too lilcely to reduce tho total volume of capital goods 
outlays over the cycle, thereby leaving the system at a 
loTjer average level over the entire cycle .2 
Certain aspects of the e:q)erisnce rating system that v?ere considered 
objectionable arc also found in genei'alized giiaranteed -wage plans. Since 
all firms \roxild be reqxiired to set up reserves to finance the program, 
there is the presumption that business units are able, on an equal basis, 
to provide for the. unemploymont (nov/ hidden by imge guarantees, regardless 
lUansen, 4,H., and Samuelson, P^l., "Economic Analysis of Guaranteed 
Annual *?age", 0£. cit., pp. ii36-li37. 
^Ibid., p. 837. 
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of the firm's actual labor requirements) prevailing in their respective 
industries. Firms least able to bear tlie burden vrauld now be required to 
support the "unemployed". This is also true of the experience ratiaag 
system in v-hich firms hit hardest by a slackening of business activity are 
requi.red to make relatively larger contributions to the uneiaployiiient 
insurance reserves than the more fortunately situated business units. 
On the other hand, if a hi£;h enployjient economy is maintained by govera-
ment and as a supplenient^ury program a system of annual vrage guarantees is 
encouraged, there is something to be said for charging industries which use 
labor reso\irces seasonally, the full cost of attracting labor temporarily 
aTOy from other, more stable, productive \init8. In this sense differential 
contributions by fiims can be Justified, but fundamentally on allocative 
grounds rather than on their individual responsibility for an overall reduction 
in employment. 
The possibilities of a publicly financed guaranteed annual wage will be 
taken up in a later section dealing -Aith overall wage policy. For the present 
•vie shall limit ourselves to the theoretical aspects of such guar'antees, 
entered into, vdthin the framev/ork of free collective bargaining. Leontief 
has this to say about the introduction of combined "price-quantity" •«age 
bargains in place of the former technique, -wherein the tsas usually 
determined by the seller and the quantity to be piirchased at the wage -was 
left to the buyer's discretion: 
Such a change extends appreciably the magnitude of the 
maximum advantage vshich the stronger of the tiro contracting 
parties can obtain, at the expense of the vreaker, through 
exercise of monopoly po'iier. If the employers constituted 
the stronger side, thia inorearjed cain would bo ti^eira. 
•If the labor unions cox.ild secure for thenselves a dominant 
bar«»ainln.c position, they vculcl '•leri:iitel7 increase their 
distributive share by lettiiig the total amount ol' labor 
to bo hired as -well as the irago rates to be caiic. become 
an object of collective bar-gaining. 
It is i;'itere3ting to observe th^.t the <irive for guaranteed 
amual ifrages represents only ohe particul^x instance in the 
more general tendency to replace the conv&Jiticual method 
of nonopolistic marketinc; - vviiich allov.'s the other party to 
to the transaction to choose free^l^^ the ajnount T.'hich it vdll 
bviy (or sell) at the given price - vnith a new kind of agree-
r.ient T-hich fixes both the total volume as ivell as the price 
of purchase .#.1 
Fima subject to T^age guarantees are also likelj'- to make compensations 
in the product market for the adc'.iticnal fixed costs rriiich they have now 
incurred. And it seems likely that relatively small firms will find it 
increasingly difficult to operate, rdth a large proportion of their costs 
fixed rather than variable. Hochwald describes these tendencies in the 
folio-King terns; 
For the individual fira, the iiost inporbant and nost obvious 
result of grotdng cost rigidities is a shift in the 'optiaiuni 
scale of enterprise'. Tiith larger and larger investuiGnts 
in relatively' fixed agents necessitated by institutional 
changes in the labor market, the rang;® of decreasing unit 
costs Tddens for the fiiia, and the optimura point of output 
is shiftjjig to the right on the conventional cost-output 
diagram. This trend toT.-ard 'big busines:;', initiated by 
cost conditions, is intensified by the grovrbh of uncertainty 
T.tiich resxilts from the employ:::srnt cf relatively'- fixed sgents. 
Long-run coniKitraents in the pxirchase of fixed agents pre­
suppose a Icn^-er planning period, a 7d.der 'horizon' of the 
in^vidual firm, tirhich in turn increases uncertainty end 
the tendency to protect profit e:q:ectations through demand 
^Leontief, W., "The Pure Theory Of The Oueranteed Annual 'v/age Contract", 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. February, 19h6, p. 79• 
manip'ulr'.tion or product diversification. Eeraaiic'' rcsnipulfltion 
inplies the grovrfch of sellinc costs and all other aspects of 
monopolistic coiape>bition, an (it'jenpb to adjust decand to fixed 
resources rather than to adjust reso\irces to a r^hiftir-n de;T.f\nd. 
Product diversifioation purro-its moi^e ef icient utilisation of 
fixed agents, nialcing coats v.'hich ar'S fixed for the firni as a 
T/hole variable for ii-.diviclusl operations and. products. Both 
doaand :.ianipulation end product diversification nre likely to 
restrict opportunities for nev-r fims pnd to inerf.r'ae the optimum 
size of the tj';;.ical business 'jnit.l 
Summary 
liconomic instability takes many forms, rusiness units and trade unions 
are not capable of dealing with the xuiderlying forces makinc for instability 
and hence follow the path of least resistance - adaptation. Government, the 
only agency having the authority and resources fitted to the task, has not 
acted in accordance -srith the basic requirements of a -srell conceived and 
integrated program. It is not sui^v-rising, therefore, to find both labor and 
management solving a myriad of problems to their ovm. satisfaction, inde­
pendently of their effects on the public interest. 
In this section the inajor labor d^i^ficulties confront:\nfr society have 
been recounted. In each caae the problem has been stated, followed by a 
brief description cf the approach utilised by the s^^oup affected to ameliorate 
their difficulties, and finally other sugrrestions which have been made to 
meet these issues. Cue general proposition -chich seems to characterise 
most of tlie questions raised in this section is that instability, regardless 
of its form, cannot be managed at the level of the axidividual T-orker, business 
^Hochwald, W., "Guaranteed Wages", American Economic Ivevis-sv^ vol. 37, 
J\me, 19h7f P» 307* 
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iinit or trrxie nnion. Yet because the doctr:Lne of "individ-ui^l roaporisibility" 
is so firril^- ir.;.;rain(?d in oi\r public r:ic private thinking, '.Te have not been 
able to develop progra^is deal yrith ind3vi.duals and groups izi the 
aggregate. 
In t?ie sectiona that follovr an attempt mil be raade to outline the 
elements of public labor policy conceived in terns of the secular necessity 
for economic progress and the conditions essexitial for the removal of cyclical 
insecuritj'". It is in this latter state of instability that one finds tlie 
nanj'- circumstances which give rise to the other forms of economc behavior 
already mentioned. 
Seciilar iJaladjustnents In I-abor Markets 
Jilany of our current labor problems ai'e manifestations of industrial 
change in the secular sense# These are accompanied by occupational and 
social changes also having their roots in long-tirae bulges in tlie econcnic 
superstracture. There are no iri-nediate solutions to these problems azad in 
some cases they are perpetuated by .institutional arrangeraents. 
Secular maladjustments, in our sense, are defined as laisallocation of 
labor resulting from changes in the structure of an econoia>'- over relatively 
long periods of tijae. They are not due to short term manipulations of the 
price mechanisni, but rather reflect the protective barriers erected by 
special interest groups to fox-estall economc progress. Included among these 
barriers are the various forms of inertia vdiich inhibit rapid economic change. 
Although an argument can be made for the slow introduction of new methods and 
techniques, there is the constant danger of complacency overtaking society's 
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needs for economic urovrfch and iiTiprovenent. 
Colin Clark defines econcraic progress "as the attaining of an 
increasing output of these goods and services for a minimra ejqjeuditure 
of effort, and of other scarce resources, both natural and artificial" 
In most countries, including the United. States, progress has talcen place 
as a result of increased output per head in the industrial, conmiercial and 
service sectors of the econoraj'- end the movement of population out of the 
agricultural sector*2 
With respect to lal^or markets, there sjce still other changes accoc^any-
ing economic progress. The foUoiving, in particular, seem significant:^ 
1. Grad\ial elimination of the unskilled manual worker "vvith the rapid ex­
pansion of the nuiaber of Tfiorkers in the clerical and professional fields. 
2. The narrordng of earning differentials betvreen skilled and unskilled 
workers as \vell as manual and clerical -workers. 
3» The impact of educational opportunities on job preference has been 
responsible for this tendency tOTrard the equalisation of earnings. 
High real wages are fundamentally associated ivith iiigh output per head. 
Income inequalities arc an outgro-wrbh of the tinequal distribution of 
property oraaership, hence, labor's demand for an increased share of the 
total output may have serious repercussions on present institutional 
arrangements yrith regard to property. 
^lark, C», The Conditions of Economic ?rogress» llacmillaii and Co., 
Ltd., London, IphO, p. 1. 
^Ibid«, p. 12. 
^Ibid., pp. it.-l6. 
Arnong our institutional arraiigeciants, perhaps tha nost significant 
chance to occvir i3 tho eacr{;T.ncG of laltor orjjanizationj a3 a vital force 
in the labor lacirket. In an oarliur section the trade union novcaent vjas 
traced frQ:z its foiriative ataj;;:, in ivhic.h ita interests "were clevoted to 
the cei^eral social and intellectual i:7itrove::i:r.t of the Trarkingrtan's 
Ijosition in the comir-imitj, to its prr.soat sta.ve erri.boa>'ir.£; the principles 
of busjjnesa -unionisra. .Secularly'', therefoi'O, the tr;;.de union raovenent has 
made an iiinortrait ccntrib'^bion to the caui.;^ of econo;aic progress» It has 
played a aignlfiCcJit i'ole in L'lprov^in;: Ui£ 3tatj.a of tha human i'^jent through 
its deraarids for better edixaticnal facilities, 3hortei' >vorlcjja!,; hours, work­
men's cosipensation and social security legisl vtion snc so on, thei'eby niaking 
it potentially more prodtictive. 
At present, ho\7ever, haviat;; acconu^lished thcdc initial tasks, trade 
unions have assumed a new role, in vftldh they exercise a grcaLer degree of 
co!itrol over the supply ox labor, the wages .oaid to labor and the employer's 
demand for labor. ;Vhat effect "will such control have on the ef i.icient 
utilisation of labor in the futare? Are barriers bein^ erected against 
further economic progress? For exaaple, -will the importance currentli"" being 
attached to the maintenance of wage dilTerentials between industries and 
occupations slow' down the tendency to'.7a,rd the equalisation oi' earnings? 
Concerning the 3up;-ly of labor a. sec-ol-r problem still other questions 
arise. Vtith the steady increase in real 'wagss as output per head rises, 
the rate of population increase tends to decline, ^i'hat are the consequences 
of a relatively station.-or}'^ population on the requirements of a dynamic econoiny 
ftliat are the effects of an ageing pop'olation on output per head? Moreover, 
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as real v/ages rise can \ve eiKpect the supply of labor to all firnia to decline? 
Iiouglaa, for exar-iple, round that this v/ay the case in his aarly ^;tuclies of the 
supply curve cf labor.^ The effects of such behavior on national output are 
obvious. 
Our 3(^cal<..r lobor probleias arc not cill Jooncl on bht; jupol;' aide. There 
are also long-i'Uii cIlTricultiss to be Toii-'id in the c-esiaiicl for labor. Tech-
nolor;ical i:i;iov'a.,ioii3 ai'c constii^tly crfccoini^ new labor i-equii'eaiento and 
displaciiit. old skills, -he groivin^ concentration of corporate ownership has 
far-reaching ilaplicatioiis with reapect to th. location of economic activity, 
the rapidity \yith -i!iich technological iiv.ovii tions axe introdiiced, and the 
responsiveness of these firms in meeting: labor requirs.iients consistent tvith 
an econoiny of high eu^Aoyaent in the future. V^ith the labor force constant]^ 
increasing in size, -will these relatively large Lidusbrial enpires have the 
imagination and foresight sufficient to provide jobs by continuing to eapajid 
their productive capacity? 
An attempt Td.ll be ruade in thia section to investitrate the more signi­
ficant long-nui changes which have occurred in our labor market and to 
suggest public policies designed to overcoee iwv maladjustaents which have 
taken place. 
The supply of labor resources 
The product-ive capacito'' of any nation is measured by the qu^tity and 
%choenbergj ii.H. snd Douglas, P.H., "Studies in the Supply Curve of Labor", 
Journal of Political Economyj vol. H^. February, 1937, pp» H$~79» 
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quali'bj of natural resources (iiicludint: the huiaan agent) at its disposal. 
For the achievoiEsnt of a high stanciard of life, however, the suni total 
of all reyources is not a sufficient fficaaure of a xiation's potential, 
since procmctivo agents ore not perfect substitutes for each other. The 
cojj;b;lnation of resources at the disposition of a nsition is therefore of 
conaidera!;le inportarce. Devourst declares: 
'Tnat a ocjntrir lacks most sets the liiait to its productive 
capacity, and the ability" to use an^' of the factors of 
production is so dependent on the supply of tiio othars as 
to aake a stjiplus of one useless - except as it sets up 
pressures to increase the supply-" of the others.^ 
The United States has) had an Jjiterestijig experience over the last thi'ee 
decades that nay -vrell serve as an illustration of this proposition. During 
the colonial period shortages of labor limited our econojaic ejqjansion in 
spite of the abundance of other resources. This "stas fundajnentally true 
also of the long period of national expansion up to the 1920* s. 
Apart from occasional periods of business slack, ?;e utilised 
all the huiaan resources st our disposal, and up to iVorld 
War I, T.-e absorbed a continuous flood of insdcrants in building 
up our industrial plant atid railroad system, developing: 
natural resources and coloniwing the vrestern frontier. 
During the 1520's the situation appears to have changed soae-
T>hat« i'.'ith a generally high level of business activity, -se 
had a sufficient labor supply to meet all demands, in spite 
of shrinking iruaigration, The severity and duraticna of the 
depression after 1929 Jaade it appear to many as a turning 
point in the economic history of the United States, rc-thiar 
thaoa a phase of the business cycle.2 
^Dewhurst, J.F., opt cit., p. 539* 
^Ibid., pp. $39-hQ* 
With 1/Vorld War II, hoiwever, \TO found that the supply of labor seemed 
excessive only in retrospect, but vdth the construction of additional 
plant and eq\iipnient our manpovfer requirements were again in excess of 
supplies. The postwar period once more finds the American economy limited 
in its esg^ansion of goods and services by the size of its labor force. 
Yvhat fundamental changes have taken place in the composition of the labor 
force during these several decades? 
Impact of population change« la discussing the supply of labor we are 
actually concerned -with the size of the labor force at any particular moment. 
The labor force, however, is a rather difficult magnitude to define and it 
is constantly fluctuating due to influences not related to changes in 
population alone. There are seasonal as vrell as cyclical changes which tend 
to increase or decrease the number of individiials seeking jobs or entering 
nevT trades or professions. Apart from these factors, the most significant 
changes are due to secular causes. Table 2 shows the expansion in our labor 
force since 1870. 
The changes 7/hich have occurred in the percentage of the population, 
ten years of age and over, in the labor force, provide the policy-maker 
vd-th important information concerning full employment policy. The 
particoilar definition of "full employment" used, of covirse, is of the 
utmost importance. But any attempt to define the concept of "full employ­
ment" is immediately beset with a number of important questions involving 
the size of the labor force. This involves both c/clical and secular 
considerations. One definition which has been put forward, namely, to 
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provide job opportiriitiea in exceas of the mmbor oi' job asolcers^ is an 
almost inposaible one to fulfill. The data ahonin in Table 2, for ex-
aiaplCf iridicato tliat frcra forty-foui* to fifty-tTro percent of our popu­
lation have at various t.iwe3 entered the labor aarlcot. 
Table 2. Gmvth of Labor Force in United States, 1370-I9h0* 
(Population and painful i^orkers in alillions) 
Persons 10 Years of Age and dver 
Population Gainful3y Occitpied or in I<abor Force 
ICr tears of Percentage of Percentage of Pop. 
Year Total Agci and Over Humber Population 10 Yrs. of Age ^ Over 
1870 39.8 29.1 12.9 32.5 lili.li 
1380 50.2 36.8 17.lt 3lt.7 a7.3 
1890 62.6 1^7 .ii 23.3 37.2 li9.2 
1900 76.0 ^.0 29.1 38.3 50.2 
1910 92.0 71.6 37.lt hO»6 52.2 
1920 105.7 82.7 h2.h hO.l 51.3 
1930 122.8 98.7 lt7.6 33.8 I43.2 
19liO 131.7 110.3 53.3 liO.5 i;8.3 
Sources Dewhiirst, J.a., op. cit., p. ^Ii2» 
For a time it yrds thought that this percentage increased during 
depression periods. Tlie "ad.litional rorksr tlieory" assucifib 
that a drastic deciline in deiaand for labcr compels 
man;?- dependents (hcuse-srives, students, and retired 
elder]^ persons) to enter the labor narkct in search 
for jobs. The pui^jose of their search is, of course, 
to restore the family income, reduced by the uner;g)loy-
laont of husband and father.2 
An opposing point of view states that the labor force expands vfhen 
wages rise. And still a third point of view, recently put Xorvfard by 
^f. Beveridge, Sir W,H,, Full ikiployxient In A Free Society, lY.Vf. Korton 
and Co., New York, 19hp, pp • 18-19. " 
^Loxig, C.D., "The Labor Force and Economic Change", in Insights Into 
Labor Issues« edited by Lester, ii.A. and Shister, J., The J^acrnillan Co., 
iJeiw York, i9li3, p. 333-
I6ii. 
Long, states the foUovrincJ "Vrhile shovring, at times, considerable 
tvirlralenco in its composition, the labor-force proi-ortion is remarkably 
constatit in over-all size" A 
Perhaps a more reasonable conclusion would take into account the 
inherent vreakneaaes of the data upon •Rliich most labor supply discussions 
are based. There are certain arbitrciry classifications of labor ^iiich 
are not included in the official statistics - household labor being the 
moat inportaiit. With the gro\Yj.ng ini'lux of woinen ;i.nto i:he labor force, 
ranch ol" the Y.ork formerly done- in the home (and not officially designated 
as eaploionent) is novf transferred to individuals outside oi' the hone, 
T.-iao are included in the labor force. One vtould therefore expect to find 
the groTrth in the proportion of individuals enteri:i£ the labor force 
soaevfhat over-stated as aore and nore wonen become job seekers. 
The age distribiition of the population, as -well ao social security 
legisl tion, also have an impact on the size of the labor force. In terms 
of labor policy, for example, the maintenance of a rel^tivelj' stable price 
level, given the nuiuber of old age pension recipients, would not induce 
individuals over sixty-five years of age to enter the labor force. A 
rising price level, however, would probably accelerate the rate at T;hich 
older individuals enter the labor laarlcet, thereby mailing the rsaintenance 
of full employtaent (hoirever defined) more difficult. 
World 'iVar II also provides us Tdth some indication of the flexibility 
in the labor force. From 19hO to Ipi;!;, for example, the labor force 
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eaqjanded by ten niillion vjorkera. By I960, on the other hand, it is 
estijnated that the labor I'orce vdll decline by almost one niillion 
from the 1914; peak.^ 
We still knoTf relatively little about the elements Tdiich determine 
the size of the labor force. The follov^ing are undoubtedly important 
ini'luencesJ money v/ages, the price level, job opportunities, age 
distribution of the population, educational opporbunities, extent of 
social security provisions, changes in consumption expenditures and 
tastes, and the net reproduction rate of society. Since laanj.- of these 
factors are subject to modification as a i-esult of public policy, it is 
difficult to project past trends into the future. 
It is interesting to note that the percentage of the popxilation 
entering the labor force has shown the greatest variation fron 1P30 to 
the present. This is also the period of social experimentation and up­
heaval. V<e can conclude that the size of our labor force in the future 
•viill be largely determined by conscious or unconscious social policy. If 
society does attempt to ini'luence the number of indi^'iduals seeking employ­
ment, ivhat fomi should it take? In effect, are asking T.tiat the optimum 
size of the labor force shoiild be, consistent mth tlie criteria of eco­
nomic grovrbh and development. In short, is there scxie relationship 
betTreen economic progress and the size of the labor force over tiias? 
For any given amount of land and capital the optimum population^ can 
^Ibid., Appendix 3> P» 695 
^IVe shall assume that L = kP, -nhere L is the size of the labor force, 
k is some constant greater than aero but less than one, and P represents 
tlie sise of the population. 
166. 




Fig. li. Determination o?^timum Population, Fixed Resources 
In Figure 11, OA represents an optimum population since, vdth a 
larger population the marginal product of labor vrould be less than the 
average output per head and a reduction in population, to OA, would raise 
the output per head. Conversely, if the population -were less than OA, 
marginal productivity would be greater than average output per head and 
an increase in population to OA iTould raise average output per head.^ 
If the assuisption of fixed capital resources is dropped, however, 
the notion of an optimuni pop\ilation (labor force) requires modification. 
For each stock of capital vre c^n construct a production function and 
thereby detenaine the cori'esponding optimum size of the population. 
Figure 12 illustrates these successive optimal positions. 
The optimal size of population -with a stock of capital equal to 
is OA, 02 is Ob, and C3 is OD. Time periods are denoted by subscripts 
1, 2 and 3» Should the population not increase at the required rate, i.e. 
%eade, J.E. and Hitch, C.J., An latiwduction To Econoiaic Analysis And 
Policy 1 Oxford University Press, wew lork, p. 257. 
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frcan OA to OD, vdiile the stock of capital rises from to tlie average 
output per head trould not be as high as it might othervd.se be. That is 
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Fig» 12. Effects of Capital Accvmiulation On C^timal diae of Population 
Up to the present we have been assuming that the proportion of the 
population enterini,' the labor force reaiains constant. This assumption 
must now also be removed. Suppose, as the experience of the United States 
TOuld indicate, that the proportion of the population entering the labor 
force declines as well as the rate of population gronth. V;hat vdll the 
effects be on the optimal size of tJie labor force? Two ooiverful in­
fluences will now be at "work distorting the utilization of capital re-
soiirces over time. The -Raste of capital resources due to a discrepancy 
in the rates of growth between population and the stock of capital is 
reinforced by a decline in ths proportion of the population entering the 
^F. Kalecki, 21., "Three Yt^a^'-s to Full limplojiaent", The Economics of 
Full Employment, Oxford Institute of Statistics, Oxford, I9ii6, p. 50. 
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labor market* 
Figure 13 illustrates this deviation from an optinium labor supply, 
and C2 again represent production functions baaed on changes in the 
stock of capital over successive time periods, N represents the sisie of 
the labor force, ? represents the size of the population arid L represents 
N s f(P), subscripts 1 and 2 denote corresponding time periods. Asswiie 
the existence of an optimal labor force during ti aoiovinting to OB workers 
v.lth a population of OE. At t2 the stock of capital has increased causing 
the production function to rise to Cg^ The optimum iLabor force vrould now 
move to OD but suppose at t2 population only increatjes by ilF and moreover 
the percentage of the population in the labor force is shom by L2. The 
labor force nDuld therefore drop to OA and AD v/ould represent the dis­
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Fig. 13. Discrepancy BetTOen Actual and Optimum Labor Force 
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In view of the foregoing discussion ifdiat constitutes desirable 
public policy from a secular standijoint? Meade and Hitch point out that: 
the United States probably finds itself az> the 
moment, -ydth its population greater than the optimm 
(with the existing quantities of capital), and in­
creasing, but -vdth a net reproduction rate less than 
moity and decreasing. The initial fall in population 
•will be in the direction of the optiraura, and should 
therefore raise the potential standard of life, but 
it -vdll be continued far beyond the optimum point 
unless steps ai*e taken in time to raise the net I'e-
production rate back to one by the tine the optimum is 
reached.^ 
Secular labor force policy obviously involves an attempt to influence 
the size of the population either by immigration or the encouragement 
of larger families if the size of the labor force is less than the optimum. 
On the other hand, should the labor force be larger than the optimum an 
increase in the stock of capital vrould seem warranted. 
A lowering of the immigration barriers Trould be one means of 
effectively increasing the size of the labor force. Hcfwever, if the fut\ire 
labor force size is of paramount interest the use of family allowances 
and the taxation of single individuals -would tend to encourage lai^ger 
families. 
Increasing the stock of capital, if the labor force is larger than 
optimum, poses several difficulties. Coupled Tfith a full ecployment program, 
an attempt to accumulate capital for the purpose of getting the labor force 
and capital resources into proper alignment, may result in a rapidly rising 
price level. In turn, still greater numbers of individuals may enter the 
Ijjeade, J.E., and Hitch, C.J., 0£. cit., p. 29h n» 
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labor market in order to maintain their real incomes and hence the 
anomt of capital needed to balance the size of the "nonaal" labor 
force would tend to be exceeded. 
A full employment prograia may also run counter to the secular 
capital requirements for an optinum labor force. This poiht is clari­
fied by Hansen: 
The ' ea^loyment' criterion for investment may not 
correspond to the 'groisth* criterion (population 
increases and technical progress). It is "the latter 
that should guide us in our investment policy. If 
the 'gro^vth* criterion does not provide adequate 
inveslanent to maintain full employment, methods other 
than an increase in investment should be found to 
ensure both full and optimum use of resources. The 
principle of optinuE use of resources v/ouM be 
violated if we artificially increased the level of 
investment merely to provide employment.^ 
The demand for labor resources 
The changitig character of the American economy, in the secular sense 
manifests itself in terms of the maldistribution of labor resources among 
the major economic regions of the country. Since labor is relatively 
immobile, any discrepancies betTreen the availability of labor and the 
number of job opportunities (excluding cyclical differences) reflects 
long term changes in demand* 
As technology progresses and the availability of factors of pro­
duction is modified, regional misallocations of labor occur. But even 
TTithin a particular region certain skills and occupations become outmoded 
^Hansen, A.H., Economic Policy andFull xjaployment« McGraTf~Hill Book 
Company, Kew iork, 1^47, p. xfim 
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However, if the region generally is an e:g)andiiig one, absorption of the 
unemployed rrill occur at a rapid pace and new uses will be i'ouiu lor old 
skills. The difficult problems are centered in those regions vrtwi-e the 
pace of economic activity docs not keep ijp ^lith the groirth of labor 
resources# Secular labor policy must address itself therefore to such 
cases* 
As Spengler has pointed outs 
The fitness of a region for the production of specific 
goods and services depends, tranter relations (i.e. 
the circumstances i^ich defccnnine the costs of over-
coaing distance) being taken as constant, princip.'-Uy 
upon the proportions in -vrhich the several factors occur 
in that region.^ 
Of course, there are non-economic factors infeich also contribute to 
the growth characteristics of a region. Moreover, neither the pro­
portions of the factors nor "transfer relations of a region" remain 
unchanged over periods of time#^ 
In spite of the expansion of industrial activity during V.orld v;ar II 
and the relocation of plants and industries, no significant shifts have 
taken place sufficient to correct the maldistribution of labor resources. 
As a recent studj' indicated, "the older industrial states are not shordng 
serious siniptoaio of becoming ghost areas, at least nob in the foreseeable 
future."^ However, this does not mean that the denand for labor in the 
Spengler, J.J., "Eegional Differences And The Future of llanufacturlng 
in i\iaerica". The Southern 3Ccon<anic Journal, vol. 7# April, iplil, 
p, Ji77. 
2lbid. 
3Mational Industrial Conference Board, Decentra3J.zation In Indus try. 
Studies in Business Policy, No. 30, New llork, p. lo. 
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older areas fdll continue as before. 
There are sIot'- changes taking j lace in the resource requirements of 
nianufacturing industries vihich eventually vdll create serious allocatxve 
problems. Just as the extractive and maiiufacttffing industries required 
68 percent of all workers in 18 70 ctnd by 1930 only k5 perctnt, this 
trend *tvill probably'" continue.^ There is increasiJig evidence that the 
"tertiary industries", that is, the conmiercial and service sectors of the 
econoay, are undergoing a narked seculer expajision. 
Table 3» Industrial Distrib'ation of the Labor Force 3i;70-1930 
Industrial Division Per Cent Distribution 
1870 1860 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture 53.0 h2,6 37.5 31.0 27.0 21 .u 
Forestry and fishing 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Extraction of lainerals l.it 1.7 1.9 2.ii 2.6 2.6 2.0 
Manufacturing and 
20.5 2lt.8 mechanical industries 22.1 23.7 23.5 30.3 28.9 
Transportation and 
1;.2 ii..C comaunication 6.0 6.7 7.1 7.3 7.9 
Trade 6.6 7.9 8.8 10.6 9.7 10.0 12.5 
Public service (not in­
cluded elseTJhere) 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.8 
Professional searvlce 2.6 3.2 3.8 it.l h*(> 5.1 6.7 
Domestic and personal 
service 9.7 8.8 9.6 9.7 10.1 8.0 10.1 
Clerical occupations 0.6 0.9 2.0 2.5 1;.6 7.3 8.2 
Source J Bureau of the Census, Comparative Occupation Statistics for the 
United States, l870-19ii0j Govezment Printing Office, V/ashingtoni 
D.C., I9II0I 
^Spengler, J.J., cit.j p. Ii79* 
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In contrast, the "priiaary industries", i.e. agriculture and extractive, 
are undergoing a sharp reduction in the proportion of the total laboi' force, 
while the "secondary induv=5tries", i.e. manufactui'ing, have stopped groTving 
and face reductions in the futxire. Table 3 describes the foregoing in 
detail. 
Although in the aggregate these changes may not seem acute, on a 
regional basis the problem is somewhat more urgent. This is particularly 
apparent in terras of regional patterns of population growth and rates of 
laigration. As a recent BLS study indicated if 
... there is tj^jically not enough migration fron areas 
of lov; econoEdc opportunity to drain ofl the surplus 
labor supply. -srorkers are reiuctaiit to leave 
familiar surroundings and fsmd.ly ties, 'fhe uncertainty 
and fear attending migration are reinforced by its cost. 
This is particularly significant, for it is precisely 
those Tiho shoixld nove ^ao usually lack the raeans to do 
so. Added to these factors is the general ignorance as 
to -v^iere emplojiaent opportunities ;|J.e. The TTsr stimu­
lated migration not only because ne?? job opportunities 
arose but also because bhey were dramatized and publi­
cized to an unusual degree. 
There has been a noteworthy trend toward the develop­
ment of industry in areas of surplus labor supply. 
During recent decades, for exaaple, industrialization 
of the South has been proceeding more rapidly than in 
the country as a v.'hole. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the resulting shift in the distribution of employment 
opportunity has been relatively small. Internal 
migration Tsill have to continue if all workers are to 
be afforded useful employmont opportunities.^ 
Tiihat factors are responsible for long tern changes of the occupational 
^TJ.S. Department of Labor, "State and Regional Variations in Prospective 
Labor Si5)ply», Monthly Labor Reyieiy, vol. 63, December, 1916j p. 86l. 
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structure? Two forces seem most relevant: (a) increased productivity 
per -worker and (b) the extent of the market for the product of the 
•workers concerned#^ These forces have contributed to the changing 
occupational structure unevenly as we view regional labor markets from 
1880 to 19l}.0. Figure lij, and Table k show the percentage distribution 
of gainful i-rorkers by three major groups, extractive, manufacturing and 
mechanical, and distributive and service, according to the six major 
regions of the United States dxuring this sixty year period. For the 
United States as a -whole, the proportion of gainful -vrorkers in -the 
extractive industries declined from l;6 percent ii-i i860 to 21 percent in 
I9I1.O. The proportion engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries 
3?ose from 20 percent in I88O to 30 percent in 19i4fi, 'while the largest 
gains took place in the distributive and service trades increasing from 
3lj. percent in 1880 to 59 pei'cent in IpliO. As the National Hesources 
Comiaittee pointed out: 
Employment opportunities are, to an increasing extent, 
in the factory, store, and office. If the trend 
established in the past decade continues in the future, 
^st of the ne-w jobs must be sought -where there is an 
opporttinity for taking part in conrolex industrial and 
commercial processes or in servicing community needs. 
This has important ircplications for population re­
distribution .2 
Distortions in the occupational structure become ^parent T»hen we 
IVance, il.E., All These People, University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, IpltS# pp» liiii-lli9. 
National Resoia:*ces Committee, Problems of a Ch^ging Population, 
Government Printing Office, V/ashington,~T3.^ , 193^} p* w. 
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note the regional devir.ticnn fron the United States occupational trend. 
Considering existirtg rates of population growth, the Southeast provides 
the most urgent and irxiodiato px'oblem. In 1380, the extractive industries 
provided employsient for 70 percent of all gainful wrkera in the region, 
^jr 19i;0 there -were still 37 perccnt employed in this group. In contrast, 
the manufacturing and meclianical trades only increased from seven to 
thirteen percent during the aame parlod, actually declining from a peak 
of tvrenty percent reached in 1930. 3ince fertility rates are highest in 
this region as compared to the rest of t!ie nation^, particularly in 
rural areas, the absence of industrial expansion tends to accentuate the 
nisallocation of labor resources in the secular sense. Horeovcr, this 
accounts for the fact that "the ratio of farm populstion to land in farms 
is much greater there than in any other region. 
The Southnirost manifests the sane difficulty, as does the Uorthirest, 
but perhaps to a lesser degree. Both of these regions have mere than a 
third of their gainfully employed Trorkers in the extractive industries. 
V.'ith productivity per rorker in agriculture increasing rapidly, labor 
requirements in farming rdll decline, hence releasing these -Korkers for 
jobs in either the manufactxuring or service sectors of the economy. 
Fortunately the rates of populi'.tion growth are not as rapid here as they 
are in the Southeast. 
^Thompson, V/,S, and 'whelpton, P.K., Estimates of Future Population 
of the United States 19li0~2000j National Resources Planning Board, 
Wasiiington, D.C,, 191i.3, P.16. 
^National Resources Planning Board, Problems of a Changing Population, 
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Figure Hi. Percentage Distribution of Gainfxil "'i'orkers by Three 
Major Groups, United States and the Six Major Regions 
1880-.191;0. 
Source; Vance, R.3., All These People, University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill, P* 1^ (data for 19liO)j National 
Resources Coanmittee, Problems of a Changing Population^ 
Government Printing Office, Viashin^on, D.C. 1938, P* US, 
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Table 1|. Percentage Distribution of Gainful Y/orkers by 
Three Major Groups, United States and the Six 
Major Regions lS80~19ib-0. 
Date and 
Ivis-jor Group 
Per Cent Distribution 
by Regions 
U.S. N.E. S.E. S.W.  n.s* P.Y/. 
1880 
Extractive k6 23 70 63 50 50 ItO 
Manufacturing 20 35 7 6 18 13 20 
Distributive 3h h2 23 31 32 37 ItO 
1900 
6h 36 Extractive 38 17 62 50 30 
Manufacturing 22 35 10 7 23 13 20 
Distributive liO hB 28 29 la 37 50 
1920 
50 25 Extractive 29 12 5i» lili 21 
Manufacturing 31 la 17 15 3h 20 29 
Distributive liO h6 28 35 51 36 50 
1930 
la Extractive 2h 11 ii5 20 39 17 
Manufacttiring 29 h2 20 18 32 18 26 
Distributive hi hi 35 10. hi li3 57 
19itO 
Extractive 21 1 31 33 18 36 lit 
Manufacturing 30 39 13 16 3lt 15 36 
Distributive 59 5b 51 ijS h9 50 
Soiirce: Vance, R.B., All These People^ University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel ilill, 19hS>f p. Ili2. (data for 19hP)i Kational 
Resources Coimaittee, Problems of a Chang^g Population, 
Govenment Printing Oi'fice, "iVashingtbn, B.C., 193y* C<ista 
for 1880-1930) 
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Recent shifts in the location of industrial plants are not adequate 
in vievr of the foregoing discussion, although some sections registered 
a slight iraprovement. Tlie recent Industrial Conference Board Study-
describing the location of industrial plants built before I9I4.O as compared 
to those b\iilt from 19l;0 to l^it? points out the following: 
... the Nev/- England, Middle Atlantic, East ilorth Central 
and South Atlantic states show proportionate losses in 
recent years, v;hile the East South Central, V.'est South 
Central, Vfest North Central and Western states registered 
gains.1 
In no case was the shift spectacular, however, yd.th Minnesota and New York 
shoTfdng the largest gains. 
Impact of economic progress. Changes in the location of economic 
activity are largely a function of economic progress. At any moment 
of time, however, a number of factors are responsible for the existing 
location of such activity. The accident of historical settlement, 
the location of natural resources, geographic attributes of an area in­
cluding the consequent opening up of transportation routes, all contribute 
to the geographic structure of economic enterprise. As technological 
progress, in all its forms, takes place, discrepancies appear betTreen the 
existing location and superior regions of development. V/ithin a given 
area, technological advances may involve a recombining of the factors of 
production already available. Moreover, the same degree of pressure 
is not exerted on all forms of economic activity at the same time. 
Rates of economic progress subject some industries to more violent 
%ational Industrial Conference Board, 0£. cit., p. 10. 
j - t y ,  
stresses sjicl stx'ains than ethers. For any particular enterprise, a 
number of specific interrelated factors need to be vrei^-hed. i-'or exan-ples 
Production and distribution problems require consideration 
of the sources of jnaterials, fuel and powerj the need for 
special laboi- skills, prevailing wage levels, and the 
efi'iciency of labor, availability of management, trans­
portation facilities, service, and costs, and the nature, 
location and extent of the market.! 
For convenience 've may classify industrial location as either: (a) 
resource orientated, (b) market orientated, or (c) "foot-loose"* As 
technology exerts an 'sver-increasing influence, industries tend to shift 
their orientation awa;;- from particular localities and exercise much greater 
freedom in choosing their location. The resource perhaps most affected 
by this change is labor, "the trend has be-n to malce labor orientation 
on the basis of skill a locational factor of decreasing importance in most 
manufacturing industries."^ This trend of course -rorks to the advantage 
of unskilled labor in surplus areas, especially Y^iere local governments 
offer additional inducements, e.g. loiror tax rates, free factory sites, 
etc., but the displaced skilled trorker creates an even more dif;i:'icult 
problem to solve. 
In some instances trade unions unwittihgly provide fcr such a 
transition by liMting the number of entrents to the skilled trades there­
by raising labor costs for the pres nt but loirjering futuc- social costs. 
It may also be argued, however, that the unions in turn encourage sub­
stitution of ma.chineiy for labor by their Tvage policies. To %"(hat extent 
National Resources Planrong Board, Industrial Location and Hatioaal 
ae3ourcea> Government Printing Office, Washington, D,C,,191;2, p. 3* 
^Ibid.J p. 
1G(\ 
eivbrepa'snourj-. mrJre iiuch .TaVotttntions on the basis of comparatiye costs 
car.not be deliominc^d cn the basis oi" ^ivailablo emi>iric?.l evidence. Li 
sny case, there sep-m to be fer* instprirea in frhich plant locstion is 
bancd on labor rescui'CQ orientation. Tho extent of the narkot and the 
•;.;roxiinjty of nf.tyral rosoiirces far ovtTreich tlie availabila.V ^  sk3J.led 
laVior in tlie selecbi .n of j.^L-'nt Iccntion. 
Boddjr, in describiiic a ntndy of the distribution of seventy-five 
•.oaii'ufacturir^ ii-xdustriGs bv the ratio of skilled labor to total gEinful 
irorkers in 1930, points out thot otHy tvielve industries had a v.'ork force 
in f/hich skdjLled operators uade up botfmen thirty and sixty cercent of the 
total. In ccntraat, sixty-three iiidustries reported percentages betireen 
nought and thirty. The largest gi'oiip, involrinE thirty-seven industries, 
reported only zero to ten percent of their worlc force in the skilled 
categoi^^.l Hoivever, on a regional bacis jnost of the industries using a 
large proportion of .skilled v.-orkers v.-ere centered in sii: states located 
in the Mortheast. The Far V.'est aiid the North Central region also had 
large conceniiraticns of skilled worker.:;. 
Increasingly, ho-wever, a combination of circumstances has redticed 
the skilled labor requirenenbs of -iin-rican industiT* contributing 
factors seem most important. 
In the first place the development of specialized and 
autoBiatic nachineri has reduced the skill requii^eaents 
on many production Jobs to the semiskilled machine-
operator level from the former reqidjremeats of a laigh 
level of all-roTind skill. Secondly, the groTtlng 
^Ibid.. p. 227. 
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en^phasis on time and motion study and the brealcing-dcm 
of skilled operations into simpler ccaaponents which can 
then be apportioned to separate seBdskiUed operatives 
have further reduced the demaiid for general skills. 
Such developjiients have undoubtedlj'' reduced the locational 
pulls to\Tard areas in -which large groups of liighly 
sicilled workers have been concentrated.^ 
Viforld VSar II caused a considerable shift in the occupational structure, 
reflecting; a marked eiipansion in industrial capacity and tlie increased 
utilization of nevf techniques. This temporary upsurge in investaient 
activity, filling the \'oid created by the absence of civilian activity 
during the war, laay tezaporarily alleviate the secular distortions in the 
occupational distribution of the labor force. Table $ indicates clearly 
the major trends since IjljO. 
The data for 19h7 show a re^-eiaergence of the pre-Tvar pattern and the 
probable shifts to be expected in the future. Agriculture suffered the 
sharpest decline, falling froa 18.6 percent of gainfully engjloyed workers 
in 19iiO to 13.6 percent in 19i;7. Operatives and kindi'ed vforkers shovied 
the most significant increase moving frcaa 18,5 percent in 19l;0 to 21.5 
percent in IShlt reflecting the shift of workers out of doaestic service, 
sales \York eiid farming into these relatively higher paid positions. 
With respect to the future, it is estimated that under optinial 
conditions betTireen i^0 and ip. pei'cent of the vrarking force would be found 
in the jaanufacturing and extractive industries.^ This objective is 
rapidly being achieved as neiir techniques continue to raise the productivity 
^Ibid., pp. 229-230. 
^^engler, J.J., og. cit.i p. hl9» 
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per -worker in these industries. This poses serious problems for a 
labor force isdiose locational freedom is seriously limited. Spengler 
estiEiates that approximately 60 percent of the labor force is directly 
or indirectly linked to resources or concentrated in manufacturing 
industries.^ 
Table Percentage Distribution of Employed ViTorkera Classified 
by Major Occupation Groups, April 19hO, 19h$t said 19li7« 
Major Occupation Groups Percentage Distribution 
19U0 19lig 19U7 
Total employed 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Professional and seaiprofessional 
Tforkers 7.5 6.1 6.8 
Proprietors, managers, officials 
8.6 (except farm) 8.3 10.2 
Farmers, farm managers, foremen 
18.6 13.6 and laborers 16.0 
Clerical workers 10.lt 13.0 12.k 
Sales workers 6.5 5.0 5.8 
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred 
workers 11.2 12.7 13.3 
Operatives and Idndred workers 18.5 22 .i; 21.5 
Domestic service TOrkers U.9 3.3 3.2 
Service worbsrs, except dcaaestic 
workers 7.3 7.7 7.2 
Laborers, except farm 6.8 5.2 6.0 
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Labor, "liecent Occupational 
Trends", Monthly I^abor Review, vol. 6^, August, 19h7t p. liiO. 
^Ibid., pp. U80-^8l. 
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Discrepancies between the percentage distribution of manufacturing 
•wage jobs -within two hundred indus-brial counties from 2399 to 1935 and 
rates of population groisth from 1930 to 19liO are shown in Table 6* 
Table 6t Percentage Distribution of Manufacturing Wage Jobs Vfithin 
200 Industrial Counties, 1899 to 1935® aiad Ilates of 
Population GrCTirbh 1930 to 19iiO^, by Uajor Economic Regions 
iPopulation Growth^ Percentage Dis-tribution oiC 
Region Manxifacturing v7age Jobs 
"s'fithin 200 Industrial 
Countiesd 
1930-19l;0 1899 1929 1935 
percen-t per­ per­ per­
cent cent cent 
HecT- England 3.3 20.7 U;.8 lli.5 
Middle Atlantic li.9 k3'9 37.1 36.it 
East North Central 5.3 22.0 31.2 31.1 
South Atlantic 12.9 3.ii li.9 6.2 
East South Central 9.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 
West South Cen-bral 7.3 .3 .9 .9 
V/est North Central 1.7 li.5 3.8 3.U 
Momtain 12.1 .3 .2 .2 
Pacific 18.8 2.k k.h it.3 
United States 7.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a. Source: National Resources Canuiittee, The Structure of the 
American Econoay, Pjirt I*, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, V/ashington, D.C., June, 1939> p* 57» 
b* Source: Adapted from, Spengler, J.J., 0£. cit., p. 14.90. 
c# Data represent percent increase in population for region as 
a -whole* 
d. Data rotmded to nearest tenth. 
Although the three major Southern regions, along -with the Houn-tain and 
Pacific regions, ea^ierienced the largest increases in population, very 
slight changes occurred in the percentage distribution of manufacturing 
I8it. 
imge jobs during the 1929 to 1935 period. The increase in population 
in the Pacific region reflects heavy migration into the area rather 
than high fertility rates and is consistent with the relatively higher 
"wage levels prevailing in the region as compared to the rest of the 
nation. The South, on the other hand, t-dth its high fertility rates, 
ranks at the lor/est end of the scale rrith respect to prevailing TOge 
levels.^ 
Given the relative immobility of labor, clear3y seculs-r labor politqr 
•will require an industrial location pattern niiich not onOy contributes 
to the most efficient utilization of physical resources but of existing 
and potential labor resources of regions as "vsell. In some instances, 
encotiraging a degree of fluidity in labor markets iBhich does not novr 
exist may be the only iray of dealing with depressed regions. On the 
Trtiole, hotrever, governmental policy Y/hich attempts to influence the 
location of economic enterprise, rather than increased labor mobility, 
seems to provide the better solution for problems involving the secular 
misallocation of labor resources. The broad outline of such policy may 
take any of the following forms: 
(a) The actual determination of locations for Govemnent-
otmed or Government-financed plants^ (b) the influencing 
of private locational decisions through control of trans­
port rates, labor costs, power costs, and other factors; 
and (c) the provision of data to aid private businesses 
in choosing profitable locations.2 
^U.S. Departanent of Labor, "Regional Wage Differentials", Monthly Labor 
Beylevr, vol. 63, October, 19it6, p. Slh* 
National Resources Planning Board, liidustrial Location and Hational 
Resources, op. cit., p. 337• 
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No specific policy recornraendations are provided for these secular labor 
problems "because they properly involve considerations involving the 
allocation of non-labor resoxirces. \Vhere increased labor mobility offers 
a partial solution, suggestions are provided for in a later section.^ 
The particular aspects of public labor policy concerned vdth the seculai' 
maladjustment in our labor markets are subject largely to political 
considerations and hence the part of the program receiving special 
emphasis Td.ll be determined by such influences. 
Cyclical Maladjustments In Labor liarkets 
The Employment Act of 19i;6 marked a turning point in American economic 
history. Prior to its enactment the Federal Government had no stated policy 
•with respect to the dislocation resiilting from changes in the level of 
business activity. Now —-
... it is the responsibility of the Federal Government 
to 'coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, 
and resources for the purpose of ei*eating and main­
taining in a manner calculated to foster and promote 
free competitive entezprise and the general -welfare, 
conditions under -pMch there trill be afforded useful 
employment opportunities, including self-ec^jloyment, 
for those able, -willing, and seeking to -.vork, and to 
promote maxiDium employment, production, and purchasing 
po-v?er.'2 
^See infra, p. 231• 
2"The 19it8 Report of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic 
Report", reprinted in The Economic Reports of the President, Harcourt, 
Brace aid Company, Ne-w York, 19h9f P* 219. 
For the first time attention is specit'ically directed at the 
maintenance of high levels of einplojmient. As a major policy declara­
tion such legislation haa great merit. Its fmidamental shortcoming, 
hovvever, is reflected in the absence of detailed proposeils for achieving 
its high purpose. Morvsover, noT«here in the Act can one find a reali­
zation of the importence of integrating public labor policy -with that 
of the goal of "maximum employiaent". 
Although President Truman, in his "Economic Report To The Congress" 
dated January S, 19li7, recognized the need for policies frhich v/ould 
foster the efficient use of labor resources and the maximua utilization 
of productive agents, his nessagc merely argued against job discrimination 
and the disorganization of our present system of public employment ex­
changes* 
Cyclical maladjustments in our labor markets manifest themselves in 
a number of •vra^'^St Most important perhaps are the distortions Tvhich occur 
in the imge-price relationship. With po^'rerf;il labor unions and employers 
initiating changes in these magnitudes, stabilizing employment and output 
at high levels poses a serious threat to tlie institution of free collective 
bargaining. More concretely, government policy which proposes to maintain 
high engjloyraent must also choose either a rising price level and resource 
misallocation or some control over labor union Trage determination and 
^trepreneur price fixing; As vje shall presently show, society may 
have to pay a high price for maintaining the institution *of free collective 
bargaining in its present formi The possibility of reconciling this 
dilemma will form the major part of the following discussions 
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V/agea. pricos and pi'odaotlon 
Once full esgjloyment has been achieved, real inccaae received by 
a factor of production can only be increased at the expense of sojoe 
other factor* Since all factor incones are ei^ qpressed in money terms 
however, and most factor prices are detenained autonomously, the 
futility of attempting to modify real factor shares only becomes apparent 
after inflation has "lifted the monetary veil", 
Reder has provided an interesting analytical approach to the problem 
of simultaneously foUordnc a program of high encloyment and a stable 
price level*^  The implications of such a program vith respect to pttblio 
labor policy have also been raised ijinger,2 JeiriCBs,3 Beveridge,ii 
Graham,^  lemer,6 Worswick,? and Lange,^  to name cmly a few. 
•'fleder, M.?/., "The Theoretical Problems of a National Vvage-Price Policy" 
Canadian Jotimal of Economics and Political Science, vol lit, Februaryi 
isfETro.ira: 
^Singer, H.W., "Wage Poli^  ^  Pull En j^loyment", Economic Journal, 
vol. 57, December, IShlf PP» l{3S-lt55« 
^Jewkes, J., Ordeal ^y Planning, Macmillan and Co., London, 19hBt 
pp. 83^5. 
%everidge, W.H., og. cit., pp. 19it-207. 
^Graham, F.D., Social Goals and Economic Institutions, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton7TL942, pp. 166-181. 
^Lemer, AJP., c .^, pp. 69-12?. 
TSbrswick, G.D.H., "The Stability end Flexibility of Full Enployasent", 
yie Sconomics of FtiH Employment, Oxford University Institute of 
Statistics, Oj^orti, 19ij,6, pp. 59 ff• 
^Lange, 0., Price Flexibi^ ty and JE l^oyment, The Principia Press, 
Bloomington, l9i<9, pp. 83 ff • 
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Following Ileder, we can assume that tho monetary authority proposes 
to follow a policy of maintaining full employiaent and hence maximum real 
output. (It is assumed that the distribution of income and the degree 
of monopoly remain vinchanged) • Money national income -will therefore vary 
directly tdth changes in the price level. Since Y s PX, iishere Y equals 
money national income, P equals some appropriately defined index of 
prices, and X represents total physical output, the maintenance of X at 
some level sufficient to en^jloy the entire labor force can be achieved 
T/ith Y and ? varjdLng in the same proportion ^ Figure 1^ shows this 
relationaliip.^ The line, N, denotes the variation in Y as P changes, 
assuminE X to be the level of real physical output to be maintained by 
the monetary authority. In the soapiest case, Heder defines the equi­
librium price level as one ii^iich TTill prevail sub;}ect to the condition 
that the sun of the cilaiuis to the national incons (?/, the aggregate 
S 
•wage bill plus a, contractual income payments such as interest, rents, 
i 
royalties, etc., plus TT, entrepreneurial income or profits) must be 
equal to the money value of national income produced. 
Line T represoats the vertical sum o£ the claims to the national 
income at different prices. As Reder points outJ 
The equilibrium price is at F2f fithere the T curve 
intersects the N line. Eqtiilibrium implies tliat the 
set of product prices that satisfy the profit demands 
of employers (given wage and overhead costs) isould 
imply a product price level that would satisfy isage-
eamers*^ 
%eder, M.¥., 0£» cit., p. h7* 
^Ibidtij p. ^ 0. 
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w 
Figure li>. Money Claims To National Income 
At P, it is clear that the suai of the claims to the national iiicome 
P;jR, are in excess of national income prodnced, P^^S. Hence, eqnilibrivaa 
does not prevail. That is to say, the price level and national incorae 
"Will continue to rise vsntil the equilibritaa price level P2 is reached. 
It is also possible, ho-wever, for no equilibriiim price level to 
prevail. In a completely unstable system, for exaciple, the T line would 
lie above H at any price level -vre may choose. Since the monetary mechanism 
tends to hide the incompatibilities of demands laade by the various groups 
in the econoay, this case may be quite realistic. Moreover, the monetary 
authority may find it quite impossible to maintain both the value of the 
currency and full emplojnnent. Certainly either one objective or the other 
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•would have to be niven up.l 
There are several of partially reconciling this dilema, but 
in any case, the role of public labor policy in an economy of full 
emplojouent is of first importance. Radical changes in our attitudes 
toward free collective bargaining laay be necessary. Basically, public 
policy vdll require a shift in eiaphasis from "labor relations legislation" 
to "Trage-price adjustment" legislation. More ivill be said about this 
matter in the section dealing Tiith the establishment of a new labor policy. 
The economic system consists of several interrelated aggregates or 
markets -which are only remotely related to the existing state of industrial 
relations .2 Kven "with the smoothest machiiieiy available for -the settle­
ment of industrial disputes, the relationship between the labor market and 
the other markets in the economj'" is of major importance for a program 
involving the maintenance of full employment -with a stable price level. 
As a matter of fact, a -well oiled arbitration system, appended to the 
institution of free collective bargaining, may simply speed up the vrage-
price spiral. "i"ith the frictions betAveen labor and management no longer 
retarding the rate at -vrtiich "ft-ai^es and prices may rise, a full employment 
policy TTOuld rapidly lead to inflation. Since each trade union leader 
is obligated to ob-bain a -wage increase for its membership coinijarable to 
increases secured by rival unions, no one trade imion leader can afford 
llbid., pp. 53* ff. 
2see Appendix A for a summary of the interrelations of the various 
markets in the economy. 
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to be left behind in the rushi^ Esiploiiers, on the other hand, are free 
to raise prices sufficiently to effect any wage jjicreases, or they may 
do so independently of a rise in v/ages if they desire to increase their 
profit margins. 
The onlj'' theoretical solution to this problem -would, of course, 
require both parties to bai-gain in real rather than money terms. As 
Reder jjoints outi 
Hov^ever, one cannot be sura that this viill help matters... 
Poi", while agreeraent on irtage rates ma^' be possible pro­
vided the employer retains his freedom to adjust product 
prices, it may be q^lite impossible to reach agreement on 
Trage rates if, at the same time, his prices are set for 
him at a level he feels to be too low, given TOge rates. 
AtteETOting to conduct bargaining in real terms might 
•vjell bring about a wave of bitter labor conflicts far 
more difficult to settle than any -Re have eicperienced 
hitherto; for the safety valve of product price adjust­
ments vrlll have been removed.^  
Labor markets and full eggjloyaent. 
Other Tfriters in the field are scmcfvjhat more optimistic about the 
tvage-price problem. They divide themselves conveniently into two groups. 
The first, bases its argument on the restrained bargaining thesis; the 
second, uses the liraited control thesis. Both, hovw-ever, agree sub­
stantially mth the analysis provided by Eeder. They differ only in 
their conclusions 7dth respect to the pressirre labor leaders might exert 
on the wage level and the degree of control req;iired to keep inflation 
iLemer, A.P., "The Inflation Problem", Speech delivered before the 
American Economic Association, Cleveland, Ohio, December, 19i|8. 
^Reder, o^. cit.^ p. 52. 
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•within reasonable bounds. 
Restrained bargaining thesis» Sir William Beveridge argues that 
since v;age pressures during full employment emerge as a result of 
uncoordinated sectional bai'gaining by individual trade unions, it is the 
responsibility of the national parent organization to unify its "wage 
policy "vrith"reference to the economic situation as a 7/hole."l As to 
the question of the trade union leaderships' ability to follow such a 
course of action, Beveridge declares; 
Organized labor in Britain has sufficiently demonstrated 
its sense of citizenship and responsibility to justify 
the e^ipectation that it will evolve, in its ovfti manner, 
the machinery by Tdiich a better coordinated T:age policy 
can be carried through.2 
He recognizes, ho-wever, that additional measures may be reqiiired and 
proposes that a compulsory arbitration clause be included in every 
collective agreement. To facilitate the v/ork of the arbitrator and to 
minimize the possibility of awards being rejected, he TOuld add t-wo fxarther 
conditions: (l) that the government make a real effort to stabilize 
prices, and (2) that employers accept the responsibility of making alT 
facts concerning profits and costs available to the arbitration agency. 
Under these circumstances it is assumed that labor "vdll have sufficient 
•wisdom to use restraint in its negotiations rdth employers. 
The price level, according to Beveridge, vrauld be stabilized by 
^Beveridge, Sir W.H., Full Employment in a Free Society, WJ/, Norton 
& Co., New York, 19ii^71p* 200. ~ 
2lbid. 
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selective price controls ai'fecting goods and services in short supply. 
For many conmiodities, hoTwever, he assumes competition among employers 
v.111 keep prices fron rising and hence no controls rould be needed. 
Another advocate of the restrained "b^xgaining thesis, Braunthal, 
argues that in a full employment economy trade unions vrould temper their 
•wage demands for several reasons:1 
(1) The force of public opinion isrould inhibit the leadership some-
•what, since direct responsibility for price increases would fall on the 
xinions' shoulders. 
(2)  liVith sustained full, euiplojinent, "workers vjould not feel that 
yfage losses during depression iTOuld have to be compensated for during 
prosperity by inordinately high vrage demands. 
(3)  Full eiaploymentj for the econoHQr as a vAiole, -A-ould not guarantee 
each specific fim or industiy a market for tlie goods and services it pro­
duces, hence, vrorkers attached to such firms or industries •Rmxld still 
need to concei-n themselves v/ith the loss of their crni jobs, should they 
press their vrage demands too far, 
(];) In vie\T of the discussion under (3)> vrorkers -rould still need 
to concern themselves vdth the possibility of being laid off and forced 
to accept employment elsev;here at lower rates of pay or inferior working 
conditions* 
Are these conditions sufficient to curb the wage demands of union 
leaders? Forsey adds the follof?ving qualifications: 
^Braujitlial, A., "Wage Policy and Pull Employment", International 
Postvrar Problems, op. cit., p. hB-k9» 
• ..if the public, iiicludini: the union public, is 
sufficiently'- educated; if the governraent shov/s that it 
really means to get and keep full em.pi0jn2.entj if it 
controls prices; if it talcea the unions into its confi­
dence, and gives them a real share in the formulation 
of its -iiTihole industrial policy, and if the employers 
accept unions tuigrudgingly and wholeheaartedly, in­
stead of dreatai-'ig of the lost delights of the open 
shop and individual bargaining, and scheming to bring 
them back; bhen the xmions inill as a rule act reason­
ably.! 
Still another group lending authoritj'- to the restrained bargainojig 
thesis, perhaps unconsciouslcv'" or for other reaso&s, not of purely'-
academic interest, are the industrial relations experts and accoimtants. 
Tiith Beveridge, they hold th:.'.t the availability of facts concerning costs 
and profit laargins can do much to encourage the use of "reason" in Trage 
negotiations. Financial statements diivscted toward the -sTorkers of a 
corporation, as vrell as the stockholders, would lessen many of the mis­
conceptions held concerning profits, they argue .2 
Many of the assumptions ijnderlying the foregoing discussion have 
come toider attack from several quarters, although not specifically 
directed at the question of rra.ge policy under full employment. Since the 
nature of the trade union body in terms of its internal politics, as Tsrell 
as economic objectives, are notably neglected by the proponents of the 
restrained bargaining thesis, how realistic are their suppositions? 
A characteristic of the American trade union movement frequently over-
^Forsey, E., "Trade Union Policy Under Full Employment", Insights 
Into Labor Issues, 0£. cit., p. 319-320. 
^Stans, M.H., "An Accountant Shovrs The Hoad To Industrial Peace", 
The Journal of Accountancy, vol. Sit, July, IPii?# p. 19-28. 
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looked b7 the above gi'oup is the systeia of dual unionismj thoroughly 
entrenched in our labor laarkets. It does not appear likely that under 
full emploi'Tuent this rivalry vdll disappear. Moreover^ "the rank and 
file judges its leaders by comparison ivith other leaders. And in this 
comparison, iranediate monetary gains are the caramon denominator."^ 
Apart from rivalries resultr'mg fi-oia the present split in the trade union 
movenent, there are also cosipeting groups vrithin a single trade union 
body, as -srell as the personal anbitions of the opponents of the present 
leadership i\lthiii any one local or national union. Subject to such 
pressures, political considerations may easily talce precedence over the 
use of reason on the basis of econoiaic facts alone, in the bargaining 
process. For, as Boss has stated: 
Unless the union is unusually secure, it most deliver 
at frequent intervals. The fact that it may have 
delivered ira the past does not eliminate the necessity 
for delivering in the future. ... The more pronounced 
is the i:>olitical contest T.lth the employer, the more 
necessary it is for the union to show tangible results.2 
Left-vdng unionism, intra-union eaploitation, and tie possibility of 
e35)loiting the unorganised irorker, all tend to vrork against the validity 
of the restrained bargaining thesis. 
Recently, Singer analyzed the "unified trages policy" set forth by 
^Shister, J., "Union-Management Cooperation; An Analjrsis", Insights 
Into Labor Issues, op. cit., p. 109. 
^Soss, A J£., Trade Union Yfage Policy, op. cit•, p. 110. 
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Beveridge. His connlusiona establish a i'rame-work for ditscusning the 
liiuited control thesis. /unonc the inajor criticifsms sugG^-s'ted by Siiager, 
the folloi,^dng;, not already nentionod, are listed: 
(1) For pvirposef? of arbitration can vre asaunie, in the face of 
present accorintv-iv" techniques^ that "costs and profit niargina" are in 
tiie nature of scientifically observable data? Doesn't it seem likely 
that the Trade Unions vrould siiK:ly fl.rg-ae that by squeesing .profits, 
aanagerial efficiency may be sufficiently ;lncroased to coraponsste for 
a larger -ivage bill?^ 
(2)  Tfago pressures nay be induced by eaployers as Tsell as trade 
Tuiions* Under fu3.1 emplo^ra-': nt, relatively high profits nny exert pressure 
on the -iTagG level by competiJig firms bidding against each ether for 
scarce labor. It seems unlilcely that the trade unions "prould refuse to 
accept higher v?ages offered by unrestrained entrepreneurs 
(3) Since Trade Unions are political bodies and are often motivated 
by such influences in malcing economic decisions any attempt to unif;'' the 
bargaining process cannot ignore the issues of sovereignty rliich are 
bound to arise. There are large unions and saaLl unions, craft unions 
and Industrial unions, organized "vrorkers attached to one industr:^'" facing 
siniilarly organised Avorkers in a competing industrj'' — in short, a siase 
of divergent intei-ests vail need someho:7 to be reconciled by a single 
^Singer, 11.1?., 0£. c i t p .  hk3-hh* 
^Ibid., p. ijli6. 
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workers' bargaining agency, for a unii'ied imge policy to succeed.1 
(Ij.) V/hat appears to the outsider to be irrational conduct on the 
part of the leadership niay involve two further obstacles to a unified 
wage policy: 
(a) Trade unionists are not concerned primarily vd-th immediate 
gains T;hen the very prestige of the organization may hang in the balance. 
Victory over a recalcitrant employer may be more important to the rank 
and file then wages lost during a protracted strike. 
(b) The maintenance of relative wage differentials are often 
more important than the absolute level of wages received. Under full 
emplojrment, where bottlenecks in the labor market can only be remedied 
by raising wages in the less attractive jobs, workers formerly satisfied 
with their wage scales will now demand similar increases to preserve the 
"historical wage relationships" existing between the two occupations.^ 
Limited control thesis. The foregoing discussion clearlj'- illustrates 
the limitations of a wage policy based largely on voluntary restraint. 
Recognizing this v^eakness, a nianber of authorities have proposed economic 
controls of a limitod natxire designed to augment a full employment 
program. Perhaps it will be useful to explain the meaning of the term 
"limited controls" as used herein. It does not, of course, mean "economic 
totalitarianism" in the sense of direct regulation by some authority over 
^Ibid.f pp. i4]|l-l|li2. 
^Ibid.^ pp. k$2-'k$3* 
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every phase of the productive process. Hovrever, it may include such de­
vices as taxes, subsidies, compulsory arbitration (-vdth voluntary 
acceptance of the avrard) and at the extreme, price control. 
Kalecki providefs an interesting scheme whereby government expenditure 
(for the puipose of maintaining full employment) TOuld constantly fall, 
while at the sane tine, a policy of stabilizing the price level Tras pur­
sued# One TOiter makes the foUovdng claim for the proposal: "If the 
rise in money -wages is not too rapid, the method might indeed be said 
to provide the virtues of gradualism, fiscal orthodoxy, and social 
justiceI 
The follovdng is a summary of Kalecki's plan:^ 
(1) It is assimed that the monetary authority is running a budget 
deficit in order to maintain full employment and mges are rising more 
rapidly than increases in labor productivity. 
(2)  To prevent prices from rising, subsidies are paid to firms to 
offset any increases in costs. The subsidies, hOYrever, are financed 
out of increases in income taxes. 
(3) Because most of the taxes -will come from the higher income 
groups, the daaand for consumption goods nd-ll increase (as a result of 
higher money incomes in the hands of wage earners) by more than taxes 
^orswick, G.D.N.J cit., p. 66. 
^Kalecki, M., "Three Ways To Full En5)loyment", Economics of Pull 
Employment» op. cit., p. 
rcduoo such spending. 
(li) Consequently, in order to prevent prices iron rising it vail 
be neceasary for tax revenuos to exce&d the subsidy, aiifiicient to 
prevent aixy rise in prices. 
(5) ihe increase in income taxes, horrever, must not af±''ect private 
irn-estineut advei'sely. 
(6) The iviaoiint of tropes in excess of the subsid;^^ can then bo used 
to reduce the deficit. 
In evaluating this proposal one JIJI2IETY.ately aust ask, "HOY/ far can 
the process of iiicome redisti'ibution be carried, vdthout serious political 
repercussions?" For a time it ;iiay, indeed, be possible to squeeze higher 
incomes vdthout affecting investment. But, as Graham has pointed out, 
"any considerable rise in the aggregate of real -vrages must be attained by 
increased productivity."^ 
An altei'native plan, pat fo37Ffard by u"ors;'a.ck, endeavoi-s to control 
price dii'ectly by imposing price ceilings. It is his contention that 
Tfith a full oicploynent guarantee entrep3?eneurs give -way i^dthout mch 
resistance to higher V;ragc deiiands, i:iiOTd:ig full v/ell that prices Ccr. be 
raised ^'dthout losing their laarket. Under these circumstances entre-
preneuz's are no longer constrained in their negotiations vith trade unions. 
Ho^rever, should price ceilings be imposed, siaployers TOuld then find 
themselves obligated to resist an increased wage demand or else suffer a 
Graham, F.D., o£. cit«, p. 17h> 
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reduction in tiy^ir profit nergiiis. Vrnere resistance' is not feasible, i.e. 
v;here a strong "ui-iion uiuat be dealt vrithj the earployer still has the option 
of reduciritj liia noii-v/age costa by iricreasiiig efl'icienoy. This -rill not 
only increase labor's prod-uctivity but will also tend to speed up the rat© 
of technological projiress. i.'orsvdck adaits that the iinposition of price 
ceilings is a complicated proces;j but, in principle at least, he maintains 
the pi-obleai can bo aolved tliiG way.^ 
Foi- the Jlnierican econoi^j'", the above altei-n^itive v-.'ould also have to 
bo ruled out since the degree of control envisaged vrould be incomjiatible 
7dth the generally accepted end of "free private enterprise". 
Eeder, inadvertently, offers a possible solation to our' p^i'oblem. In 
the px'ocess of negotiations, both the trade unions and the employers are 
in effect Uiaking decisions -iVith respect to vjages and prices. On a nation­
wide scale, sucli bargaining %TOuld involve usurping the function of the de 
.juz'e monetary authorities (the govenment) by the facto monetary 
authorities (trade unions and eiaployers) That is to say, uader full 
employaent the aonetsry authority •vrould find, much to its consternation, 
that trade unions aiid eiaployers isere able to change the value of the 
currency by their influence over coiaraodity and factor prices. 
Reder suistnariaes the discussion in the follovdng manner; 
In short, if the (_^ jure) monetaxy authority coixiit them­
selves to the preser\''ation of full eaigjloyment, th^ 
%orsTreick, G.D,N., cit., p. 66-68. 
^Gf. 2oder, M.¥., o£. cit., p. $3-5k» 
relinquish control over the price lovelj if they cor.idt 
themselves to maintaining a constant price level, they 
lose control over the volianc of real national income and. 
employment. Of course, they need not commit themselves 
iz'revocabl}'" to either of thoae •..olj.ciea, b\it may ijastend 
embark upon a policy of trilateral bargaining (i?ith the 
other tvTO parties) usin^; both the price le/el and the 
level of real national income (employment) as bargaining 
±astriii;i';nts. The resulto of auoh a policy v^ould be, of 
course, formally indeterminatej but it is clear that 
the .-^ure) monetary authorities vrculd not be isi sole 
control of either the price level or the volume of 
er!i[:lo^";i(;r..t. Triore v^r^uld Ixc- in effect tiiree monetiiry 
authorities — the ^  .jure authoritasaj the labor union, 
and the employers' organisation. Under such conditions, 
binding the hands of the ^  jure aonetaiy authorities by 
cosniitting them to some specific policy (e.g. maintaining 
either full employment or a constant price level) -i-dll 
definitely (Umitiish biieii' ability to bargain .-
The Golutic^n iiaplicit iii Reder's discussion, but not mentioned 
directly, is Tfsll v.orth exploria^g. In this section ipre shall merely 
establish the general friiraeivork for a consistent labor policy enbcd;)'lng 
the aforenentionad suggestions 
Although the T.-aj-e bargain at px-esent is a two-sided affair, in­
volving trade unions and employers it also ]ias an iiripact on a third 
party, namel;/- the public. It y.v^xld therefore seem desirable for all 
tlu'ee parties to participate in the bargaining process. The do jure 
monetarj" authority, a major interest iii stabilising the price 
level, is ii'i effect, the representative cf the public. lb also has 
^Ibid., p. 55. 
SSee p«212 for a detailed outliiaa of a proposed full emplopient 
labor policy. 
a Treapon at its disposal equal in force to that possessed by tho employers 
and trade unions — the power to manipulate the tax mechanism. 
If the collective bargaining procedure "srere revamped so that 
all three interested parties participated in negotiations on equal tenas, 
it should be possible to prevent undue pressures on -wages and prices. This 
does not mean that the monetary authorities should participa-fce in every 
T/age negotiation, since all vrage contracts do not exert equal pressure on 
the price level. Hence, the monetary authorities should have the opportunity 
to participate in •wage negotiations threatening the stability of the price 
level. As one of the participants, it -woxild present facts concerning the 
public* s interest in the negotiations and the -sider in^jact of any agreesient 
acceptable to the other t'vro parties. The mere presence of the monetary 
authorities in the negotiations should have a restraining effect on the 
agreement reached. Moreover, the publicity attached to such three-sided 
bargaining iidll inevitably bring the iseight of public opinion to bear more 
heavily than it has in the past.^ 
Assuming, hotrever, that all three parties are not able to reach an 
agreement, T^at further action should be taken? Arbitration is generally 
accepted as a method of settling labor disputes. Corapulsoiy arbitration, 
hov®ver, is considered alien to the basic canons of inglo-Saxon law. Xet 
one must make a choice between free collective bargaining and the right 
of the community to stabilize its currency. Given a program of fuil 
^Hart, o£» cit., p. Ii26. 
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employment, one or the other of these alternatives must yield. 
Perhaps it would not do too much violence to oui' established bargain­
ing practices if a system of compulsory arbitration and voluntary accept­
ance were instituted. Harrowing the scope of the arbitration board to 
Tfjage questions only, wuld avoid the possibility of the board finding itself 
enmeshed in problems concerning non-iwage clauses in collective agreements 
Hence, free collective bargaining -wrould still prevail vfith respect to non-
wage issues. And where the monetary authorities felt that it "was not 
concerned -with a particular wage dispute, the case vrould not come v/ithin 
the purview of the arbitration board, but instead, would be settled accord­
ing to existing bargaining techniques.2 
Labor markets and depression 
Thus far "vre have assumed that the Federal Government intended to pur­
sue a full employment program. Under such circumstances, we outlined the 
elements of public labor policy designed to prevent a wage-price inflation. 
It v/Duld be too much to sxjppose that appropriate action to forestall 
a decline in economic activity would be undertaken at precisely the right 
%or an opposing point of view with regard to the feasibility of 
limiting arbitration to non-wage issues see: Reynolds, L.G., 
Labor Economics and Labor Relations« Prentice-Hall, Inc., 191+9, 
pp. k^2 ff. 
^or a discussion of the criteria to be used by the monetary authority 
with respect to entering negotiations see infra p. 216. 
2Qh* 
moment — in apite of the Eniployment Act of 19ii6. 
There are some •iviio believe the.t a depression may be tiie only isay 
of correcting any structural dislocations in the economy, gro^Ting out 
of the previous prosperity and therefore no action should be talcen what­
soever. Moreover, this same school believes that the threat of depression 
may prove to be our aaos t powerfill restr-aining influence on the r/age-pricc 
demands of the various groups in our econoiry. 
"/iTith respect to the first argiuaent, Grahsja has this to say: 
The T±iole explanation of depressions in terms of 'structural 
maladjustments* in the economy is inane» Structural mal­
adjustments ai-e always present, are usually"- in process of 
elimination, and are constantly appearing in new forms. If 
production is kept the process of elimination of such 
isaladjustments proceeds apace, but, if they are permitted 
to stop production, the maladjustments are multiplied in a 
vicious circle of economic stagnation. Majoy economists 
have been content to discoui'se on structural maladjustments 
as if they -srare acts of God (rather than the result of 
defective human institutions) and to enlarge their importance 
in indefinitely proliferating structural fictions about 
frictions. The above remedy is so to alter the institutional 
environsient as to preclude such structural maladjustments, 
as may occur from becaming clironic.^ 
In effect, depression "wage policy is most amenable to the anal^iiical 
distinction made earlier — separating the income from the resource 
problem. The argument for flexible vrages and prices during the dovsnswing, 
is deficient on both practical and theoretical lines as a method of dealing 
Td.th either problem. At best, a reduction in both wages and prices during 
a depression is an inefficient method of increasing the money supply. 
Since it is desirable to incinsase the supply"" of real cash balances 
^Graham, F,D., op. cit., p. 171 n» 
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during periods of lag^ixig businosa activity there nrs tvrc mys of 
achieving sucli on objective: (1) by holdiiy: the supply or money 
constant end poraittin^ prices to fall to tho reo.uired level and (2) 
stabilisinp the price level Trhile inci'onsinn the supply of money 
The flexible price ar£;:i:i:icnt, horever, rcruld onjly prove effective under 
static asaunptions, i.e. in the absence of eicpectaticns and vincertainty. 
Vihen dynamic considerations arc introduced, flexibility may sinrply result 
in continuing price declines and further reductions in oraploynent as 
additional price reductions are anticipated. 
From a practical standpoint, the existing rigidities in wages (due 
to trade unions and custom) and prices (because of the inroerfections in 
coiaaodity markets) preclude any significant manipulation of these magni­
tudes. Moreover, it is not sufficient for one or the other to be flexible 
•— a universal, "once and for alH." reduction to the desired level vrould be 
required. In addition, all factor prices ivould have to fall in like pro­
portion and coEmodity prices r>t>uld have to be freed from monopoly control 
of any sort. It seems Utopian to bclieina that the multitude of autonomous 
decisions constantljr being made by diverse economic units ''.dll somehow 
exactlo"- fit the inquired pattern of adjuslment.^ 
Given the relative stickiness of TOige rates and their general tendency 
to rise, irrespective of erg^loyment conditions, ne juay establish certain 
%atinkin, D., "Price Flexibility and Full fimployment", ikierican 
Economic Revie-g, vol. 38, September, l^iiS, p. 561. 
2cf. Lemer, A.P., The Economics of Control, The Macmillan Company, 
New York, ipiUt, pp. 285-301. 
criteria for depression -sirage policj. For the no at part, depression wage 
policy laust largely depend on laonetar?/" fiscal policy as it endeavox's to 
raise the level of output and emplo?/:iient in the economy. Attempts on 
the part of trade •anions to raise y/ages during depression may have desir­
able as iTell as -undesirable effects. Insofar as the monetazy authorities 
pursue a policy of expansion, a risinj; level need not cause addition­
al meaployiaent. It does, ho-fl-evei*, mean that the goverriEient deficit may-
have to be sojuev/hat larger than otheirdse -.liould be •the case. 
If, hOTjever, "ifage rates begin to rise rapidly'', irhilc the goal of 
full employment has not yet been reached, d3.rect action on both wages 
and prices may be required. In such a situation, prices v/ould begin to 
rise v/hile large segments of the labor force are still unenplo^/ed. This 
does not aean that the trade unions are responsible for -bhis phenomenon — 
circumstances otiier than wage increases may also contribute to "premature 
inflation". But appropriate labor policy vvould be required in either 
case. Hart suggests a nunber of actionsA 
1. Iii5)roving labor mobili'by 
2. Liiniting ijrice-support programs of the govemiaent 
3. Curbing excessive v/age increases 
ll» Encouraging business fiims to increase production rather than 
prices. 
Lerner, on the other hand, recommends "comterspeculation" as a 
method of preventing price increases resultiog from monopolistic 
%art, A.G», og. c i t p .  
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restriction#^ Presmnably, this teclmique vrould deal adequately with 
nmibor i;, suggested bjr Hart, but vtould not apply Tdth equal success to 
price increases due to iffage pressures* 
Graham, however, claims a number of advantages for his conmodity 
reserve proposal. For our purposes the follovdjig claim, made by Graham, 
is of particular interest: 
All the interminable dispute vyhich now afflicts us 
as to Tshether -wages are or are not excessive, and 
•y?hether there is scay wage vfliich would provide f\ill 
employment would go by the board»2 
Since real and money wages would always aoye in the sac® direction under 
the conmodity reserve sji-stem, and the maxiiaimi level of real wages irould 
be determined by the level of employsient, any unen5>lojTnent in the re­
serve industries T;ould inmiediately signif^i- that real and nones'- "wages 
•were too high. A reduction in money rrages "vrould therefore cause engjloy-
inent, once again, to rise#^ Unless the government is able to deal Tidth 
such TSGE pressures, honvever, even the Graham storage proposal ITOUM find 
itself in difficulty.^ 
• ^Lemer, A.P., Economics of Control, op. cit., p. 55* 
^Graham, F,D., o£. cit., p. 173 n» 
3lbid., p. 173. 
^Hart, A.G., cit., p. An excellent illustration of this 
possibility is provided by Hart: 
For example, suppose ,. • that a persistent upward pressure on 
tha.price level arises fro6 trade-union and government policies 
•vk-Mch raise "vsages. Prices in the con^josite, being stable, 
TTOuid be falling relative to other prices. Thus, reserve 
(continued) 
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It is clear, therefore, that wage policy diiring depression must be 
prepared to deal ^ vith the problem of "preraatm'e inflation" growing out 
of the monetaiy authorities' attempt to I'aise output to the full employ~ 
ment level. It is also clear that neither the Lerner nor the Graham 
proposal, designed to remedy some of the defects in current monetary 
fiscal techniques^ can operate successfizUy, if -wage rates are subject 
to arbitrary trade union pressure. 
In this context, it is also useful to investigate the tvage mechanisia 
as an allocative device. With less than full emploiment, -wages no longer 
perform the allocative function usually ascribed to the price nuechanism. 
The availability of jobs novr directs the flor of labor from one employ­
ment to another. Hence, monetary-fiscal policy not only acts on the 
income problem but ^fects the resoxirce problem as -well. With "premature 
inflation", however, labor resources are -wasted in a double sense. The 
services of labor still remaining unemployed are not available to society. 
With prices and -wages rising, relative changes in the -wage structure are 
commodities isould be good bargains, and vrauld be sub-
stitu-bed where possible for other comniodities. At the 
same time, the upfward drift of -wages and nonreserve 
commodity prices -would boost costs of production for 
reserve commodities, tending to reduce their output. 
Thus a gap Tro-uld open out bet-ween the consumption and 
the output of reserve commodities. This gap could be 
filled tengporarilly by draining the commodity reseinrej 
and the resulting deflationary pressijre might slow the 
-wage-price advance (by the unpleasant method of crea.t-
ing unemplojhaent) • But if the up-ward push -were strong 
enough (and sufficiently immune -to unemployment), the 
only -.vay to keep a commodity reserve system in con­
tinued operation -would be by sxiocessive 'devaluations'... 
20?. 
not easily perceived. Conaequentilor, movoraents of labor Tdthin tho 
eniJloyed sector occvir less frequently. The fear of not being able 
to find another position also inhibits ajiy jnovonent from job to job. 
Controlling vrngos at loss thm full eraploynient is beset v.i.th o 
mxiiber of difficulties. As business conditions improve and i.rofits 
becoae oomevjhat buoyant, labor unions increase their deiaands. 
Moreover, arguments for higher T/ages are Justified in terns of the 
necessity for Increasing purchasing porer £t this tiae. HoirT valid are 
these argunsents? »Yould trade unions be vdlling to alter their wage 
demands if suitable alternatives inere offered? Answers to these 
questions are basic in formulating depression wage policy. 
The great danger of redistributing incone from profits to '.mges, 
as business conditions ii!^)rove, is the danping effect it may have on 
private investment. Furtheraore, and this leads to the second argument, 
increasing -wage rates need not result in increased purchasing porver. 
This is only true if a rise in v/age rates does not lead to uiiemployruent. 
HOTT then are vre to reconcile the possibilitj'' of higher wage rates lead­
ing to unemployment and the need for increased purchasing povrar to raise 
employrjient? Learner has this to sayt 
The answer to this paradox lies of course in the 
distinction between wage rates and TX>rkers' incosjes. 
The former must correspond to the increase in labor 
productivity if prices are to be kept stable. The 
latter must be maintained at a sufficiently high 
level if there is to be an adequate demand for the 
products of industry. Any discrepancy bet^veen the 
two objectives must be met by adjustments in the net 
iiicoEB and spending power of vrorkers without affecting 
their wage rates. This is a matter in which taxation. 
free income and social services can adjust the total rate 
of spending, of -v^ich the expenditure on consumption by 
Tirorkers must be the overwhelming part.l 
Whether the last alternative, offered by Lerner, TO-II be acceptable 
to the trade union leadership, is open to question. Since the ability 
of a trade union leader to obtain a ffage increase at the bargaining 
table is a measure of his usefulness to the meiiibership, it does not 
seem likely that a tax reduction or a government grant of free income 
•vd.ll prove attractive to the leaders. In addition, they may feel that 
a larger increase can be obtained than the government is mlling to offer 
in the form of free income. 
The use of subsidies to firms and industries may, hof.'ever, avoid 
some of the difficulties described above. Obviously, employers receiv­
ing subsidies sufficient to cover their added wage expense, v/ill not be 
inclined to restrain the unions in their tfage demands. let, if the 
government made it quite clear to the employers that the subsidy mjuld 
eventually be removed or that it i^ould gradually be reduced, as f^^ll 
employment tras achieved, the en^aloyers vrould then have to consider the 
level of -wage rates that they ivould be forced to pay tdaen the subsidy 
came to an end. Some resistance on the part of employers should there­
fore be esqjected. 
For the most part, labor policy during depressions is less of a 
problem than the full eiigjloyment case. The possibility of causing a 
reduction in the employment of trade Tinion members 7fill tend to moderate 
^Lemer, A.P., "An Integrated Pull En?)loyment Policy", 0£. cit., p. ?1. 
the -wage claiias of the leadership. The strike vfoapon also loses some of 
its force during depression since shutting doivn the plant or curtailing 
output becomes a very real alterative for the employer. 
Under v^at circumstances would it not be necesseoy for the gcvern-
inent to intervene in TOge negotiations? There is a "sojae of free col­
lective bargaining" TAierejUi the government -.vould maintain a "hands off" 
policy. This, of course, applies to labor policy in the resti-icted 
sense used in this study, ac distinguished from industrial relations 
policy involving the socio-political balance betv/een labor and manage­
ment. As long as unemplojuient remained below four million vrorkers, and 
the price level, as measxired by the cost-of-living index, did not rise 
by more than four percent per six month period it would not be necessaiy 
for the government to intervene.^ If one or the other, or both, should 
occur public labor policy, of the sort previously suggested, would come 
Into play. 
^This folloyrs the "gong and whistle system" advocated by Hart. See: 
Hart, A.G., "The Problem of 'Full Snployment'; Facts, Issues and 
Policies", American Economic RevieTT, (Proceedings) vol. 36, May, 
lS»li6, pp. 259-2^0. 
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BASIC CRITERIA FOR A NBf/ L/vBOR POLICY 
During the past century tub have seen many illustrations of the 
public's interest in labor-management relations. The last two decades, 
however, have vritnossed the emergence of a continuing "industrial 
relations policy" on the part of government, its major emphasis being 
in the area of equating the socio-political balance of po-sver betwen 
the two parties. KOXT that this objective has been substantially 
achieved, it is necessary for the government to have a two-fold policy — 
an "industrial relations policy", designed to maintain this balance, and 
a "labor policy" designed to deal irith the macro-economic problems created 
by two equally poiTerful groups bargaining for wages. 
This policy distinction further implies that it may be necessary 
for t-wo different governmental agencies to deal vdth these problems at 
the appropriate level. The monetary authorities are unquestionably 
qualified to establish our public labor policy Thile the Department of 
Labor should be provided with authority to deal T.dth industrial relations 
problems. 
Although it is not a sijiu>le matter to separate the labor problem 
in the manner suggested above, vie frequently lose sight of the high price 
society may have to pay for industrial peace. The absence of industrial 
conflict is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a progressing 
econony. l^ith government assuming the reiroonsibility of maintaining full 
en?)lo7iaent, it is no longer possible for the public to limit its activities 
to the framework of monetary-fiscal policy. The labor unions and 
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employers, iia concert, can easily upset the bost laid plraiis of vrell 
intentioned government officials. 
The effectiveness of a public labor policy ivill ultimately rest 
on the successful operation of industrial-relationfs policy. A.s long as 
labor and management distrust each other and the government frLnds it 
necessai^' to throw its support first on the side of one party then on 
the side of the other, our labor problems -.Till continue to be settled 
in the political arena* There are some v.'ho believe that democracy's 
major failing lies precisely in this region. As Hansen has clearly 
stated: 
The fact is that vb have not been able to resolve the 
basic problem of the rolo of government in our modem 
•vrorld. Particularly, Tje have not learned how to make 
government an effective, flexible, and responsive in­
strument in a varied and highly ccHi5)lex society.^ 
Under the best of political circumstances, what criteria shall TTB 
use in establisloing a public labor policy? Our first consideration 
obviously, involves the framework within Tihich policy is to operate. 
Since the prevailing political atmosphere Tdll determine the role of 
government, vie shall need to establish a separate frameifTork for each of 
three assmed conditions: (l) Limited Government liitervention; (2) 
Economic Totalitarianism and (3) Relatively Free Collective Bargaining. 
We can predict mth a reasonable amount of accuracy intoat consequences 
Kill follow from a labor policy adapted to these frametrorks, considered 
^Hansen, A.H., "Needed: A Cycle Policy", Ijidustrial and Labor 
Helations Review, vol. 1, October, 19li7, p. 6^* 
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indiYidually iii teziaa of the task of acliieving full Giaploirsant cr.d the 
optinmra allocation of labor reso-urcea. 
Aggi-egate Tfege Incocie And Tlie Task Of Full liiaplojTaent 
Full employment, as an economic goal, rests largely on criteria 
designed to meet the income problem in cur labor markets. Borrowing 
from contributions recently made in the field of agricultural policy^ 
ire can define aore specificalHy the inccme goals of ilmerican labor. 
Three distinct criteria emerge: 
(1) The achievement of 
a certain minimum scale of living for all members of 
society on the basis of. social TOlfare criteria "flhich 
can be gelled out rather specifically in terms of 
health, education, nutrition and housjiiig.^ 
(2) The reduction of differences in the distribution of income 
among irorkers in different labor markets. 
(3) The stabilization of the aggregate level of income going to 
T/rarkers generally, as an end in itself, as vrell as a contributing 
factor in maintaining a high level of consnnption e:!q)enditure consistent 
Td.th maximum pliysical output. 
With reject to the achievement of minimum scales of living, even 
at full en^loyment, there are large numbers of trorkers unable to sell 
their services at wage rates high enough to provide adequate health, 
^Johnson, D.G., og. cit., pp. 6$k-66k» 
^Ibid., p. 6Sk* 
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education^ nutrition and housing.^ Government attempts, in part, to 
deal fdth sijch poverty through the enactment of miniaum wage laws. As 
indicated in an earlier section,2 however, such legislation merely 
establishes the lovrest rage rate permitted xuider the law but does not 
guarantee the vrorker a taarket for his services at that rate» 
For the vast majority of -yrorkers, full employment ivill provide 
adequate incomes. The price (TOge) mechanism is neither an adequate 
nor desirable means of providing income for the disadvantaged segments 
of the labor force. Labor policy therefore should seek to provide direct 
imge subsidies to these groups* In addition to monetary grants, it 
TOuld also appear desirable to offer training facilities and moving 
expenses vrhere individuals receiving low incomes have not had the oppor­
tunity to raise their innate productive capacity or have become immobile 
"due to ignorance, lack of skills, poor health, and insufficient funds 
to make movement possible 
The goal of full employment, hovjever, may only partially fulfill 
the criterion of adequate levels of living if rapidly increasing prices 
are permitted to affect certain segments of the labor force adversely. 
^In 19ltl "vri-th unemployment falling to five million, k9 percent of 
consumer units received incomes of less than ^,^00 per year. 
Among urban consumer units 38 percent received less than this 
annual income vdiile rural nonfarm consxmier units in this categoiy 
constituted 70 percent of total rural nonfarm consumer units. 
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llTni.ted government intervention 
Given a vAUingness on the pert of the American people to accept a 
lainimum amount of government interference Ydth our labor markets, the 
objective of full employment vdth a stable price level can be sub­
stantially achieved. The bare outline of a labor policy designed to 
achieve this goal has already been suggested. V/e must now illustrate 
more concretely the manner in which this policy is to operate. Figure 
16 attempts to show first, the maxinrun amount of unemployraent per­
missible under the program, second, the maxinnim increase in prices to 
be tolerated by the monetary authority and third, the "zone of free 
collective bargaining" under iihich no governmental interference -vsill be 
necessary. Full employment is represented by Gi. Yjith a permissible 
price increase of P1P2 nanetaiy authority "ssould not enter collective 
bargaining negotiations as long as money wage rates did not exceed IV3, 
assuming of course that the level of employment remained xinchanged. It 
is quite possible, however, that the en^iloyment level "srould fall as wage 
rates approached At W2, for example, eqxdlibrium in the labor market 
may be obtained by en^loyment falling to G2. If G1G2 represents the 
minimum amount of tinen^loyment to be tolerated by the monetary authority, 
it may be necessary for government to enter collective bargaining 
negotiations when wage rates have already achieved the level of ¥2# 
The "zone of free collective bargaining" can notr be defined in terms 
of the follpTjing benchmarks: 
(1) Ei!5)loyment at G]_, price rise limited to PiPg ~ ^'>^1 
(2) Eng)loyment at price rise limited to P1P2 - 1?2 
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That is to say, trade viniona may bargain for wages between the limits 
and Wji^ ivithout restraint. At the lower limit, the monetary authority 
could pursue a succcssful policy of full employment and a stable price 
level, Yrtiile, at the upper limit, the economy TOuld esperience a aomewiiat 
higher price le-'/iel, say 8 percent per yea", and unenplojTricnt not exceed­
ing four million TOrkers. 
This deviation f rm the goal of full emplq/ment with stable prices 
i-epresents the sacrifice society is Tiilling to make to maintain relatively 
free collective bargaining. 0bviou33y, the price society is vdlling to 
pay foi' such freedom vdll determine the actual limits used in framing 
policy. 
The proposals offered under limited govezment intervention need not 
conflict with the point of view expressed by the supporters of the 
"restrained bargaining thesis" noted earlier. Should labor and management 
manifest the responsibility, maturity, and statesmanship attributed to 
them, government would not intervene, and hence, the parties T/ould negoti­
ate -vjithin the framerork of "free collective bargaining". We are, in 
effect, defining quite Vigorously the meaning of the tern "labor-cianage-
ment responsibility". Goverment controls are suggested only if that 
responsibility should fail to materialize. 
Economic totalitarianism 
V/e can apply the same analysis to a more extreme case. ShoiLLd society 
refuse to accept any deviation -whatsoever from an employment level equal 
to Gi and a price equal to free collective bargaining (with respect to 
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Tiages) could no longer prevail. In effect it •would mean that the average 
level of noney vage rates would be fixed by government at Any in­
creases in the wages of vrorkers attached to specific finas or industries 
could take place only at the e^ipense of other Trorkers suffering vrage 
reductions. However, in vier.- of the three percent increase in pro­
ductivity -vhlch ire can expect each year, average money wage rates laay 
increase by approximately that amount vdthout causing prices to rise. 
Since commodity prices wuld also need to be regulated to prevent 
entrepreneurs from atteii^)ting to increase profits at the expense of irages, 
the monetary authority could cause a three percent Increase in real "wages 
by forcing prices down by that percentage each year. There are certain 
disajdvantages connected -vdth this alternative, ho-«rever. As Hansen has 
pointed out "wage iJicreases represent tangible and clear evidence of 
progress to the xrage earner. Higher -vrages in the pay envelope are im­
pressive, lower prices are noticed only vaguely if at all."^ There are 
also allocative reasons for preferring wage increases to price reductions, 
•which TO shall discuss later. 
Although the goal of full employment and stable prices is generally 
accepted as desirable, it appears to be inconsistent with at least one 
other frequently supported goal namely, freedraa in the di^osition of 
resources. It is sometimes argued that appropriate use of the tax 
mechanism Tsrould be sufficient to guarantee stable prices at full eji5>loy-
ment, "siithout reqiiiring the use of direct "wage-price controls. This 
^H^sen, A.H., Econoiaic Policy and Full Saployment, op. cit., p. 2l;2. 
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contention is justifiod undor rather restricted as sumptions. Figure 17 
illustrates the conditions of absolutely stable prices at full ouployment 
and Qi) and the corresponding level of national income (Xi). Given 
an increase in non^ rmge rates from Wi to T/gj taxes Trould have to be 
raised sufficiently to reduce the level of national income from to 
if the price level is to be maintained at its original level P-|_, This, 
however, can only be achieved at the expense of full eugjloyaent since 
the number of Tiorkers en^jloyed -Rould fall from to Gg. The only other 
alternative available to the monetary authority is to maintain eaploy-
ment at G^, but by doing so the price level TOuld necessarily rise from 
to p2» 
Obviously, rigid isage and price controls arc required for absolute 
stability. For tax tecliniques to accomplish the sane objective it 
TTOuld be necessary to utilize the plan suggested by Kalecki^ involving 
a redistribution of income from fixed income and profit receivers to 
T/age earners. 
Relatively free collective bargaining 
It should not be inferred from the foregoing discussion that trade 
union Tiage policy is responsible for the econoay's periodic instability. 
Thus far -we have assumed that the determinants of the national income 
are given and hence certain conditions must pirevail in the labor Tnarket 
^See p» 198above. 
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for the system to be in eq-uilibriumA For any given wage rate, v/ith the 
system in equilibrium at full employment, a reduction in the supply of 
money or investment vdll cause the level of employment to fall. Public 
wage policy is therefore no substitute for monetary-fiscal policy, but 
rather attempts to reinforce the price-employment goals of the govern­
ment . 
If relatively free collective bargainiiig provides the political 
frame-work vdthin T.'hich stabilisation policy is to pperate, the best vre 
can hope for is full employment and inflation. But the degree of in­
flation depends on a number of factors. In a dynamic system (as com­
pared to macro-static models used in our discussion), the rate at -which 
prices increase T/ill be governed by the lagged relationships in the 
system. 
Since most collective bargaining agreements are binding for a year 
or more, the wage adjustment lag mil tend to slow doTOi the speed mth 
vjhich prices increase.^ In this context, "industrial relations policy" 
can also make an important contribution to price stability. Since the 
frequency -with v.'hich collective agreements are broken is largely a 
function of the ability of labor and management to settle their differences 
peacefully, a -well conceived "industrial relations policy" can do much to 
prevent wage issues from cropping up before wage contracts have expired. 
^f. Modigliani, F., "Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest 
and Money", Econometrica, vol. 12, January, ipiiit, pp. 1^^-88. 
p 
Koopmans, T., "The Dynamics of Inflation", RevieiT of Economic 
Statistics, vol. Zky 19U2, p. 53* 
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Nevertheless, our major premise still holds — fd-thout a labor policy, 
fluctuations ±a economic activity "will be somewhat greater than they 
TO\ild otherv?ise be. With a linited amount of control, such fluctuations 
can be held Tsithin reasonable limits* Finally, absolute stability can 
only be achieved by ccffl^letely abmidoning oui' existing collective 
bargaining institutions iiith respect to wage determination. 
The Optimum Allocation of Labor liesourcea 
It is possible to utilize labor (and other) resources fully t.ath-
out, of course, maximizing the total product. A full employment program 
may not, therefore, achieve its major objective of providing the lai-gest 
possible output of goods and services desired by society if resources 
are not allocated efficiently. Although the problem applies with equal 
force to all productive agents, we shall limit our discussion to labor 
resources. As a practical matter, hotrever, public policy in this area 
vail prove successful only to the extent that similar policies are pur­
sued vd-th equal vigor in other factor marlcets. 
Fortunately^ there has been a recognition of the resources problem 
by the public and legislation designed to inrorove the allocation of 
labor has been enacted. The establislmient of the U.S. Sngjlojrment Service 
has iiroroved the channels of information with respect to job opportunities. 
The development of free trade schools in many communities has contributed 
to a better utilization of existing labor resources. 
But only a bare start has been made ±a the direction of better 
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reaourco use. The major areas of waste and inefficiency still face 
us — trade union restrictionism, iwmobility of labor, technological 
unecmlojTiient loss of productivity due to illness and strikes. Public 
labor policy, uTith respect to these issues, Tvill also be limited by 
the prevailing political climate and hence our criteria irdll depend 
largely on the alternative political fraroeTrork assumed, Vj'e shall 
employ the sane political categories used in the previous section. 
It is a generally accepted doctrine of economic analysis that 
the price mechanism is superior to any other device as a method of 
allocating resources. Within labor markets, again borroTdng from 
Johnson,^ the resource problem may be classified as foUoirsJ 
1. T/ithin firma 
2. Among firms 
(a) Among firms in different geographical ai^as 
(b) Among firms in the same geographical area 
3. Allocation of resource use in time 
The price mechanism fails to perfoim its allocative function ideally, 
however, for several reasons. Although almost half of oior labor force 
is represented by trade unions, and hence wages are not determined by the 
free forces of the market, -vTorkers not belonging to unions are not emr-
ployed in their most efficient uses. Information concerning labor 
supplies, irage rates, job openings and conditions of employment for spe­
cific firms and industries are not available* 2$any non-unionized sectors 
of ovir labor markets are in^rfect on the buying side, being characterized 
^Johnson, D.G., ot). cit., p. 635» 
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by monopsony, oligopsony or monopsonistic competition. Vihare the labor 
market is perfect on the b^ying side, it may be itnperrect in the conEaodity 
marlcet, thereby resulting in the misallocation of labor resources. For 
all these reasons, labor resources are not allocated in an optimum fashion. 
In addition, of course, goveraiient contributes to the inefficient use of 
labor resources through the passage of minimum vrage legislation, the 
establislment of local building codes and the use of protecti'^/e tariffs. 
The existence of powerful trade unions coi35)licates the formulation 
of a public labor policj'- ?d.th respect to the resource problem. Henry 
Simons has described the problem this tray; 
The establishment and preservation of effective competition 
throughout the labor market is a difficult and forbidding 
task. Given real con5>etition among employers, one might 
Tsiisely advocate application to labor organisations of the 
general prohibitions upon restraint of trade. If trade 
unions coul-d somehoir be prevented from indulging (sic) 
restrictive monopolistic practices, they might become 
invaluable institutions. They might then assume their 
proper role as agencies for making labor articulate 
politically, for preventing arbitrary and oppressive 
treatment of individual "v^orkers, for rendering special 
services to their members, and for promoting cooperation 
vri-th respect to both commodities and the various forms 
of social insiirance. Such policy, hotfever, may seem 
politically fantastic. The community regards unions as 
representing the interests of labor generally, rather 
than as agencies for eDiploitation Tdthin the ranks of 
labor. Even the yreaker groups Tsho largely bear the brunt 
of such exploitation cooperate mth their organized 
brethren and applaud their conquests.! 
Perhaps the most important contribution public policy can make to 
^Simons, H.G., A Positive Program For Laissez Falre, Public Policy 
Paii^hlet Ho. i^,' University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 
193h, pp. 21-22. 
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remedy the misallocation of labor resources is the provision of f^^ll 
employment. Though much ^ vill still remain undone, the availability of 
jobs is an extremely effective force in reducing the esraloitation of 
unorganized labor. Oddly enoiiigh, infoat little empirical evidence there 
is available indicates that certain groups of unorganised -workers have 
improved their relative wge positions to a more significant degree 
than organized workers during the lS^k2-19h9 period. Farm laborers and 
domestic employees are tTjo excellent illustrations. Both groups are 
also characterized by a high degree of mobility. 
In establishing public policy -wdiat criteria shall TTB use to obtain 
the best use of our labor resources? 
The first condition is that the value of the marginal 
product of a factor is equal to the price of the factor. 
The second condition is that the value of the marginal 
product of a factor diould equal the marginal opportunity 
cost of the factor or the factor's marginal value product 
in its highest alternative uses.l 
The first condition obviouslj'- applies to the individual firm's 
resource problem and departures from this ideal grow out of existing 
inqperfections in both product end factor markets. In the factor market, 
inperfections on the buying side lead to exploitation of labor and hence 
to -waste and inefficiency in its utiliaation. On the selling side, the 
trade union may prevent the employer from pm'-chasing as much labor as he 
TTOvild like to hvys and the eijgjloyer may also find that he is not per­
mitted to combino other factors of production -with the labor purchased 
^Johnson, D.G,, o£. cit., p. 635* 
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in the most efi'icient mcnixer. 
Economic totalitarianiam 
Asauniing complete acceptance by sooiuty of the desirability of 
allocating resources most efriciently a political framevork for the 
fulfilment of sucii an objective, •VTliat sort of program can vre sugciest? 
Tie vfould have to assurao that, even under such circimstances, it would 
not be desirable to eliminate tlie institution of trade unionism and, 
secondly, price flexibility may lead to undesirable income effects. 
Hart has suggested the follovdng wage controls for the purpose of 
achieving axi optinium allocation of labor: 
Vfage increases should be obtainable through collective 
bargaining only •when the group of -workers affected can 
show 
(a) that unemployed workers of the qualifications in 
question number less than ten percent of those emplo^'sd, 
in the labor-market area affected; 
(b) that \TOrking hours are not unreasonably sshortj 
(c) that there is no substantial number of -workers in 
other eaKloyaents able to do the Trork in question and 
TJishing to transfer to it at existing -rages j 
(d) that the absence of such trbrkers does not result 
from restrictive practices preventing them from getting 
training and experience j 
(e) that the v/age increase is necessaiy to prevent a 
labor shortage in the occupation and labor-market area 
in question.^ 
In addition, all forms of union restriction, e.g. feather-bedding. 
^Hart, A.G,, "A Program For Maintaining Full Engsloyment Af-fcer The 
^"ar", The Winning Plans in the Pabst Post-ror lijaployaent A-wards, 
19i{l;, p. ^  
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etc«j would be outlawed.^ Entry into specif'ic unions would have to be 
guaranteed to all vforkers meeting the requisite degree of tralrxiiig aid 
skill. Government subsidies, encouraging greater nobility on the part 
of labor, TOuld not only finance the movement of workers from one 
geographic area to another but in addition, training facilities would 
need to be provided for workers desiring to change their occupation or 
to Improve their skills. 
A national health program would also be required, not only as a 
means of reducing the tremendous amount of lost time due to sickness 
and injury, but also as a means of increasing the productivity of the 
human agent over time. 
A tax on excessive profits may also be necessary if such profits 
are being used to bid lap the price of labor in order to attract workers 
away from other industries .2 
V/ith respect to "bottlenecks" in particular labor markets, it has 
also been suggested that the establishment of a highly mobile coips of 
"industrial commandos", capable of performing a great nuniber of jobs, 
would relieve any sudden shortage that may arise .3 
^The Taft-Hartley Law atteii5)ts, in part, to deal with certain forms 
of tinion restriction. Sec. 8 (b) (6), for exau^le, declares that 
any union causing an en^iloyer to pay for services not rendered can 
be charged with an "unfair labor practice". 
2 
''An increase in the rate of investment will tend to bid up the 
prices of resources, once the economy has reached full employment. 
^Graham, F.D., Social Goals and Econcmdc Institutions, op, cit., 
p. 175. 
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Clearly, the degree of control reqiiired to achieve the most efficient 
use of labor i^sources so overbalances the amount of freedom labor -srauld 
have to give up that something less than an opticium allocation vdll need 
to be the goal in a democratic private enterprise system. 
Limited government intervention 
It is worth re-emphasizing the contribution that a ftill employment 
program vdth relatively stable prices can make to the resource problem. 
Since under such conditions the degree of monopoly Trdll tend to fall, 
the proposals suggested under this same heading in the previous section 
7dll do much to facilitate the movement of labor resources to pro­
gressively higher uses. 
With wage rates ini'lexible in the doimward direction, the allocative 
process can only come about as a result of some iTage rates rising more 
rapidly than others. In declining industries, -vsage rates would not 
increase at all. 
Public labor policy guaranteeing free entry into trade unions and 
also providing training facilities for individuals desiring to acquire 
new skills iTOuld aid the allocative process by exerting internal pressures 
on the union. That is to say, unions, required to admit all vrarkers at 
reasonable Initiation fees and dues schedules,^ would find a large portion 
^Sec. 8 (b) (5) of Taft-Hartley does not meet this criterion since 
the N,L.R.B. in considering the reasonableness of the fee is re­
quired to talce into account the "practices and customs of .labor 
organizations in the particular industry, and the israges currently 
paid to the employees affected 
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of their membership unemployed if T,'age rates tfere raised too high. In 
Figure 18, for example, assume the sinple case of ? monopsonist fnced 










Figure 18. Uneiaployment of Union Membership. 
seeking employment at that vfage (and belonging to the union) Trould be 
DC, but the ei!Q)loyer vrould only purchase OB units of labor at that trage. 
BG v/ould therefore represent the number of union members unable to 
obtain engsloyraent at the -vrage established under the collective agreement. 
Obviously, the mion leadership could not remain in porer for aiy length 
of time -srith a large proportion of the membership unemployed. The most 
sensible approach for a tinion leader to follow Tfould therefore be one 
in -vsMch the amount of unemployment TTOuld be at a minimum, i.e. a -wage 
of OF. 
Such a course of action could be guaranteed by imposing limitations 
on the -wage increases a union may obtain until the volume of its 
unemployed membership falls to soice specified level. Asa\iit:e, for 
example, that five percent of the vrorkers in a particular labor market 
are unemployed, but a union, in the aame labor market, has ten percent 
of its membership out of work. The union would be subject to a v/age 
"freeze" until the relative amount of unemployment among its membership 
fell to (say) 8 percent. Some flexibility above the area percentage 
•would be desirable in order to account for peculiarities to I'lhich 
particular Industries may be siibject. Idoreover, unusual cases could 
be handled by placing the burden of proof on the union. It v/ould be 
required to offer convincing evidence that the magnitude of its un­
employed membership isas not related to the union's wage policy. 
Even under limited government intervention, retraining facilities 
and mo\'lng subsidies vrould be required to facilitate greater labor 
mobility, iioreover, a national health program would aid immeasurably in 
reducing the tremendous \mste of labor resoiirces due to sickness and 
accidents. There is a marked inconsistency in the public's attitude 
tOTsard the -waste of human resources due to strikes and the even more 
significant loss of man-hours resulting from illness. If this concern 
is real, both forms of waste must be vievfed in proper perspective. 
Finally, we come to the matter of strikes. Admitting that the 
strike is labor's major -weapon in the settlement of grievances, it is 
also a Treapon luhereby labor may enforce the kind of resource allocation 
it prefers over that preferred by society. An "industrial-relations 
policy^' is best adapted to the solution of non-nrage disputes, w^ith respect 
to vrage questions, the probability of strikes occurring rests largely 
on the gains to be achieved by using the vreapon. If, as suggested above, 
bargaining for higher wages also means bargaining for higher taxes, we 
can expect unions to use some restraint in utilizing the strike -weapon 
as a means of enforcing their demands. As a general principle, hoTOver, 
the outlavring of strikes is consistent only v/ithin a framework of economic 
totalitarianism. 
This is true even for labor resources having the highest prioidty, 
namely, those attached to industries affected Tdth the national health 
and safety. Vfith regard to this latter category of •workers, their imique 
importance in the operation of the economy should be reflected in the 
yrage structure-. That is to say, their remuneration should be commensu­
rate -with the high value society places on their services. Preventing 
strikes in this area can only result in the creation of labor scarcities. 
Since the strike is fi^quently a determinant of •wages or other attri­
butes of a ;3ob, restrictions on its use may also have allocative effects. 
Faced Yd.th the choice of job opportiinities, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Korkers ?/ould prefer employment where exercise of the strike 
•weapon is not excluded. To the extent that labor is not attracted to a 
particular occupation or industry because of such strike limitations, 
this eventually Toll lead to an increase in -wages sufficient to meet 
society's needs for such services. Tliis process is in itself -wasteful 
since the public, by preventing strikes, is in effect refusing to 
recognize that a contradiction exists bet-ween their professed demand for 
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such, services and the resoiirces required to produce them. 'The strike 
therefore performs a valuable function in the sense that it clarifies 
this contradiction. 
Relativeily free collective bargaining 
^7ith iaroerfect factor and product laarkets, relative freedom in 
collective bargaining is achieved at the expense of efficient utilization 
of labor resources. This is not to aay that such ndsallocations ai'e 
perpetuated by these irjperfections. There are forces at -vrork tending to 
break doTOi artificial barriers to labor mobility resulting from distortions 
in the wage structure. Hence, it is over relatively longer periods of 
time that improveiaents in resource use take place. 
As Dunlop has pointed out, eijqianding industries tend to attract new 
vrorkers by offering -wage rate increases in excess of the average increase 
in productivity for industry as a viiiole, Titiile decliniJig indxistries in~ 
crease vjage rates by something less than the average increase in produc­
tivity.^ 
Moreover, the rise in prices in industries in -wliich the 
increase in productivity is less than the averagetends to 
accelerate the relative or absolute contraction of employ­
ment in such industries. The failure of prices to fall in 
industries -vrith greater than average increases in produc­
tivity, as far as they might otherwise, tends to restrict 
the eaqpansion of eE5)loyment from vjhat it •would otheimse 
be. These relatively adverse effects on employment 
constitute the short-run effects of movement toward the 
^Dunlop, J.T., "Productivity and the Yfage Structxire", in Incoaiej 
Engjlo^ent and Public Policy, Norton and Co., ^ew lork, 19it8, 
p. 346. 
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longer run equilibrium position in -which the average 
ivage level is adjusted to an increase in average 
productivity.! 
Under relatively free collective bargaining, society must be content 
v/ith the kind of allocation that the passage of years vdll ultimately 
grind out. Given an abundance of all resowces and the vast output 
potential of the United States, mder conditions of full-eiia>loyment, 
there are some v^ho believe that -we can afford the luxuxy of labor in­
efficiency (relative to the output TO can achieve under optimum, conditions) 
since the alternative may involve a degree of government intervention 
conflicting -vijith our accepted standards of econoinic freedom. The apparent 
exception to this proposition applies to the enomous waste resulting from 
large-scale unemployHent. 
As a matter of policy, ho-wever, there are certain suppleaentaiy 
controls Tjhich may conflict with the ideal allocation of labor resources 
but are roqii±red for otlier reasons. Minirium -prage legislation is an 
appropriate device for preventing exploitation providing all workers are 
covered and society refuses to accept either liniited govemiaent inter­
vention or economic totalitarianism. Inhere moving siibsidies and retrain­
ing facilities are provided, however, the increased mobility of labor 
should be sufficient to prevent exploitation. Moreover, even Tdthout 
increased mobility, income subsidies would be preferable to minintuza isage 
laws since low -wage rates may manifest low productivity rather than 
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exploitation and the establislment o£ awh minima would lead to unongjloiy-
inent* 
Jxirisdictional disputes frequently axis© as a result of inter-union 
rivalries. Because of the hardship vdiich iiinocent eioployers and the 
public are subjected to, legislation attempts to outlaw such conflicts. 
The Taft-IIartley Low,^ for example, bars jurisdictional disputes of the 
"job or trade type" in the sense that the MISB may determine the proper 
jurisdiction if the parties are not able to reach a settlen^nt themselves. 
^Taylor sumuiarizos the sections of Taft-iiartley dealing vath 
jurisdictional disputes. 
CcazqDulsoiy arbitration is but one of the remedies proposed for 
•work-jurisdiction disputes. Under Section 3 (b) h D, it is 
an unfair labor practice for a union to force or to require 
any en^iloyer 'to assign particular -work to eii5)loyees in a 
particular labor organization, or in a particTilar trade, 
craft, or class ...' Action of the board respecting this 
kind of unfair labor practice may be enforced in * situations 
Tshere such relief is appi^opriate' under Section 10 (k) (l). 
This section provides for priority treatment and allocs a 
petition for 'appropriate injunctive relief.pondine the 
final adjudication of the Board ...' Under Section 10 (k), 
the National Labor Kelations Board 'is empoyrered and 
directed to hear and determine the dispute'. lii addition 
xinder Section 303 (b), 'whoever shall be injured in his 
business or property' by a iwork-jurisdiction dispute may 
sue therefor in any district court. 
See: Taylor, G.IV., Goveri^nt Rogxilation of Industrial Relations, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New i'ork, 1943> p* 325"n» 
Undei'" certain circumstances, hoTrever, .•jurisdictional fjispiites have 
desirable allocative effects and hence it is not in the interest of the 
econaisy to lay domi mconditional prohibitions agaiast such contests. 
Moreover, each case must be evaluated on its am merits. The mere fact 
that a union has traditionally regarded a job as falling vdthin its 
"teri'itory" should not provide the union vdth an everlasting claim to 
that job. 
"iVhere inter-union political rivalries are not responsible for 
jurisdictional contests, under iihat conditions Tdll desirable allocative 
effects take place? The principle involved can be illustrated in the 
following manner. Assume (a) tv«o unions, A and B, (b) a single job 
already divided in some fashion bettreen the vrorkers belonging to the 
unions concerned and (c) one of the unions manifests a desire to extend 
its sphere of influence over the "job territory" of the other union. 
Figure 18 de<s^;ribes the foz-egoing diagranamtically. Before the dispute 
arises, the job is divided betTreen tlae unions such that OX workers in 
Union A and 0*X -norkers in Union B sre employed. If novf Union A should 
vdsh to' extend its influence by increasing the number of its members 
enmloyed on the job, at the espense of trorkers belonging to Union B, it 
%vill seek a redivision such that (say) OT of its members iisill be 
engjloyed -while only O'T -prarkers in Union B Tdll -work on the job. That is. 
Union A attempts to increase its share of the job by an amount XY. 
Obviously the question raised by this conflict, of interest to the 
economist, is -vriiether the redivision ccaateEgslated by Union A is superior 
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to the old division in terras of productivity. The results of the re­
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Figure 1?. Jurisdictional Dispute 
H plus R represents the gain in productivity resulting from Union A 
esrberiding its influence by an amount XT laborers. R represents the loss 
of producti^rLty occasioned by the TSfithdraml from the job of XT laborers, 
belonging to Union B. Subtracting the losses from the gains (H + R - R) 
•Re have a net gain of PI resulting fron Union A extending its influence over 
the job. Aay additional encroachment by Union A (beyond point D) hoiuever, 
•will result in a net loss in productivity» The optimum distribution of 
labor between the two unions is at the point -where their respective 
marginal productivities are equal. 
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Even if no strilce of a jurisdictional nature is contemplated by 
either union and the job is divided betvroen the unions in such a aanner 
that a reorganization vrould reaiilt in a superior allocation of labor, 
a strike may actually be desirable. This judgment, however, must be 
based on the anticipated loss in output resulting from the strike as 
coiapared to the gain to be derived from the final reorganization. 
Viith respect to political rivalries, the issues a2:*c not clearcut 
either. 
There may be occasions -Khen the only rray a group of 
xmionists can escape from corrtqjt, or inefficient, 
or unduly conservative, or unduly radical leaders 
is to set up a next union or join an old one, and 
then engage in a jurisdictional dispute -with the 
organization to trhich they formerly belonged.! 
We may sum up by pointing out that the allocstion of labor resources 
deviates from the ideal -when trade unions are permitted to bargain 
collectively v/ithout restraint. But there are union policies ivhicli 
promote increased productive efficiency as well. Demands for iiroroved 
Tforking conditions — better sanitation, ventilation, use of safety 
devices — tend to I'aise output. The union's demands for increased 
security and status for the vrorker in the form of tenure pi'ovisions, 
prohibitions against arbitrary discharge and grievance procedures are 
perhaps even more inroortant in their effects on increased productivity. 
The interest of such unions as the ILG9II in the overall, efficiency of 
^Danloert, C.S., Contemporary Unionism, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Hew 
York, 19hBj p. 176. 
the gamient industry'* and the better utilization of equipment and man­
power in parbiciilar firms causes output per man to increase. The 
productivity of labor i^sources over time is iCLso enhanced by union 
pressxire for a shorter day. Also, v.-here higher v/age demands lead to 
the substitution of machinery for labor, not only are workers relieved 
of tfieir former arduous tasks but they in turn become available to those 
industries in need of laore labor. There seems to be some evidence that 
trade \mion leaders are becoraing increasingly aware of the close relation­
ship between the welfare of the jneiflbership and the efficiency of the 
industry employing the rank and file. Unfor-tunately, however, union-
nsanageaent cooperation in this area has occurred mainly as a result of 
adverse business activity affecting the fim or industry concerned.^ 
It is itapossible to determine the exbent to Tsiiich the previous policies 
of trade luiions contributed to the decline in a fina's business position. 
The introduction of substitute conmodities, changes in tastes and the 
degree of conpetition in the product market are all contributing factors. 
Since tJie resoizrce problem is a coit^jound of the imperfections in all 
factor markets, attempting tcj^ allocate labor resources efficiently pre­
supposes a degree of efficiency in the use of otlier resources -vrhich may 
in fact not exist. Hence, a large part of the question wa are attempting 
% 
to solve Tdll ultimately rest on our ability to reconcile the econozaic 
interests of opposing groigps. This is largely a political problem. 
^Shister, J., "Union-ilanagement Cooperation: An ilnalysis", in 
Insights into Labor Issues, edited by Lester, R.A. and Shister, J., 
The Macniillan Co., New lork, iPhB, pp. 90-91. 
The Political Problem 
Perhaps much of the discussion thus far has been both academic and 
naive since economic policies, no matter how reasonable, affect men and 
organized groups. Moreover, the state as an instrument of national 
policy, is not an objective is5)artial instrument but is subject to the 
control of men and groups. Although the social scientist frequently 
delimits the functioning of the state to that of in^iartial overseer and 
enforcer of the "rules of the game" -- a mirror of reality would represent 
the state, however, as both rule-maker and participant in the game. And 
certainly it is neither iuipartial nor objective. 
We have therefore endeavored to prescribe policy according to miles 
that might conceivably be established for three different "gaunes": 
economic totalitarianism, lianited government intervention, and relatively 
free collective bargaining. There are, of course, an infinite number of 
alternatives lying bet-y/een the benchmarks yte have used. T^ithin the 
categories -m have eu^loyed, honvever, there is the additional separation 
of the income problem from the resource problem. Hence it is also 
possible to combine, for example, lijiiited government intervention vTith 
respect to the first and relatively free collective bargaining with 
reject to the second. It may very -well be that the members of society 
place a much higher premium on freedom in the disposition of resources 
than they regard attempts to cope with unemployed resources generally. 
In any case, there is still the political problem of giving effect 
to any economic program ithich -works to the disadvantage of some particular 
grot^) but benefits the remainder of society. Since departures from the 
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status qxK> ar-o alsfKys harbingers of uncerteiaty for sU i;rci]xpBf and ea-
bai'kijig oa acw pro^ixaaa na^'' brlntr aloag TdUi thm. luiforesoca circuristanccs, 
there is a general reluct^vuce to delegate new po-ffers to the state even 
uiidor the aoat promising coriditioaa. 
Though there is every reason to 'relieve that all interosted psrtiea 
are to be represe-'ited in ceasocratic plimniai.;, thez-e ar-e sbill fears that 
public officials %-iill go beyond the bormtls of authority vested ia thea. 
For3 as ileinhold Mieb'oljr has so vsr/ isell stated: 
All social cQoptiratioii on a larger scale than the aost 
intiKiate social grcra^-. reauirea a sieas\ire of coercion« 
While no state emi rjaintain its mity ptireljr by coercion 
neither can it pi't;serve itself vsithout coercion, shere 
the factor of iwtual coaaetit is strongly developoc, and 
Tshere atandaraised and approxjfjssatell;^'" fair isethods of 
adjudicating and reselviiig coiiflictlag interests mthin 
an organitEcd group have been established, the coercive 
factor in social life ia frequently covert, and becomes 
apparent only ia soiaents of crisis and ixt tJie group' s 
policy toward recalcitraait individuals. Yet it is never 
abisent. divergence of interest, based -a^jon geographic 
«nd f-anctiraaal differences ?d,thin a society, is bound to 
create dli'ferent social pMlosophios and peliticsl 
attitudes ^ silica goodvdll and intelligejic© siay partly, 
but never corajjletely, haraoniss- Ultiaately, unity 
-s^lthin an organiaed socinl group, or Tdthin a federation 
of such groups, is created by the ability of e dosdnent 
groiigj to iE»)ose its xill.^ 
It is t'^ds last point, laade by Hiebulir, irhich leads to the Major 
obstacle to planning ia deiaocrstic societies. By their very nature, 
deaocrscies «re peculiarly mistable political inatituticns. As long 
as the delicate balance of po'ssor is saaintained, they fimction success­
fully. But the balance is coastaatly threatened by a variety of econoalc 
Ij'liebuhr, E», Moral lian and Iiaaoral Sooielar, Charles Scribner' 3 JJons, 
Hew Xork, 1?32, pp.*^ !; . 
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crises. And, unfortunately, attempts to lessen tho iapaot of such crises 
are also jsolitical lanues. 
Coiaplicuting:' tho matter of reoonciXinfj oi^posjiiii'; Interests 3a the 
notion that a reconciliation is inipo3r,i"ble. It is frequently held that 
the issues involved can be settled by eliminating the opposition. 
Mills, for cxanple, states that "the state, in the interests of doaestio 
stability and international secvriiy, increasingly- appropriates the aims 
of the employer and eroroijriateo or abolishes the functions of the unions."^ 
lioreovor, ho claims that vinion leaders are partially responsible for this 
development for, as they continue to seek protection fron the state, they 
slowly hand over their authority to tho state. This, according to liills, 
is exactly the nethod of eliminating the trade unions preferred by the 
more sophisticated employers. Eventually, an es^sloyer dominated bu­
reaucracy -iTill force trade unions to "cooperate" -with business units by 
forcing the leaders to discipline the rani: and file in order to sanctif^r 
labor contracts and achieve stability.2 
In opposition to the point of vievr expressed above, two considerations 
need to be underlined. First, eimloyers as a group, have conflicting 
interests and hence, are fearful of the power of the state. Secondly, 
labor has in recent years displayed political potentialities -which, 
if effectively pursued, could throw the balance of power on the side of 
%ill3, C.r/., The Herr Men Of Power, Harcourt, Brace and Co., Kevr York, 
191s, p. 233. 
^Ibid., pp. 23^238. 
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the trade iiiiions, leading to what Slichter has perhaps premat-urely called 
the "laboristic state". 
Success in dealing Tdth economic problems on the political plane 
Td.ll therefore be achievisd 6h3y when all groups are vdlling to recognize 
that the state can play a disinterested role, if that role T/ere clearly 
defined and agreed to by all interested parties. This in itself Trould 
be quite an achievement and the difficulties involved are not to be 
minimized. In principle at least, it should be possible to establish 
ingiartial rules of economic behavior, administered islthout the use of 
arbitrary poorer. 
Foxmdations of economic discord 
There are two rather broad areas of conflict that contribute to 
industrial turmoil. They grow out of a divergence of interest between 
labor and management and can be conveniently classified in terms of their 
scope. These "conflict horizons" involve micro-economic interests and 
macro-economic interests. To the former use attach the classification of 
industrial differences, used by Pigou, relating to (l) questions of tfage 
determination and (2) "demarcation of function" 
Questions relating to wage determination fall under the folloTdng 
heads: 
(l) Those connected with the reward of labour, generally 
raising an issue as to the money rate of -wage, but 
^Pigou, A.C., The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan and Co., London, 
1929, p. his. 
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sometimes touching such matters as workshops fines or 
the amount of special alloTvanoes, whether in money or 
in kindj 
(2) Those connected Tdth the doing and bearing of the 
emplc^yees, generally involving the question of hours. 
Differences as to demarcation of function include, 
besides the vrell-kaovin, but relatively unin^ortant, 
'demarcation disputes' between kindred trades, all 
quarrels arising out of claims by the workpeople to 
a larger share in the work of management. They 
generally relate to: 
(1) The tray in which rrork is apportioned betT?een 
different classes of irorkmen and machine toolsj or 
(2) The sources from rihich the employer draws his 
vrorkpeople^ or 
(3) The voice allcm'ed to -workpeople in the settle-
raent of working conditions* 
The second of these subdivisions includes all questions 
concerning discrimination against, preference to, or 
exclusive eugjloyment of, trade unionists 
Industrial conflict, ho-ssever, is not restricted to the immediate 
interests of -Korkers and eu^loyers in specific firms and industries. 
There are also differences involving broader issues. They stem from 
the uncertain movements of macro-economic magnitudes and manifest them­
selves in the form of fears> desires, iasecurities and suspicions. 
F\irthermore, these manifestations aie not directed toward individuals 
as such, but rather toward groups or symbols or institutions. Desire for 
status, fear of an impending depression, suspicion of the motives of 
employers are illustrations of the foregoing. In this connection, it 
should also be pointed out that the foundations of economic discord do 
^Ibid., P-. 
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do not simply apply to homogeneous iriasses of labor confronted by homogene­
ous groups of businessmen. Conflicts cut across classesj they may involvB 
spatial differences, competing technologies and predatoiy exploitation of 
the unorganized sectors of the community.! 
The market place obviously attempts to reconcile conflicting interests 
through the operation of the price mechanism. But the desire on the part 
of all groups to l^y-pass the market in order to obtain some advantage 
contributes to further conflict. Hence, the availability of "extra-
market operations",2 that is, techniques which lie outside the frarae-vrork 
of the market, makes the problem of reconciling economic conflict the 
more difficult. 
Walker provides a nutaber of useful categories for the classification 
of these "extra-market operations": 
1. Violence by one economic unit against another 
(a) Violence to person, including physical compulsion 
, or restraint 
(b) Violence to property, forcible dispossession or 
destruction 
2. Specific instructions by one economic unit to another 
(a) Backed by individual po-vrer including threats of 
violence or of damaging business policies, such 
as price-cutting or boycott 
(b) Backed by authority in an organization, including 
the power of the government or its agencies over 
the sTibjects of the state or the povfer of majoriiy 
stockholders over others or the posrer of a bank 
over its debtors. 
' Progress, The Macmillan Company, 
talker, From Economic Theory to Policy, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 19li5j p* iS7» 
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3« Infonnal influence (-wlthuut exLjlicifc instrucbiona or rules) 
of one economic unit over the decisions and behavior of 
another 
(a) Control of psycholotiical conditions in r^hiuh decisions 
are uuxdo, including; the i)arade of povrer witlioiit direct 
threats, pressure for incjediate decisions, appeal to 
sontlnent 
(b) Control of rolsvant information 
h, iistablislincnt (or alteration) of jjencral rules, blinding on 
other econoioic units 
(a) Unforced by vn organization 
(b) ijiforced by social approval or disapproval.^ 
One ioay clai,,; that these tecimiquea are not in tho nature of economic 
operations, but sinpl;/- alternative political means for the attainment of 
certain ciai'ket objectives. But as luiight has Indicated: 
The political and econoiaic structures of society are so 
closely interr&lated that they are ultijaately little 
nore than aspects of the saiae organization. The probleiis 
or issues rrith -which modem society has to deal arise 
predominantly in the field of economic life, ajid par­
ticularly in collection rdth the terms of economic 
association and cooperation.2 
Since the automatic operation of the liiarket no loiiger plains the role 
of conciliator of conflicting interests, the state must assme control 
of these "extra-market operations". The choice of control usy take the 
form, of direct inteanrention or prohibition. I^dwards, for example, pro­
poses the following policy irith respect to labor markets. 
Cou^jetitiVB policy should include enactment of a larr 
distinguishing commercial coc^ietition from labor 
relations. and subjecting unions fuUy to the anti-
Ijbid. 
2Knight, F.H., Freedom and Seform, Harper and Brothers, New York, 
19k7, p. 201;. 
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trust laws in so far as their activities are directed 
toward control of the former 
Alternatively, the state may attempt, by the use of its taxing povser, to 
force the conflicting parties to talce the jprice mechanism into account 
as they pursue their objectives. Insofar as the state is able to dis­
courage the xiso of "extra-markBt operations" by re-introducing price 
considerations into the conflict, it can thereby avoid the use of 
arbitraiy administrative potrer in the settleiaent of disputes. But such 
a program must attack such operations ioipartially and on an equalitaj'ian 
basis if it is to succeed at all. 
The reconciliation of opposing interests 
Although many problems involving a conflict of interest among groups 
are of a political nature, there are some, of an economic nature, that 
are capable of solution by economic means. The field of -welfare economics 
attempts to provide techniques for the reconciliation of such conflicts. 
The policy maker, in passing judgment as to the possible measures to be 
used in the settlement of disputes may, for example, use the follovriLng 
classification: 
(1) measures 7fhich increase somebody's income isithout 
causing a decline in anybody else's (the extreme 
case under this headaiig is that of measures ushich 
increase everybody's inccaae); 
(2) measures -which decrease scaaebody's income v/ithout 
causing an increase in anybody else'sj 
^Edwards, G.D., Maintai.niTig Goiig>etition, UcGra-w flill Book Co., Hew 
York, p. S7» 
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(3) meastires which increase someboc^' s income so much 
that they can afford to compensate fully everybody 
Tirhose income has been reduced by the policy in 
question^ and 
i k )  measures vihich increase somebodi'-' s income, but not 
sufficiently to enable them to compensate fully every­
body -whose income has been thereby reduced.! 
Yfith regard to measures falling mthin clas^^es (l) and (2), obviously, 
no conflict of interest arises. Moreover, policies classified under case 
(l), i.e., maintaining fiill en^ployment, may have secondary effects TThere-
by measures falling under classes (3) or (U) 7dJLl not need to be utilized. 
As indicated previously, hoiiTever, even under full emplojiaent individuals 
engaged in particular occupations and industries may be subject to special 
insecurities and hence, they sjay desire to secure privileges for them­
selves .2 
The compensation principle has recently come under attack and 
consequently cases (3) and (i;) have only limited applicability.3 It is 
therefore necessary to fornnilate other means by ?^ich groups receiving 
special protection at the ezpense of the rest of the community v/ill re­
linquish their positions of advajitage. In principle, the compensation 
doctrine is still valid, if not on economic grounds, certainly in terms 
of sheer political necessity. This does not mean that "full compensation" 
need be given to those inhose incomes have been reduced as a result of 
%alker, EJi., o£. cit., p. 253* 
2see p. 93 above. 
^See: Samuelson, P.A., Foundations of Economic Analysis, liarvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 19Ufc5, pp. i2<l)5-^^3« 
2h9 
some govemiaental ijolicy. 
The comnvmity or the State may attach a certain "marginal social 
significance"^ to the various interest grotips in the econony and hence, 
partial compensation may be provided or in the extreme case, no compen­
sation vrfiatsoever. Moi'eover, the form of coii^jensation need not be 
cash, but instead may involve moving allowances, retraining facilities 
or other incentives i^iich groups aaj'- •vdllingly exchange for tlieir former 
positions of advantage. 
Questions of economic policy today reflect, on the one hand, attempts 
on the part of gro\;q}s to by-pass the inai'lcet and secondly, an increasing 
tendency for price malcing to find its vray into the political arena* It 
is, therefore, not surprising that political problems seem to pervade 
most economic discussions. We have endeavored to suggest T?ays by -which 
conflicts of interest may be reconciled by economic means. There are, 
hoii'rever, legal prohibitions that can also be used. Thunaan Arnold 
suggested the prohibition of five xmion practices rrhich he felt were of 
a monopolistic nature.^ 
(1) Exerting economic pressure on employers in order to prevent 
the introduction of more efficient methods of production. 
(2) Forcing enployers to hire more labor than a job required. 
(3) Racketeering by trade union officials. 
^See Tintner, G., o£. cit., pp. 69-78. 
^Gregory, C.O., Labor And The Latr, W.W, Norton and Co., New York, 
19h6j pp. h2lt~h27s Joints 2,3 and 5 are now covered by the Taft-
Plartley Law. 
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(li) Compelling business establishnents to observe a uniform 
price policy in order to prevent price cutting in the industry. 
(5) Jurisdictional disputes. 
Clearly these prohibitions do not strilce at the heart o£ tlie labor 
problen. They represent rules of behavior to be follorrod by the trade 
unions vdthout attes^pting to deal v.*ith the basic causes of such conduct. 
As Bouldlng 1ms pointed out, "... protectionism generally is the only 
recourse of a single group faced by a general deflixtionary Hovement, 
in the absence of any general political or econoaic solution.It is 
quite likeli'' that, mth reduced uncertainty and "frameivork incentive 
planning" in our factor markets, the desire for monopolistic re-
strictionisn will not be as strong as it now is. 'inhere "prohibitions" 
are required, economic sanctions in the form of special taxes or direct 
•wage controls are more efficient than mere legal coercion. The previous 
discussion of "extra-siarket operations" -srauld seem to bear out this 
contention. 
The democratic solution in theory and practice 
... the real essence of democracy seems to be not a fom 
of government, a sum of institutions, etc., but a certain 
real attitude in life, behavior of a certain Icind, not 
only in state matters but generally in relations betireen 
men. This attitude has SOUE characteristic similarities 
iBoulding, K.E., "In Defense Of Monopoly: Reply", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 6o, August, 19h6, p. 619* 
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to the role of the judge oi- the juror, rather than to the 
fighting of interests. The state is vievred not as a 
governing body, but as the guarantor of justice and reason 
•which has not to create law but to fulfill it, to realize 
it by making the rules.^ 
In establishing rules, hoivever, it may also be necessary for the 
democratic state to intervene in the affairs of groups. There are sone 
vdio ai'-e not Td.lling to play the game according to established rulesj 
there are others who belong to minority are in constant 
danger of having their freedom suppressed by the majority. But the 
state cannot simply linit its intervention to these infractions. It 
has special goals to achieve for its citizenry and they in turn lapose 
limitations on the means by vMch the state may achieve these goals. 
As Barker has stated: 
One of the problems of the democratic State is to adjust 
process to its aim, and to ensure that the free movement 
of general opinion is not inimical to the free action of 
human beings. In the second place, the end or aim of the 
democratic State demands a constant and complicated inter~ 
vent ion, above all in the sphere of economics. The 
liberty of all, shared equallj'' by all, is so far from 
being a natural condition that it inay be described, -iri-th-
out any paradox, as the most artificial of all conditions. 
It is so far from existing vathout intervention that it can 
only be created and maintained by means of intervention. 
To introduce the spirit and method of liberty into the 
system of economics — not for employers only, but also 
for Tforkersj not for employers and vrarkers only, but also 
for others nvho are also concerned — involves an inter­
ference with the natural order Tsiiich is perhaps greater 
than any other object could involve. It is comparatively 
sinmle to intervene in the system of economics mth a 
view to securing the maximum production of national -ssrealth. 
IWertheimer, M., "On The Concept Of Democraqy", in Political and 
Economic Democracy, edited by Ascoli, M. and Lehmann, F., W.V'i, 
Norton and Co., Ke-w Tork, 1937* p. 280. 
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or the BiaxinnEi insurance of national pov/er or national 
independence. It is a more complicated matter to 
inter\'ene in the system iiith tlie object of securiixg 
the majcinma energy of indiridual freedora for all alike, 
v/ithout any respect for j[3ersons.l 
The democracies have now reached their ultimate test. They are 
confronted vidth'the tasic of cai-iyiiig out a program of abuiidance. But 
programs involve pl.-in3 and our le^jal structure as TCU as our insti­
tutions are geared to the doctrine of laissez-faire. Labor policy must 
eventually find its p].ace in a conprchensive, consistent program, of 
abundance involving goveinsiental intervention and restraint. As a 
general proposition; 
The role of la-vv in labor controversies deals with the 
formulation of social and public interests vjhich take 
precedence over rights and interests asserted by given 
persons or groups at given times and places.2 
Our present "industrial relations policy" seeks to obtain peace and 
harmony between labor and man^einent -nith little or no relation to the 
other economic goals tve have concaitted ourselves to. It undoubtedly 
meets one of the criteria for planning in a democratic State, Tsrhich is 
perhaps" the least objectionable, namely, "much of the adjustment of 
economic claims and counter-claims can be achieved, and should be 
achieved, at a stage xdiich is prior to the action of the State ."3 
^Barker, S., Reflections On Governments Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1942, pp. Ib^-l^TJT 
^Teller, L., "Requirements of a National Labor Policy", Annals of 
The American Academy of Political and Social Science, labor 
Relations and The Public, vol; 2it8, November, Ig'iiO, p« 173. 
^Barker, E., o^. clt., p. 255• 
However, vfhon the State liiids it necossiiry to direct economic 
activity or, on occaaicii, to rcabrain or coerce particular £:roupa, 
there is an implicit threat that its influence may go beyond bJie bounds 
of safety. Yet the effects of mreabrained activity on the part of 
organised {groups — business, labor and agriculture ~ poae an equally 
serious threat to democratic institutions, . ith aiiother ceprcasion or 
serious ii^flation as the price of ncn-intervention, '.fe icai'- fi jd the 
State forced to undertake a decree of control far in excess of fiat re­
quired to stabilize the econonx/ at full-e!ni;loiTiient. The excesses of 
Statism are fundamentally correlated with the urgency and pressure of 
the time. Barker states the argtuaent in the foUoiring terrus: 
The idea of the standing eajergency is a recurrent 
idea in politics. It is the standing temptation 
both of governments and of ardent reformers. It 
encourages govemaients to substitute the method of 
dictation for the process of deliberation. In 
emergency, action must cone first, and deliberation, 
if it comes at all, jaust follow on the heels of 
action. 3inilar3y it encourages the ardent reformer 
to substitute the method of revolution for the process 
of persuasion.^ 
Our ability to develop the requisite dej^ree of skill in formulating 
democratically conceived cir.d actdjriister^d controls "rdjLl ultinir.toly 
determine the fate of free societies. Given the econonsic goals, the 
econonist can point up the alternative means; it remains for the 
political scientist to find a satisfactory solution on the political 
plane • 
^Ibid., p. 196. 
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QEIJERAL CONCLUSIONS 
V/ith relative equality of bargaining power betvreen labor and 
management established, public policy must now concern itself 
Tvith the economic consequences of Trage-price determination on 
the part of trade unions and business firms. 
Industrial relations policies are appropriate as a means of 
settling industrial conflict. More important, however, are the 
independent actions of trade unions and business firms Tdiich 
do not give rise to conflict but man1 feat their effects on the 
level of employment and the allocation of resources. 
The absence of public policy in this regard has compelled trade 
unions and business firms to deal with their OTOI special problems 
through the "process of adaptation". 
The "process of ad^tation" takes a number of forms designed to 
meet the follo"sdng variety of circumstances: 
a. Insecurity and uncertainty growing out of technological change* 
b. Desire to maintain a particular job for the purpose of avoiding 
the problem of relocating in a new coinmunity, firm or industry. 
c. Desire to increase income, status and prestige by means of 
restriction or the use of "non-economic codes of conduct". 
d. Fear of suffering a reduction in incone due to cyclical 
fluctuations in business activity and employment. 
The cumulative effects of the "process of adaptation" as -well as 
the rapid rate of economic progress are responsible fco* secular 
2^5. 
misallocations of labor. 
6. Labor markets exliibit secular maladjustnients Tfith respect to 
supply in tems of regional variations in population growth and 
the disparity betTreen actual increases in population and the rates 
of jj?,crease required for the maintenance of econocic progress. 
7. Secular maladjustments also appear on the side of demand and are 
largely a function of technological change and alterations in 
consumer's preferences. 
8. V/ith the development of new techniques^ labor orientation becomes 
less of a factor in the determination of industrial location. 
Because of increased locational flexibility, secular labor policy 
must direct its attention toward narrcfwing the discrepancies 
betvireen the regional demand and supply of labor resources by 
increasing the mobility of all factors of production. 
9. The "process of adaptation" as •vrell as secular labor market 
maladjoistments can be overcome by remedying the periodic fluctu­
ations in income and employment . 
10. Recognition of "full emplojinent" as a continuing policy of the 
national government has already been established* Unless an 
integrated public labor policy is also undertaken no real solution 
for the problems already enumerated will be achieved. Moreover, 
serious difficulties, involving continuing inflation, -vfill arise 
should labor policy be divorced from the goal of "full employment". 
256. 
11. P-ublic labor policy must concern itself with tm separate problems: 
(a) the income problem, and (b) the resource problem. The political 
climate, hoTrever, vdll detennine the means appropriate for each 
of these. 
12. Integrating public labor policy i.-rith the goal of full employment, 
such that the optinium allocation of labor resoixrcea and stable 
prices are achieved, can only be accomplished under "economic 
totalitarianism"» 
13. Under "relatively free collective bargaining" a "full employment" 
program ngill not mitigate the resource problem and continuing 
inflation inill prevail. 
llj.. ft'ith "limited government intervention" arbitraiy limits must be 
established Tdth respect to permissible unemployment and price 
fluctuations. Such flexibility, hOTrever, reflects the price society 
must pay for maintaining some degree of freedom in the disiiosition 
of resources. 
1^. Although it may be useful, analytically, to assvime the existence 
of separate political categories, in reality combinations of the 
political frameworks, mentioned above, may prevail. The accepta­
bility of specific proposals in each category may be modified 
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3Iathematical llodel of A liacro-atatic Economic System 
Ma.jor Relationships 
Liquidity function - equilibriUEi condition 
S(Y)» I (l,r) Savings - Investment f\inction - equilibrixun condition 
X S5 PX Definition of Income 
X = X (N) Production Function 
V/o » PX(N) Definition of Money Wages 
N -F (J) Demand for Labor 
V • ^  Real TfYages 
Y/here: 
MS = Supply of money (autonomous) 
M<i a Demand for cash balances 
V = National income in money terms. 
I " Investment 
r = Rate of interest 
S = Savings 
X « Physical output 
P = Price Level 
K " Number of n'orkers 
Wo a Money yrage rate (autonomous) 
V « Real Tjage rate 
